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INTRODUCTION
In appellate adjudication, decisions are rendered by a multi-
member court as a collective entity, not by individual judges. Yet
legal scholars have only just begun to explore the formal and infor-
mal processes by which individual votes are transformed into a col-
lective judgment.' In particular, they have paid insufficient
attention to the ways in which the vote of each individual judge is
influenced by the views of her colleagues on a multimember court.
In recent years, a growing number of political scientists explor-
ing judicial behavior have modelled this aspect of adjudication.
Building on Walter Murphy's pathbreaking work thirty-five years
ago,2 these scholars view judges as rationally seeking, within their
1. Max Steams calls this the study of "constitutional process." MAXWELL L. STEARNs,
CONSTITUIrONAL PROCEss: A SOCIAL CHOICE AN4ALYSIS OF SuPREti COURT DECISION
MAYING 19 (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript on file with author). Some scholars have ad-
dressed the question of whether, in a case raising two or more discrete legal issues, individual
judges' votes ought to be aggregated into a collective judgment through an "issue-by-issue"
or "outcome-by-outcome" headcount. Under certain scenarios, the method of aggregation
will determine who prevails. See, e.g., Colloquium, Appellate Court Voting Rules, 49 VamN.
L. REv. 993 (1996) (containing several articles discussing issue); Lewis A. Kornhauser &
Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L.
REv. 1, 10-17 (1993) (discussing issue and citing other scholarship). Some scholars have con-
sidered the applicability of Arrow's theorem to multimember courts, evaluating the extent
and significance of potential voting "cycles" over time. See, e.g., Frank E. Easterbrook, Ways
of Criticizing the Court 95 HARv. L. REv. 802 (1982); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided
Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE LJ. 1219 (1994). Some scholars have considered the
problems associated with judicial decisions in which no single majority opinion supports the
disposition of the case. See, eg., John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples:
Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J 59.
2. See WALTER MURPHY, ELEMETs OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964) (describing a wide
range of behaviors available to a Supreme Court Justice seeking to maximize his influence on
public policy).
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institutional environment, to achieve certain goals. Most presume
or purport to demonstrate that judges are guided by personal policy
preferences; 3 some lawyer-economists and others posit different
goals motivating judicial behavior.4 Whatever the presumed objec-
tive, however, some theorists have recognized that judges "are stra-
tegic actors who realize that their ability to achieve their goals
depends on a consideration of the preferences of others, of the
choices they expect others to make, and of the institutional context
in which they act."'5 In certain contexts a rational judge will deviate
from her personal sincere views about the law in order to secure the
most desirable collective decision possible, given the views held by
the other relevant participants (judges or other governmental ac-
tors) who share input into that final collective decision.6
This political science scholarship is either empirical or predic-
tive, identifying when strategic behavior does or is likely to occur.
It tells us nothing about how judges ought to operate. This norma-
tive question is my focus here: Under what circumstances, and for
what ends, may a judge appropriately engage in strategic behavior
as a member of a multimember court?
Not infrequently, there will be opportunities for an individual judge
to make her court's disposition of a case more compatible with her
convictions overall by misstating her convictions as to particulars.
The details may vary, but the abstract structure of these situations is
simple. A judge will discover that by supporting an outcome or ra-
tionale with which she disagrees, she can prevent her court's adoption
of some other outcome or rationale that she thinks worse either for
justice in the case before her or for the state of the law, in general.7
3. According to the basic "attitudinal model," the United States Supreme "Court's deci-
sions are based on the facts of a case in light of the ideological attitudes and values of the
participating justices; in other words, on the basis of the individual justice's personal policy
preferences." Harold J. Spaeth, The Attitudinal Model, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 296,296
(Lee Epstein ed., 1995); see also Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism:
A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 251, 265-311 (1997)
(sketching and examining the attitudinal model).
4. These goals include such things as influence, immediate and historical reputation, and
leisure. See, e.g., RicHARD A. POsNmR, OVERCOMMG LAW 117-23 (1995) (discussing the "ju-
dicial utility function"); Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Lim-
itations of Public Choice Theory, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 827, 832-44.
5. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHoicEs JusncEs MAKE at xiil (1998).
6. Recent scholarship has focused on three aspects of a judge's institutional environment.
Every judge is situated in relation to other judges in a temporal sense, because she is part of
an ongoing enterprise in which both predecessor and successor judges contribute to the
corpus of the law. Second, judges of lower courts are situated in relation to higher courts
with the power of reversal. Third, each judge and her court are situated in relation to nonju-
dicial actors, including other governmental entities and the general public.
7. Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 1, at 55.
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When such opportunities arise, must a judge be exclusively input-
focused, always voting for rules that reflect her best personal judg-
ment as to how a legal issue ought to be addressed without consid-
ering how her input will affect the Court's collective output? Or
may the judge be output-focused, voting to secure what she deems
the best possible collective resolution of the case, even if to do so
she must strategically suppress or misrepresent her sincere personal
views?
Prevailing consensus appears to endorse some middle position.
Certain forms of strategic behavior, such as insincere voting to
forge a majority or unanimous coalition, are routinely practiced and
viewed as permissible, perhaps even obligatory to some unspecified
degree.8 Other forms, such as misrepresenting one's position in a
case in order to better advance her preferred outcome in that very
case, are either ignored or viewed with vague suspicion.9 Still other
forms of strategic behavior, such as stark vote trading across unre-
lated cases, are roundly condemned.10
This article explores the intuitive normative differentiation
between various forms and contexts of strategic voting. Judicial
vote trading is repudiated: but why? Because it has pernicious ef-
fects? Because it employs impermissible means of decisionmaking?
8. See, e.g., Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 1, at 52 ("[I]n deference to their colleagues,
appellate judges are expected to compromise or deflect their views to some extent."). The
norms governing this practice are rarely explored. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme
Court, 1996 Term - Foreword. Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARv. L. REv. 54, 59-60
(1997) ("In the literature on constitutional theory.... [t]he practical and institutional pres-
sures that require compromise to achieve workable doctrine receive scant attention.").
9. Some scholars have offered somewhat tentative and conclusory positions. See, e.g.,
Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DuKE L.J. 511, 511-12 (1998) ("Judicial strategy is
not much considered by legal scholars.... [Jludges are typically considered to be above such
devices."); Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 1, at'8 n.12, 53 (observing that the "simple line
between strategic and sincere behavior seems inapt to multi-judge courts," and suggesting
that "[pl]erhaps a judge need only strive for the best that she thinks achievable on the given
court" - but only within limits, for "she is not entitled to misrepresent her views or redirect
her voting outcome in order to better advance her own candidates for rationale and
outcome").
10. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 4, at 126 ("vote trading by judges is condemned");
STEARNs, supra note 1, at 152 (Justices are "expected not to trade votes or base their deci-
sions on strategic considerations, as opposed to merits determinations"); id. at 196 (almost all
forms of strategic voting represent "an indefensible method of determining" legal doctrines
and outcomes); Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, LAw &
CoNrrEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 65, 84 ("[Olpen vote trading may violate norms of appro-
priate behavior on the Court."); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More
Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 106 (1991) ("[U]nder prevailing ethical norms
judges cannot engage in the sort of logrolling that legislators commonly employ."). But see
Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into Fundamental
Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEo. L.i. 1787,1826 n.164 (1992) (suggesting that judi-
cial logrolling might improve "the stability of appellate voting and its accuracy in measuring
group preferences").
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Because it strives for impermissible goals? And once we identify
the salient conceptualization(s) of adjudication that make this prac-
tice improper, what implications do those conceptualizations have
for other forms of strategic voting, or even more conventional adju-
dicatory practices? At bottom, what are and should be the funda-
mental "rules of the game"u governing collegial adjudication?
I approach this inquiry by identifying and exploring various con-
ceptions of the adjudicatory process that can plausibly justify a
norm prohibiting vote trading. My goal is neither to challenge the
conventional wisdom that vote trading is improper, nor to defend it
(although I agree with it) from a singular perspective; I shall let the
reader draw her own conclusions on this score. My goal is to de-
velop and explore analytical foundations for our currently vague
intuitions regarding vote trading; more generally to edify our views
concerning less controversial strategic adjudicatory practices; and
most generally to provoke deeper thought about the nature and
goals of collegial rather than solo-judge decisionmaking. Indeed,
the ensuing discussion will expose just how much our understanding
of multimember adjudication remains underdeveloped and the gov-
erning principles remain ambiguous.12 It will also highlight the im-
plications of embracing various adjudicatory conceptions. Some
arguments against vote trading also challenge other conventionally
condoned or ignored judicial practices, and thus deeper considera-
tion of vote trading may force us to rethink our current intuitions
underlying other aspects of judicial decisionmaking. To the extent
that judicial behavior is shaped by internalized professional role-
commitments, clarification of the proper norms governing multi-
member adjudication might actually influence the process by which
judges transform their atomistic judgments into collective
determinations. 13
11. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 126-34 (characterizing judging as a game played by rules,
with these rules acting as normative constraints on the types of materials and modes of rea-
soning judges may employ in rendering decisions).
12. I find it extremely significant that, in my many conversations with colleagues, their
intuitions supporting an antitrading norm have reflected wildly divergent premises. With
respect to each objection I identify and explore, some number of scholars thinks it captures
the central conceptual difficulty with vote trading, while others think it quite wrongheaded or
trivial.
13. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 4, at 132-34 (explaining why judges desire to "play
within the rules" and thus will internalize and operate within perceived normative constraints
on their discretion); Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective
Decision-Making, 75 B.U. L. REv. 941, 995 (1995) ("Professional norms narrow the ambit of
judicial discretion."); Cross, supra note 9, at 539-40 (discussing judicial "role orientation" and
its influence on decisionmaking processes). Adjudicatory norms might also be enforced
through informal sanctions imposed both by fellow judges, see Mitu Gulati & C.M.A.
McCauliff, On Not Making Law, LAW & CoNrMPN. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 157, 166-70
August 1999] 2301
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Before proceeding, some initial definitions and caveats are ap-
propriate. First, the adjective "strategic" might seem ambiguous
because different scholars use it for different purposes, and mislead-
ing because it sounds pejorative even though it is not intended as
such. Throughout this article I shall use the term "sincere voting"
to refer to the vote that represents an individual judge's top-ranked
or ideal judgment as to what constitutes the best response to re-
solve a discrete legal controversy, without considering the impact of
his vote on the substantive collective result in his court or in other
institutions. In other words, a judge votes sincerely if he supports
the position that he honestly thinks should win and that he would
endorse were he alone on the court. I shall use the term "strategic
voting" to refer to a judge's decision to vote for a position that does
not truly reflect his "sincere" judgment in order to secure the best
feasible outcome given the influence of his colleagues in the deci-
sionmaking process. To keep this specific focus on collegial inter-
play in mind, one might mentally substitute the phrase "peer-
strategic" for "strategic" as I employ it here.
Second, to make this inquiry more manageable, I confine my
focus to strategic behavior by Justices on the Supreme Court of the
United States.14 I also focus solely on the Court's merits determi-
nations, even though the Justices confront opportunities for strate-
gic behavior with respect to other important decisions as well.15
My inquiry proceeds as follows. Part I sketches the decision-
making process of a Justice deciding cases by herself, and then uses
this model of "solo adjudication" as a backdrop against which to
introduce an input-focused and output-focused model of multi-
member adjudication. Part II details the opportunities and incen-
tives for strategic voting on multimember courts, both with respect
to the form of judicial opinions and their substantive content. Sec-
tion III.A considers the extent to which norms governing solo adju-
(explaining why internal social-sanctioning mechanisms are likely to be effective on multi-
member courts), and by the public more generally (through esteem-reducing criticism), see
id. at 206 ("Norms are inherently flexible, and information can alter them. This is especially
true in the case of small, closely knit groups - such as federal appellate judges - who care
greatly about their reputation and the esteem in which others hold them.").
14. Judges on every multimember court will confront a myriad of opportunities and
incentives for engaging in strategic voting, but the propriety of their doing so may turn on
nuances concerning their particular court's location and role within a differentiated and hier-
archical judicial regime. For example, many view the Supreme Court as playing a smaller (or
nonexistent) role in the just resolution of individual cases, and a greater role in future-
oriented lawmaking, than do inferior courts. This distinction might affect the analysis in vari-
ous ways.
15. See, e.g., EPsm N & KNiGHT, supra note 5, at 58-65 (discussing strategic bargaining
opportunities arising in the consideration of petitions for writ of certiorari).
2302 [Vol. 97:2297
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dication constrain Justices on collegial courts from engaging in vote
trading and other types of strategic voting, and sections III.B
through DI.D consider whether this behavior is inconsistent with
various conceptions of the teleology of multimembership in appel-
late adjudication.
When deeply probed, the intuitive line between acceptable and
unacceptable strategic behavior grows more fuzzy, and its analytical
grounding more elusive and complex. Perhaps in the end the pro-
priety of strategic voting rests on one's choice of "first principles"
of adjudication in general, and multimember adjudication in partic-
ular - principles that are not easily defended in analytical terms.
Let me emphasize from the outset that I promise no definitive an-
swers to some of the most important questions I ask about the aims
of the multimember adjudicative enterprise. Exploration and illu-
mination, more than conclusive resolution, are this article's
objectives.
I. SINCERE DECISIONMAKING IN SOLO AND
COLLEGIAL ADJUDICATION
At the outset, let me identify this project's central premise con-
cerning judicial motivation: subject to resource constraints, judges
endeavor to discern and render their best judgment as to the proper
resolution of cases according to their best conception of the law.
By-thig assumption I intend to distinguish my analytical approach
from that employed by much recent literature concerning judicial
behavior, which posits that judges employ instrumental rationality
to advance one or more personal agendas (such as a desire to imbue
the substantive content of the law with their personal policy prefer-
ences, to enhance their professional reputation and personal pres-
tige, and to enhance leisure).16 Whatever the extent to which such
objectives actually influence judicial behavior, I embrace the con-
ventional view that a normative account of adjudication should view
judges as rendering judgments rather than expressing personal pref-
erences about the law.17 For my purposes here I need not privilege
any one of the various jurisprudential theories that have been de-
veloped to explain how Justices properly determine law's meaning
16. See supra note 4.
17. While no doubt judges frequently issue opinions consistent with their own policy pref-
erences, under most if not all plausible jurisprudential theories judges are not empowered to
issue opinions simply because of consistency with these personal preferences. Judges are sup-
posed to vote based on their judgment about the law even if that judgment flatly conflicts
with their policy preferences. 'This does not exclude the possibility, of course, that sometimes
legal determinations properly consider issues of policy.
2303August 1999]
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and best implement that meaning through doctrine. Nor need I as-
sume that each legal question has a uniquely and objectively "cor-
rect" answer.18 Rather, I simply assume here that each judge
employs one of the available judgment-based "respectable jurispru-
dential paradigms" en route to answering legal questions to the best
of her ability.
A. Solo Judgment Formation
Before considering the propriety of strategic behavior on multi-
member courts, we must first take a brief detour and consider the
ways in which even judges sitting alone may take into account-
either decisions by other judges in other cases, or the views of non-
judicial actors about the same case. This initial focus on solo adju-
dication is sensible both because the norms governing such
decisionmaking can inform the norms governing collegial decision-
making,19 and because even judges on multimember courts gener-
ally determine their own views (at least tentatively) before
considering the relevance of the views of their peers.
1. Relational Judgment Criteria and Interconnecting Cases
Assume that Justice Solo is the lone Justice on the Supreme
Court. Each case before her Court contains one or more basic legal
issues on whose resolution the proper case disposition depends.20
For each issue, Justice Solo evaluates various legal rules that could
resolve the issue and then embraces the rule that in her judgment is
the best of the alternatives.2'
18. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE
LJ. 82, 85-86 (1986).
At the core of the distinction between expressing a preference and rendering a judgment
lies the proposition that some questions have "right" or "correct" answers. In this con-
text, a "right" or "correct" answer need not be objectively true or depend upon some
ultimate view of the real world; it may depend only upon intersubjective agreement over
criteria for resolving disputes.
Id.; see also Frederick Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Reasons, 85 MICH. L. REv. 847, 855 n.26
(1987) ("[T]he idea of a right answer can survive the nonexistence of any way of noncon-
troversiay proving that one answer is better than all others.").
19. See infra section I.A.
20. I put aside factfinding because neither the Supreme Court nor most other multimem-
ber courts have significant factfinding responsibility. One exception is three-judge federal
district courts. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights
Litigation, 30 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 79, 93 (1996).
21. Of course, "[i]n some hard cases ... a judge's view about the outcome of the case may
be considerably more clear and more deeply held than her understanding of how an evolving
doctrine should be shaped to support not just that outcome, but the correct outcome in fu-
ture cases as well." Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 1, at 56. This strong intuition about
outcome might influence her ranking of potential justificatory legal rules. But her choice of
doctrinal rule remains constrained, in the sense that she will not embrace a justification for
2304 [Vol. 97:2297
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Justice Solo's respectable jurisprudential paradigm yields a set
of interpretation and implementation criteria with which she can
evaluate and rank the possible legal rules.22 For example, her juris-
prudential paradigm generates interpretive criteria by which to de-
termine the Constitution's meaning, perhaps including the plain
meaning of the text, Framers' intent, constitutional structure,
historical developments, social or technological circumstances, pre-
vailing societal consensus, and a balancing of societal interests.23
Justice Solo must also "implement" the Constitution's abstract
meaning through specific types of doctrine, such as effects tests,
purpose tests, or multifactor balancing tests.24 Her jurisprudential
paradigm guides her choice among these doctrinal types25 and
counsels the breadth or depth of the doctrines articulated.26 In a
given case (the "Instant Case"), the Justice draws upon these "in-
trinsic judgment criteria" to rank the alternative legal rules that ad-
dress the legal issues at stake.
her intuitively favored outcome that "won't write." If necessary, she will generally abandon
her preferred disposition in favor of an alternative dictated by a rule that "will write." See
Cross, supra note 3, at 270 (discussing concept and providing examples).
22. Legal issues and rules are difficult to define precisely, although in practice their
meaning is fairly clear. A legal issue "refers to some distinct or separable aspects of the case
that can be decided in isolation from the case itself, that in part resolve the case, and that
recur in 'similar' cases." Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts II: Legal Doctrine,
8 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 441, 446 (1992) [hereinafter Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts 11].
By legal rule, I simply mean a "doctrinal rule" as commonly understood by legal practition-
ers, a rule that governs the outcome of a specified issue in many related cases. Thus an
articulation in a legal precedent qualifies as a legal or doctrinal rule if it establishes a prece-
dent for deciding future cases. While some scholars have attributed precedential significance
to various aspects of a judicial decision, see, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial
Courts I: Path-Dependence, 12 I-u.. REv. L. & ECON. 169, 173-80 (1992) (arguing courts do
and should embrace result-bound over rule-bound adjudication), the Supreme Court oper-
ates on the assumption that its articulated rules, rather than merely its holdings, qualify as
precedent, see, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996); Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CIm. L. REv. 1175, 1177 (1989). I do not
intend to discuss strategic joinder of "dicta" that lacks precedential significance.
23. See, e.g., Psmnu BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 1-119 (1982); JoHN HART ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DmsTRusr (1980); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory
of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1194-1209 (1987).
24. For a more complete list of potential doctrinal forms, see Fallon, supra note 8, at 67-
75; Charles Fried, Types, 14 CONST. CoMm. 55 (1997) (dividing doctrines into effects, intents,
and acts tests).
25. Witness the ongoing debate concerning the relative advantages of bright-line rules
versus multivariate standards. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 8, at 79-81; Scalia, supra note 22;
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term - Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards 106 HARV. L. Rav. 22, 56-69 (1992).
26. For example, principles of judicial restraint such as those canvassed in Ashwander
constitute implementation criteria favoring selection of a narrower over a broader rule when
both resolve the issue presented. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring). See generally CASS R. SUNsTEINm, ONE CASE AT A TnM (1999) (defending
procedural and substantive "minimalism" in judicial decisionmaking).
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Sometimes, however, Justice Solo's jurisprudential paradigm
will dictate that a proposed legal rule is either favored or disfavored
because of its interactive effects with another discrete legal rule not
directly at issue in the Instant Case. Drawing an analogy to the
concept of nonseparable preferences in the economics literature,
we might say that a Justice has nonseparable judgments across the
two legal rules, because her judgment as to the relative merit of one
rule turns on the existence of the other.27 Such "relational judg-
ment criteria" necessarily lead a Justice to look beyond the Instant
Case to other germane issues raised in an Other Case.
The most commonly invoked relational judgment criterion is a
specific form of consistency - the maintenance of a stable rule
over time. This principle, captured in the doctrine of stare decisis,
secures structural values such as predictability, stability, efficiency,
and judicial legitimacy.28 The mere fact that in a Prior Case the
Court announced Rule A+ to address Issue A is itself a powerful
(though not necessarily a sufficient) reason for a Justice to affirm
rather than reject or modify Rule A+ in the Instant Case, even if
the Justice views Rule A+ as suboptimal as measured by her intrin-
sic judgment criteria.29 This principle can operate in a forward- as
well as backward-looking manner.30
27. See, e.g., Jean-Pierre Benoit & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Assembly-Based Preferences,
Candidate-Based Procedures, and the Voting Rights Act, 68 S. CA.i L. Rnv. 1503, 1512-17(1995) (defining and illustrating separable and nonseparable preferences in the context of
electing candidates to a political assembly).
In other words, the choice between rules A+ and A- to address Issue A in the Instant
Case depends on the choice between rules B+ and B- to address Issue B in a separate case,
and vice versa.
28. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 595-602 (1987).
29. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Stare Decisis, in 3 THE NEW PALoRAvE DICrIONARY
OF ECONOMICS AND LAW 509, 511 (1998); Schauer, supra note 18, at 849.
30. If a consistency norm dictates that Justice Solo and her successor Justices must treat
what she does today as presumptively binding, then she must decide not only what is best for
now, but also take into account how the current decision will affect the determination of
future cases that will be guided by today's precedent. Justice Solo might well decide a case
today in a manner that appears suboptimal with respect to her intrinsic judgment criteria, but
that will likely generate the best possible extended rule over the series of future cases. See
Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior
Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1994); Schauer, supra note 28, at 589.
A similar forward-looking phenomenon characterizes all rule-based decisionmaking (as
compared to case-by-case balancing tests). Justice Scalia, for example, might believe that the
balance of applicable factors favors the plaintiff in a particular case. But Justice Scalia pre-
fers bright-line rules to balancing tests. See Scalia, supra note 22, at 1175. He would there-
fore devise a bright-line rule that is optimal in the sense that, over the projected series of
cases covered by the rule, it will lead to the proper outcome in as many cases as possible -
even if the plaintiff now loses in the Instant Case. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY
= RunES 135 (1991) ("[A]ccepting a regime of rules necessitates tolerating some number
of wrong results - results other than those that would have been reached by the direct and
correct application of the substantive justifications undergirding the rule.").
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A respectable jurisprudential paradigm may identify other rela-
tional criteria besides rule-consistency. Two discrete legal doctrines
might serve as complements to one another, just as red wine com-
plements red meat and white wine complements fish. One example
concerns right-remedy definition. A Justice who views constitu-
tional law as involving a balancing of societal interests may decide
that giving a right a relatively broad scope is appropriate if and only
if the remedy is relatively weak, and vice versa. Perhaps she would
try to balance the scope of Fourth Amendment rights and the exclu-
sionary rule to prevent "too many" criminals from going free due to
a constable's blunder.31 Other examples of complementarity
abound.32 Like the consistency norm, complementarity can exert a
forward-looking as well as a backward-looking influence.33
31. On one hand, courts have narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule by recognizing
various exceptions. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (limited "good faith"
exception); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (impeachment exception). On the
other hand, where the remedy of exclusion clearly applies, some suggest that "[j]udges do not
like excluding bloody knives, so they distort doctrine, claiming the Fourth Amendment was
not really violated." Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L.
Rav. 757, 799 (1994).
32. For instance, a judge may favor regulation in a particular context if and only if
another area is left effectively unregulated. See, e.g., Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the
Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MicH.
L. REv. 1, 26-37, 36 (1976) (arguing that the Court should uphold regulations designed to
ensure access to the media, such as the "fairness doctrine," only when imposed on either the
broadcast or print media but not on both, in order to balance "two distinct constitutional
values").
For various examples drawn from federalism doctrine, see Evan H. Caminker, Context
and Complementarity Within Federalism Doctrine, 22 HAav. J.L. & PuB. POLY. 161 (1998).
For an example concerning separation of powers doctrine, see Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes,
Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the
Second Best 80 CoRNELL L. Rnv. 1, 23-40 (1994) (arguing that the Court should have upheld
rather than invalidated the one-House legislative veto, to restore a proper overall balance of
power previously skewed by earlier Courts' erroneous decisions affirming unduly broad dele-
gations of power to the executive branch).
For an intriguing discussion of yet another possible relational criterion, one running
counter to the consistency norm, see Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging
Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90
CoLum. L. REv. 2121, 2172-74 (1990) (arguing that certain democratic values might be
served by having the answer to some intractable legal/moral issues cycle over time, such that
the law reflects the principles espoused by various groups at least some of the time).
33. Suppose Justice Solo views rules A+ and B+ as complements, and views rules A- and
B- as complements. A case presents issue A before the complementary issue B is resolved.
Justice Solo's intrinsic criteria identify rule A+ as a better answer than rule A- for the Instant
Case. But suppose she can confidently predict that, when issue B does arise in a Future Case,
her successor Justice will select B- over B+ (either because the successor does not view A+
and B+ as complements, or because he views this relational criterion as less weighty than his
intrinsic criteria that strongly prefer B-). Justice Solo now has a relational reason to prefer
rule A- over rule A+ in the Instant Case, even though that is in tension with her intrinsic
criteria which prefer A+. Depending on the relative weight of her intrinsic and relational
criteria, she might well select rule A- today. Concededly, it may be difficult for Justice Solo
to predict how a successor Justice will rule on a complementary issue.
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In determining the optimal legal rule to address a specific issue,
Justice Solo consults both the intrinsic and relational judgment cri-
teria that her respectable jurisprudential paradigm yields. In most
instances, these judgment criteria enable her to rank a range of al-
ternative rules, from "best" to "next-best" and so on.3 4 For ease of
exposition, I will use R1 to denote the Justice's sincere judgment
about the optimal legal rule, R2 to denote the Justice's second-
ranked choice, down through Rn. I will sometimes characterize a
Justice as "preferring" R1 to R2 to Rn, or voting her "preference"
for R1, or "favoring" outcome R1, though I still mean to refer to a
ranking determined by sincere judgment-based decisionmaking and
not personal utility.
2. Sophisticated Consideration of Nonjudicial Actors' Views
Sometimes, an intrinsic judgment criterion might lead a Justice
to consider the views of legislators or the general public in forming
her sincere views on a legal issue.3 5 But once the Justice identifies
her own sincere position (whether or not such deference plays a
role in judgment-formation), she might still sometimes deviate from
her sincere view of the Instant Case in order to accommodate the
different view held by a nonjudicial actor. First, the Justice might
suppress her sincere view if she predicts a negative reaction by a
legislative body. For example, her sincere interpretation of a stat-
ute might prompt an overriding statutory amendment; her sincere
interpretation of a constitutional provision might prompt either an
overriding constitutional amendment or a stripping of judicial juris-
diction over future cases. She might therefore decide to embrace a
34. In certain contexts, the number of plausible alternatives capable of being ranked in
intelligible fashion may be quite limited. Consider, for example, the interpretation of a statu-
tory limitations period for filing a pleading. There might be only two plausible interpreta-
tions, one counting all calendar days and the other counting only business days, leading to
two plausible dates on which the limitations period runs. While these two answers could be
ranked intelligibly as better and worse, all other dates would seem to be equally wrong.
In other contexts one can imagine a dual equilibrium situation in which complementarity
dominates any intrinsic criteria, such that a justice is truly indifferent between two comple-
mentary sets of rules, say B+ & C+ and B- & C-. See Benoit & Kornhauser, supra note 27, at
1515 (showing, in the particular case of voter behavior in legislative elections, that if an indi-
vidual has nonseparable preferences over the available options within two distinct choice-
sets, she may be unable unambiguously to rank the options in isolation). Such a situation
certainly calls into question any jurisprudential claim that there exists a unique "right
answer" to every legal question.
35. For example, Justices frequently defer to Congress's judgments by according its stat-
utes a presumption of constitutionality. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535
(1997). Richard Fallon has recently argued that, when Justices engage in judicial review in
the face of reasonable popular disagreement over the moral principles animating constitu-
tional doctrines, they should accommodate the reasonable views of the public to some de-
gree. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 147-48.
2308 [Vol. 97:2297
HeinOnline  -- 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2308 1998-1999
Sincere and Strategic Voting
suboptimal ruling in the Instant Case rather than to trigger a reac-
tion that will move the law in an even more suboptimal direction.3 6
Some scholars have also suggested that a Justice might deviate
from her sincere views if she fears a negative reaction by either the
litigants or the general public. In the short run, a Justice might be
concerned that a negative litigant or popular reaction to a specific
sincere ruling would incite or entrench resistance and effectively
undermine the Court's judgment or broader legal principles. If so,
a strategic but suboptimal decision in the Instant Case might be
preferable to a sincere but ineffective or even counterproductive
judicial decision.37 With respect to long-term strategy, many have
advised Justices not to stay significantly out of step with the public's
deep-seated sentiments for long periods of time, else the Court's
moral legitimacy and leadership will be undermined.38
36. In other words, if embracing R1 will likely lead to a legislative move to R3, but em-
bracing R2 would produce a stable result without triggering a legislative response, then the
Justice might choose R2 in the first instance. See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, THE Puzzi
OF JUDIcIAL BEHAVIOR 119-23 (1997) (summarizing research findings of others); EPSTEIN &
KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 139-57; Cross, supra note 9, at 525-31. Some scholars have posited
that sophisticated behavior designed to promote the Justices' own policy preferences can
incidentally promote various norms consistent with judgment-based decisionmaking, such as
rule-of-law values (by avoiding legislative-judicial confrontation and concomitant temporal
instability) and democracy values (by interpreting the law closer in line with prevailing
majoritarian sentiments). See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme
Cour4 1993 Term - Foreword. Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REv. 27 (1994). Of
course, sometimes the best long-term strategy is to eschew case-specific sophisticated reason-
ing. See Howard Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive
Institutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAICING, 65,72 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) ("[S]ome jus-
tices, when faced with intransigent competitors, may think that both their short-term and
long-term interests are best served by standing firmly behind an unpopular but principled
judgment rather than by retreating or evading a conflict .... ").
37. See, e.g., ALExmEAR M. BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH 247-54 (2d ed.
1986) (defending on these grounds the Court's "all deliberate speed" formula requiring grad-
ual rather than immediate racial desegregation in Southern public schools); Dennis J.
Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-
1958, 68 GEo. LJ. 1, 61-67 (1979) (discussing the Court's strategic decision in 1955-56 to duck
the merits of an equal protection challenge to Virginia's antimiscegenation statute).
38. See, e.g., BIcKEL, supra note 37, at 239 ("Whe Court should declare as law only such
principles as will - in time, but in a rather immediate foreseeable future - gain general
assenL").
Lower court judges might also engage in sophisticated voting based on the anticipated
review and potential reversal of their rulings by higher courts. Various political scientists
have modelled inferior-superior court interaction, positing that lower courts sometimes issue
suboptimal decisions to avoid foreseeable overrulings. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Deci-
sion Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 227 (Lee Epstein
ed., 1995) (modelling lower court decisionmaking). In some circumstances, such sophisti-
cated behavior might promote the norms underlying the doctrine of stare decisis. See
Caminker, supra note 30, at 36-43.
This inferior-superior court relationship actually affords lower court judges sitting alone
an intriguing opportunity and incentive to engage in a form of temporal vote trading with
themselves. Suppose Judge Tryalone sincerely supports rule A in the Instant Case, but
believes that his reviewing appellate court would view rule A as not only wrong but radically
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Given these possible reactions by nonjudicial actors, a Justice
might strategically view her decision in the Instant Case as simply
the first in a sequence of steps to achieving the best feasible rule as
measured by her intrinsic and relational judgment criteria. Many
consider this practice of taking into consideration future reactions
by nonjudicial actors, which I will call "sophisticated voting," to be
normatively controversial.3 9
B. Sincere Judgment Formation on a Multimember Court
The placement of Justice Solo on a multimember court creates
opportunities for collegial interaction that can influence her solitary
views. The process of collective deliberation can improve autono-
mous decisionmaking. A collegial sharing of ideas brings multiple
possibilities and perspectives to each Justice's attention, and in-
creases the likelihood that she will explore all plausible positions.40
Moreover, each Justice is encouraged to hone and improve her own
positions in response to critical peer scrutiny and persuasion.41
Some scholars suggest that collegial deliberation enables a more
collective decisionmaking process that tends toward consensual
rather than autonomous judgment formation. One might regard
so. Judge Tryalone might vote sophisticatedly in the Instant Case and refrain from endorsing
rule A, not because he would likely be reversed in this case (although this is true), but be-
cause he would risk branding himself an extremist or loose cannon in the eyes of his review-
ing court, and thus increase the likelihood that his rulings in Future Cases will receive
harsher appellate scrutiny. In other words, Judge Tryalone would choose to vote insincerely
in the Instant Case (by bringing his views closer in line to his reviewing court's views) to
improve his chances of getting sincere rules B, C, and D past appellate review in Future
Cases. Optimality in rule A is traded for a future stream of improved rules. I think such
sophisticated voting by Judge Tryalone would be highly controversial; suffice for now to say
that some, but not all, of the normative objections to bilateral vote trading explored in Part
III would apply to this unilateral strategy.
39. Some scholars use "sophisticated" and "strategic" interchangeably, but I want to
draw a clear distinction here between a Justice's consideration of nonjudicial actors' future
decisions and a Justice's consideration of her peers' views regarding the instant decision -
which is all I mean by "strategic."
Both legislative- and public-regarding sophisticated behavior have frequently been criti-
cized. See, e.g., MuRPsHY, supra note 2, at 186 (suggesting that judicial consideration of cur-
rent or future political reactions "would seem to defeat the very purpose of judicial
independence"); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"- A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. Rv. 1 (1964) (criticizing
Alexander Bickel's "passive virtues," some of which involve sophisticated reasoning).
40. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84
VA. L. REv. 1335, 1360 (1998); Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 18, at 101.
41. "Strategic" tactics designed to "persuade" a colleague to modify her views more in
line with one's own position, such as using personal influence, cajoling, and imposing infor-
mal sanctions, see generally MuRPHY, supra note 2, at 43-56, do not count as "strategic behav-
ior" for my purposes. If by using such tactics one Justice convinces the second to believe
sincerely in rule X, neither Justice engages in "strategic voting" because both pursue their
(ultimate) sincere positions.
HeinOnline  -- 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2310 1998-1999
Sincere and Strategic Voting
multimember courts as proper arenas for "dialogue, in support of
judicial practical reason."42 The epistemological premise of practi-
cal reason views the process of sincere judgment formation as col-
lective or collaborative in nature, rather than autonomous.
Practical reasoning is an art, guided by a commitment to construct-
ing viable solutions to problems. This entails both a commitment to
compromise and to the civility of discourse, which is necessary to
sustain such reasoning over time. A Justice engaged in practical
reasoning might, after failing to persuade his colleagues of the cor-
rectness of his own initial views, defer to their views as part of his
effort to identify the correct answer on the merits. In brief, his deci-
sion to "go along" with his colleagues may signify a humility about
his own tentative judgment and an overarching commitment to the
process of practical reasoning as an ongoing enterprise, in light of
which individual decisions matter less than the health of the contin-
uing enterprise as a whole.43 In other words, in his view the "right-
ness" of a decision is, at least in part, grounded in the process and
fact of group agreement.
Whether one views the formation of sincere judgments as a rela-
tively autonomous or collective enterprise, the opportunity for col-
legial deliberation may strongly influence each Justice's views.
When the time for deliberation ends, he can identify and vote his
own sincere position.
But his vote is not determinative, and sometimes the Court's
collective outcome will diverge from his sincere position.44 Should
he then view his job simply as optimizing his input into the process
by voting sincerely, indifferent to the ways in which his vote will
affect the Court's collective resolution of a legal issue? Or may he
focus on optimizing the Court's collective output, registering
whatever individual vote is necessary to do so? The rest of this arti-
42. Frank I. Miechelman, The Supreme Court; 1985 Term - Foreword- Traces of Self-
Governmen4 100 HARV. L. Rnv. 4, 77 (1987).
43. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 148 ("The Justices' role ... is not exclusively one of truth-
telling about the meaning of the Constitution (as each, personally, thinks that it ideally would
be understood), but is also one, sometimes predominantly, of participating in a necessarily
cooperative project .... ).
44. Even advocates of practical reason must concede that, notwithstanding the epistemo-
logical pressure to achieve consensus, this will not always occur. See Jack Knight & James
Johnson, Aggregation and Deliberation: On the Possibility of Democratic Legitimacy, 22 PoL-
THEoRY 277,283 (1994) ("[A]s some advocates of deliberation readily concede, while it aims
at consensus there is no guarantee it will produce consensus. At some point then, matters
will have to be put to a vote.").
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cle models and then considers the propriety of such an output focus
in various contexts.45
II. OPPORTUNITIES AND INCENTIVES FOR STRATEGIC VOTING
ON A MULTIMEMBER COURT
The strategic pursuit of legitimate adjudicatory values falls into
two categories: strategic voting to improve the institutional efficacy
of the Court's collective product through its quantitative form
("form-driven" strategies); and strategic voting to improve the sub-
stantive content of the Court's collective product ("content-driven"
strategies). 46 Before delving into the details, however, let me intro-
45. I assume throughout this paper that individual Justices engage in a rigorous and hon-
est effort to determine their own sincere preferences, both prior to and during any collegial
deliberation. My focus is on occasions when a Justice self-consciously votes inconsistently
with what she perceives to be her "ultimate" sincere view. For present purposes I want to
view the practice of sincere decisionmaking in its best possible light.
In reality, things are not so simple. For any number of reasons a Justice, even prior to
deliberation, may not determine rigorously a sincere belief for every discrete legal problem
she must decide. For example, she may choose to think about certain areas of law less than
others for lack of time or interest or perceived evaluative capability; she may defer to other
authorities (such as treatises) more in some areas than others; or she may cling to a belief
without systematic investigation in one domain in order to maintain perceived consistency
with her beliefs in another domain she considers more important (reflecting a desire to avoid
cognitive dissonance). In a sense, each of these phenomena leads a Justice to sacrifice rigor-
ous development of a sincere belief on one issue in exchange for adherence to a rigorously
developed sincere belief on a different issue. One might loosely characterize this behavior as
an "internal vote trade," although technically she does not self-consciously "vote against" her
sincere belief on the former issue; she just never really forms such a belief in the first
instance.
The collegial environment may add new psychosocial complexities undermining a stark
division between sincere preference formation and strategic voting. For example, a Justice
may "allow herself" to be persuaded by a colleague, and indeed might self-consciously per-
ceive herself as persuaded, where the persuasion is really animated by the desire to engage
(implicitly) in strategic behavior. Alternatively, a Justice who perceives herself as interested
in a strategic maneuver, but believes such behavior is improper, might refrain from reasoning
carefully about her sincere views in the first instance; by "not thinking too hard" about the
case, she can act consistently with her strategic impulse but still maintain her self-image of
propriety.
The causes or prevalence of such internal decisionmaking dynamics are beyond the scope
of this article. These phenomena do suggest, however, that the line between "sincere" and
"strategic" behavior may be far less crisp that I suppose.
46. I do not explore claims that multimember tribunals afford judges unique avenues of
strategic voting designed to promote various personal agendas unrelated to optimal adjudica-
tion. For example, judges on a multimember court can expand their leisure time by joining
colleagues' opinions with which they do not entirely agree, suppressing their disagreement in
order to save the time required to write a concurring or dissenting opinion. See POSNER,
supra note 4, at 124 (noting this phenomenon in the context of intermediate appellate
courts). Judges on a multimember court who like winning for psychological reasons might
deviate from their sincere views to join the winning coalition, and judges who seek status by
enhancing their perceived importance may strategically position themselves in the middle of
a contentiously divided court to establish themselves as "swing voters" who ultimately deter-
mine important outcomes. See, e.g., Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Deci-
sionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 Omo ST. LJ. 1635, 1661-63 (1998).
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duce an analytic approach that is relevant for assessing the attrac-
tiveness of strategic voting across a range of circumstances.
A. Assessing the Magnitude of Perceived Error of the
Court's Output
On a multimember court, sincere voting by a Justice will often
lead to a collective outcome that she believes is wrong. She might,
through strategic voting, be able to improve the collective outcome
from a position she considers wrong to one she considers less
wrong. To decide whether it is worth seizing this opportunity, she
must first consider how important it is for her to supplant the
greater error with the lesser one.
To make this assessment, she must determine not only her sin-
cere order of preference for various rules (R1 through Rn); she
must also establish the relative degree of error in adopting each
suboptimal rule. This latter determination I shall call the "magni-
tude of perceived error" (MPE). The following factors, among
others, may be relevant to this calculation:
Error Costs - What principles are at stake in the choice between
two rules? What tangible benefits or burdens are being allocated?
A Justice might care more about articulating the best rule when it
will determine issues of personal liberty, say guilt/innocence or im-
prisonment/execution, than when the rule will determine issues of
financial consequence, say availability of punitive damages, or
amoral policy concerns, say a procedural pleading requirement.47
And even with respect to a given tangible outcome the costs of a
mistake may be asymmetrical: a Justice might believe that an erro-
neous conviction (where R1 calls for acquittal) is significantly worse
than an erroneous acquittal (where R1 calls for conviction); she
may believe that an erroneous denial of governmental subsistence
benefits to an impoverished person is worse than an erroneous
grant of benefits.48
Error Size - What is the size of a rule's perceived error? If the
legal issue involves personal liberty, how much will be wrongly
47. See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARv. L. Rav. 731, 750
(1987) ("There is a vast difference, for example, between sending someone to the gas cham-
ber because of his race or religion and holding that the statute of limitations has run before
an injury was discovered.").
48. For an example of one such asymmetrical valuation of mistakes, see In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that "a fundamental value determi-
nation of our society [is] that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty
man go free").
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granted or denied? If the legal issue involves money, how much
will be wrongly allocated?
Error Rigidity - Can those governed by the rule circumvent its
erroneous application? A Justice might care more about correct-
ness with rules that impose immutable requirements on private con-
duct than with those that merely establish default rules around
which private parties can maneuver.
Error Duration - How much precedential significance will the
legal rule have? The more frequently the same or substantially
equivalent issues will arise in the future, the greater the temporal
"ripple effect" created by the Instant Case (given the relational
judgment criterion of consistency), and thus the more important it
is to be correct today. A Justice might care more about articulating
the best rule to address a recurrent problem than about articulating
the best rule governing an idiosyncratic statute that is about to
sunset.
Error Certitude - How confident is the Justice in her rankings
based on the aforementioned variables? Is she relatively certain
that R1 is best, or is she sufficiently unsure that she might be in-
clined to defer to the different judgment of (some of) her col-
leagues? The more certain she is about R1, the more she will
perceive any error as significant.
An MPE assessment of this sort, in one form or another, deter-
mines a Justice's incentive to engage in form-driven and content-
driven strategic voting in each of the circumstances described in this
Part. Of course, the particular factors (and weights thereof)
included in a Justice's MPE assessment are derived from her juris-
prudential paradigm and, more specifically, the judgment criteria
that guide her legal interpretations. For example, consider a Justice
who embraces a strict "originalist" methodology in constitutional
cases. For any discrete legal issue she can rank alternative rules
according to how closely they conform to the Constitution's original
meaning, but she will refuse to consider nonoriginalist reasons to
prefer one rule over the next. In contrast, a strict "textualist" can
rank alternative rules according to how closely they conform to the
Constitution's textual meaning, but she will refuse to consider
nontextualist reasons to prefer one rule over the next. The more
capacious or multivariate a Justice's jurisprudential methodology,
the more factors will become relevant to her comparison and rank-
ing of alternative legal rules.
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B. Strategic Voting to Improve the Form of Collective Decisions
The form of a multimember court's product refers to the size of
the Justices' agreement (e.g., unanimous, majority, plurality, or sin-
gular). Specific coalition sizes can promote various institutional
values, and occasionally a Justice's desire.t shape a particular coa-
lition will incline her to endorse an outcome she views as substan-
tively suboptimal. She might vote insincerely with respect to
substance to forge a majority coalition supporting a disposition of
the case, she might do so to forge a majority coalition supporting an
opinion articulating a specific legal rule, and she might do so to
forge a supermajority coalition such as an unanimous opinion.49
1. Formation of Majority-Disposition Coalitions
If the Instant Case presents three or more plausible disposi-
tions,50 sincere voting might mean that no majority agrees on a sin-
gle preferred disposition (for example, the Justices might split
among affirm, reverse, and remand). Under the Court's prevailing
aggregation rules, such a division prevents the Court from deciding
the case.51
The Court could avoid the potential impasse through various
voting protocols, including: (a) adopt the disposition with the larg-
est plurality support (if any); (b) hold a "run-off" vote between the
top two vote-getting dispositions; or (c) compare dispositions two at
49. Technically, the Court needs a majority of a "quorum" of six to decide a case, so it
takes at least four Justices (of seven sitting) to construct a majority-disposition or majority-
opinion coalition. See 28 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SuPREME COURT
PRACnrcE 2 (7th ed. 1993).
50. It is common but wrong to view cases as presenting a binary choice over dispositions
between affirm and reverse; multiple dispositions are commonly available and occasionally
plausible. The list includes the following: affirm, reverse, affirm in part and reverse in part
(and Justices might disagree as to the particular parts), reverse and remand (with different
types of instructions, which might even be viewed as a set of continuous rather than discrete
options), vacate and remand (with same instruction options), dismiss the certiorari petition as
improvidently granted, dismiss the petition/appeal for lack of Supreme Court jurisdiction,
and vacate the proceedings below for lack of federal court jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106
(1994) (listing these options in less detail).
51. See Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 123, 140 (1999) ("A court must enter some judgment in order to dispose of the case.
Without majority agreement on the judgment to be entered.., the case cannot be decided at
all."). Interestingly, the proposition that the Court must affirmatively decide each case (even
if only to decide not to decide the merits, for jurisdictional or like reasons) is assumed rather
than defended. One could imagine resolving cases where no majority sincerely favors a sin-
gle disposition by issuing a per curiam judgment "affirmed by a deadlocked Court," analo-
gous to the conventional "affirmed by an equally divided Court." I will not pursue here
whether or not this would be a wise procedural innovation; for present purposes, the point is
a helpful reminder that judicial maneuvers are necessarily shaped and evaluated by the pre-
vailing institutional environment and decisionmaking protocols.
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a time, and select the option that defeats all other alternatives in
head-to-head competition if one emerges.
The Court has eschewed these structured routes. Rather, indi-
vidual Justices "play chicken" until one faction gives in and shifts to
its second-ranked rather than top-ranked disposition. In the final
set of opinions issued, each of the factions (which might include
from one to four Justices) articulates its sincere position. But one
of the minority factions then explains that, in order to construct a
majority-disposition coalition necessary to decide the case, the fac-
tion members will join another faction by voting for what they con-
sider to be the second-best disposition.52
A Justice's willingness to switch from his sincere to second-best
disposition should depend on both institutional and substantive
variables. First, how much value does he place on constructing a
majority-disposition coalition such that the Court can issue a judg-
ment in the Instant Case? Second, based on the magnitude of per-
ceived error assessment how strong is his preference for his top-
52. A quintessential example is Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949). Four
Justices (Reed, Vinson, Jackson, Frankfurter) voted to affirm the judgment below, and three
Justices (Black, Douglas, Burton) voted to reverse and remand. The remaining two Justices
(Rutiedge, Murphy) announced that their preferred rule would lead them to reverse outright.
However, these two Justices instead switched their actual vote to reverse and remand,
thereby breaking the erstwhile deadlock by creating a majority coalition for this disposition.
See 335 U.S. at 619 ("Since, however, that disposition [reversal] does not receive the concur-
rence of a majority, I join with those who, on other grounds, think that the judgment should
be reversed and remanded for a new trial, in voting so to dispose of the cause.").
For a partial list of other cases illustrating the same phenomenon of disposition vote-
switching, see John M. Rogers, "Issue Voting" by Multimember Appellate Courts: A Response
to Some Radical Proposals, 49 VAND. L. REv. 997, 998 n.4 & 1032 n.118 (1996). See also
Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) (two-Justice faction switched from outright affirm-
ance to affirm and remand); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (four-Justice faction
switched from outright reversal to vacate and remand); Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,
489 U.S. 46 (1989) (single-Justice faction switched from jurisdictional dismissal to affirm and
remand on one of two consolidated cases); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (two-
justice faction switched from jurisdictional dismissal to affirm); Kesler v. Department of
Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962) (single-Justice faction switched from jurisdictional dismis-
sal to affirm); cf. Inman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 361 U.S. 138 (1959) (single-Justice
faction switched from dismissal of cert. petition to affirm, to avoid equally divided Court).
There appears to be no convention or pattern that the smallest of the multiple factions
should switch its vote; the size of the switching group ranges from one to four Justices. There
is, however, a pattern concerning the direction of vote switching. The cases fall into one of
two categories: (1) a faction that sincerely believes the Court lacks jurisdiction switches to a
merits-based disposition; or (2) a faction that sincerely believes the judgment ought to be
affirmed or reversed switches to a disposition calling for some sort of remand. In no case did
a faction switch to a jurisdictional dismissal or switch away from a remand to an outright
affirmance or reversal. There is, however, no articulated rationale for these patterns in any
of the cases. It appears that the choice whether to stand firm or switch (and to what) is left
up to the strategic judgment of each faction.
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ranked disposition (Dl) over his second (D2), and his second-
ranked over the third (D3)?53
It is difficult to determine just how frequently sincere voting
generates such three-disposition impasses.5 4 The practice does sug-
gest, however, general acceptance of an adjudicative norm that sin-
cere views about case disposition may be sacrificed in order to
facilitate the Court's case-deciding function.
2. Formation of Majority-Opinion Coalitions
Perhaps much more frequently, a majority of the Court will
agree on a single disposition but disagree as to the optimal legal
rule justifying that disposition. Sincere voting will leave the major-
ity disposition supported by two or more divergent rules, each
championed by a minority faction of one to four Justices. Such
fractured support for the Court's disposition undermines various in-
stitutional values.
First, a fractured decision undermines the clarity of the legal
rules that will govern future disputes, thereby increasing the unpre-
dictability of the law's application to primary conduct and increas-
53. It is noteworthy that, given these incentives for strategic voting, the ultimate majority-
disposition will not necessarily identify a "Condorcet-winner" that would beat all alternatives
in a series of pairwise comparisons, even if such a winner exists. For an explanation and
illustration of the Condorcet voting paradox and cycling majorities, see, for example, HAN~u
NuRMI, COMPARING VOTING SYSTEMS 12-14 (1987); WILLIAM H. RXER, LIBERALISM
AGAINsT POPULISM 67-81 (1982); STEARNS, supra note 1, at 81-88. Suppose three Justices
compose each of three Court factions J1, J2, and J3, and the factions have the following rank





R is a Condorcet-winner; it will beat A (2-1) and D (2-1) by majority vote. According to the
Court's unstructured process, R will emerge as the majority disposition if either factions J1 or
J3 switch first from their top-ranked to their second-ranked disposition R. But D will emerge
if faction J2 switches first to its second-ranked disposition D. If J2 is more concerned about
breaking the impasse than are J1 and J3, or if J2 is more concerned about avoiding its third-
ranked disposition than are J1 and J3, then J2 will switch first, and D rather than the
Condorcet-winner R will emerge as the collective choice. In theory, at this point J1 could
approach J2 and point out that both would prefer R to D, which they could achieve by
agreeing that J2 would vote sincerely for R and J1 would vote strategically for R. Such a
second-round of bargaining would thus lead back to the Condorcet-winner. But unless each
faction reveals its entire set of rankings - and it is unclear how often this might happen -
such a second-round of bargaining may never occur. Emergence of a Condorcet-winner thus
depends on both the preference revelation and bargaining practices on the Court.
54. Researching published opinions reveals only a handful of cases in which the Supreme
Court has faced and resolved such an impasse. See supra note 52. But the Court may con-
front such an impasse far more frequently. Potential deadlocks might be revealed and then
resolved at earlier stages in the opinion-writing process, when one faction agrees not only to
switch votes on the disposition, but to join a second-best rule justifying its second-best dispo-
sition as well.
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ing the costs of future decisionmaking by subsequent courts
confronting the same legal issues.55 Second, it undermines the du-
rability of legal rules, both by weakening the precedential value of
the Instant Case,56 and perhaps also by diminishing public respect
for judicial decisions generally.5 7 Third, it undermines the expres-
sive function of adjudication, by failing to articulate a singular, co-
herent justification for the judicial decision.5 8 These institutional
concerns are mollified to some degree When the divergent rules
championed by two or more minority factions supporting the same
disposition happen to be "nested, fitting within each other like
Russian dolls."'59 In such circumstances, the narrower nested rule
establishes a precedent worthy of respect in future cases.60 But the
mollification is only partial; "narrowest-grounds precedents" typi-
cally are not as clear, durable, or value-expressive as majority-
opinion precedents.6 1 Thus fractured support for the Court's dispo-
sition will typically undermine one or more important institutional
values, to a greater or lesser degree depending on the precise "nest-
ing" or lack thereof among the divergent rules supporting the
Court's collective disposition.
55. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 9, at 550 ("[T]he best strategic reason for producing a
majority opinion may be the room that a plurality opinion leaves for interpretive incompe-
tence or clever disobedience by the lower courts."); Davis & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 71-75
(plurality opinions often generate confusion about the law).
56. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738,746 (1994) (stating that lower court confu-
sion in applying a splintered Supreme Court decision "is itself a reason for reexamining that
decision").
57. See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THm BiLL OF RirHrs 72 (1958) (arguing that a dissent
"cancels the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a bench of judges so
largely depends"); Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term - Foreword: Freedom of
Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARv. L. Rnv. 1, 72 (1980) ("Continuous fragmentation
could well diminish not only the influence of the Court but the ideal of the rule of law.").
58. See Ken Kimura, Note, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Deci-
sions, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1593, 1598 (1992) ("When two or more coalitions of concurring
Justices reach the same outcome based on mutually exclusive legal rules, then that particular
outcome has not been justified: it is merely the result of a chance happenstance, the mean-
ingless intersection of conclusions."); cf Pildes & Anderson, supra note 32, at 2157 ("Objec-
tive outcomes are not all that matter; the expressive significance of how those outcomes are
reached matters as well.").
59. Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 1, at 46.
60. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,
'the holding of the court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who con-
curred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds ....') (citation omitted). For amplifica-
tion of this "narrowest-grounds" rule, see Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 1, at 45-48; Mark
Alan Thurmon, Note, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of
Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DuKE L.J. 419, 427-46 (1992).
61. Lower courts frequently have difficulty discerning what rule, if any, constitutes the
narrowest grounds for the judgment; and the Supreme Court adds to this difficulty by gener-
ally not according conventional stare decisis weight to such narrowest grounds there may be.
See Thurmon, supra note 60, at 436-38.
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In response to these institutional concerns, one or more Justices
often deviates from her substantively preferred rule in order to ac-
commodate her colleagues sufficiently to form a majority-opinion
coalition. Sometimes, the vote-shifting faction's opinion candidly
reveals the decision to vote strategically.62 More frequently, the
vote-shifting faction suppresses its sincere views in the published
opinions, and the strategic behavior can be detected, if at all, only
through careful research of what occurred behind the scenes.63
When deciding whether to vote sincerely and risk a fractured
Court or strategically to construct a majority-opinion coalition, a
Justice must decide if he is willing to accept some degree of substan-
tive lawmaking error (measured by his MPE assessment comparing
the substantive rules produced by sincere versus strategic voting) in
exchange for the institutional benefits of a majority-opinion coali-
tion. These benefits will be context-specific, both because clarity,
durability, and legitimacy will be more important in some contexts
than in others, and because they will be more significantly en-
hanced in contexts where the array of sincere rules would not even
produce a narrowest-grounds precedent. Overall, strategic voting is
most likely in the extreme case in which "it is more important that
the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right."64
62. For example, in Tine, Inc v. HilH4 385 U.S. 374 (1967), Justices Black and Douglas
concurred in Justice Brennan's opinion of the Court to form a five-Justice coalition. Each
wrote separately to express his sincere disagreement with the majority's legal rule, but ex-
plained his decision to concur "in order for the Court to be able at this time to agree on an
opinion in this important case based on the prevailing constitutional doctrine." 385 U.S. at
398 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring).
63. See, e.g., EPSTrEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 96 (documenting that, in Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), Justice Powell voted insincerely to forge a majority-opinion
coalition, explaining that "[i]t is evident that a Court opinion is not assured if each of us
remains with our first preference votes .... As I view the Nixon case as uniquely requiring a
Court opinion, I am now prepared to defer to the wishes of you [Chief Justice Burger], Bill
Rehnquist, and Sandra" in order to construct a single opinion of the Court); BERNARD
SCHwARTZ, DECISION: How aHm SuPREmEm COURT DECIDES CAsES 21 (1996) (documenting
that, in Irwin v. Veterans Administration, 498 U.S. 1075 (1991), Chief Justice Rehnquist voted
insincerely to forge a majority-opinion coalition, explaining to his colleagues that "I prefer
the position taken in the most recent circulation of my proposed opinion for the Court, but
want very much to avoid a fractionated Court on this point.... If a majority prefers Nino's
view, I will adopt it .... If there is some 'middle ground' that will attract a majority, I will
even adopt that."). See generally EPSTNr & KNirHT, supra note 5, at 97 ("[M]any other
cases illustrate the extent to which opinion writers will put aside their most preferred position
to generate a definitive ruling of the court - and one that represents the best they feel they
can do under the circumstances.").
64. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
As explained earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 42-43, a Justice engaged in the
collective enterprise of "practical reason" might deviate from her autonomous views and
defer to those of her colleagues as part of her sincere judgment formation, rather than a
desire to secure competing institutional values. In any particular case, however, a Justice will
know for herself whether she perceives a tension between her sincere substantive view (how-
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It is frequently assumed that, in making these calculations, the
majority will converge in a moderate or median position. This may
well be quite likely when the Justices' ideal points can be lined up
nicely in a single-peaked fashion along a single dimension, for in-
stance from liberal to conservative.65 Convergence on a center po-
sition along the spectrum is not guaranteed, however, depending on
the effects of small-group dynamics. Large factions may have
greater ability to pull small factions (particularly a single Justice) to
the former's sincere position than the other way around, and cer-
tain individual Justices may be more persuasive than others.66
But sometimes the options under discussion cannot easily be
aligned along a single dimension. In addition to differing ideologi-
cal premises, the rules may embody tests that reflect different im-
plementation criteria (for example, rules versus standards), or make
different expressive statements. One can imagine that a Justice's
first- and second-ranked options could be on opposite sides of the
substantive spectrum. 67 If so, two factions on opposite ends of the
spectrum might prefer to join together at either end rather than to
join the middle faction. More to the point here, the outlier Justices
may care little about securing the institutional values of a majority-
opinion coalition, and the Justices in the middle of the spectrum
may care a great deal. If so, a coalition will form only if the middle
Justices move out to join one or the other wings. Thus convergence
in form does not theoretically imply movement toward a schemati-
cally median or substantively moderate position.68
ever reached) and her desire to secure institutional values. If so, she faces the question of
strategic trade-off discussed in the text.
65. Duncan Black's "median voter theorem" predicts that, if decisionmakers' preferences
are single-peaked, then the outcome of a majoritarian voting protocol will gravitate toward
the median voter's position, since her vote is necessary to secure a majority. See DUNcAN
BLAcK, THE THEORY OF CoMwrrrnEs Am ELEcnONS 19-24 (lain McLean et al. eds., rev.
2d ed. 1998); DENmNS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHoICE II 64-66 (1989) (describing theorem in
both intuitive and quantitative terms).
66. See Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 13, at 188 ("Individual judges can and do domi-
nate the courts they sit on through personality, political savvy, the ability to build consensus,
and, on occasion, sheer intellectual ability.").
67. Justice Scalia, for example, might be so wedded to bright-line rules that, after his
sincere support for a bright-line conservative rule, he might in theory prefer a bright-line
liberal rule to a moderate balancing test. For the converse proposition, see Fallon, supra note
8, at 82-83 (observing that Justices who disagree about what determinate rule to apply may
reach agreement on a balancing test).
68. See supra note 53. Admittedly, it is difficult to identify clear examples where two
wing factions eschewed the middle and joined to forge a coalition. See STEARNs, supra note
1, at 153 (asserting that "strategic interaction between and among the Justices almost without
exception appears to involve moves toward the median position on the Court"). The fact
that this phenomenon appears uncommon suggests that Justices rarely perceive the institu-
tional benefits of majority coalition formation as sufficiently strong to justify large deviations
from the ideal substantive rule; Justices tend to be willing to make small substantive accom-
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3. Fonnation of Supennajority Coalitions
More infrequently, Justices coordinate their voting to produce a
unanimous opinion.69 Unanimity establishes a very durable judicial
precedent, and it may elicit greater respect from nonjudicial actors,
both ensuring short-term compliance with the Instant Case disposi-
tion and ensuring long-term respect for the decision's underlying
principles. 70 More specifically, coordinated unanimity appears to
be strategically deployed to counter perceptible threats to the
Court's legal (and sometimes moral) authority.71 Each Justice who
disagrees with the "consensus" position must decide whether the
institutional values gained through unanimity outweigh the costs of
deviating from her sincere legal position, and perhaps her sincere
disposition as well.72
Even where unanimity is not attainable, Justices might also feel
some impulse to add another voice to an existing majority coalition.
Such "extra" joinders may add to a precedent's durability,73 which a
modations (by moving toward the middle) for institutional reasons, but are not willing to
make large substantive sacrifices (by moving to the other end).
Professor Richard Fallon has recently advanced a different hypothesis: if there is an ex-
isting doctrinal structure, any forged consensus will likely converge around that doctrine be-
cause precedent "reflect[s] the result best situated to win majority acceptance as a reasonable
accommodation of competing considerations." See Fallon, supra note 8, at 110.
69. For some recent noteworthy examples, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (per curiam); and Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). For a case study, see Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegrega-
tion: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Cour4 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1 (1979). Coordinated
voting to produce unanimous opinions was more common in earlier times, when dissents and
especially separate concurrences were far less frequent than they are today. See Karl M.
ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration, 44
CoRNELL L.Q. 186, 203-09 & tl.I (1959).
70. See, e.g., EpsmiN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 106; Davis & Reynolds, supra note 1, at
61-63.
71. See Cross, supra note 9, at 554-55. Chief Justice Marshall institutionalized the con-
cept of a unanimous "opinion of the Court" to replace the traditional issuance of seriatim
opinions precisely to enhance the respect and hence authority of the Court. See ZoBell,
supra note 69, at 192-95.
72. Even if the Justices' preferences are single-peaked, the unanimous choice will not
necessarily converge on the median voter's position, see supra note 65 and accompanying
text, because that voter no longer holds a unique bargaining position, and thus Black's me-
dian voter theorem does not apply. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in
Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. Rav. 127, 153-54 & n.79 (1997) (suggesting as a "rough
approximation" that unanimity will converge on the mean rather than the median position).
Indeed, a strongly convicted Justice with outlier views might draw the others to her, if she is
sufficiently entrenched and they are sufficiently driven to forge a unanimous coalition. In
theory, unanimity might even alter the disposition of the case, in addition to the legal rule
articulated, as compared to the outcome under majority rule.
73. Bare-majority coalitions may well command weaker stare decisis respect, and they
are more susceptible to overruling due to fluctuating personnel. See, e.g., EPs'amN &
KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 106; Saul Brenner et al., Increasing the Size of Minimum Winning
Original Coalitions on the Warren Court 23 PoLrrY 309, 309 (1990).
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Justice might value even at the cost of a sincere vote. This would
explain why members of an already-formed majority coalition fre-
quently seem willing to accommodate a marginal Justice to some
extent to entice her joinder, even though that entails further devia-
tion from the majority's sincere position. In addition, a Justice
might join a suboptimal option merely to conserve her scarce re-
sources (time and energy) for cases she considers more difficult or
more important to get right.74
For each of the types of coalitions described in this section, a
Justice would weigh the institutional values to be gained against the
costs of insincerity in the particular case, which may include institu-
tional costs as well.75 Form-driven strategic voting appears to be a
generally accepted practice on the Court. It is difficult for outsiders
to identify each occurrence, however; Justices understandably do
not candidly announce their decisions to form insincere coalitions
when doing so would undermine their strategic purpose of project-
ing solidarity.76
Moreover, bare-majority coalitions might invite greater lower court circumvention efforts
than large coalitions. See EPsTrnm & KNiGHTr, supra note 5, at 42 n.1.
74. Of course, such a Justice could just as easily save time by issuing a one-sentence opin-
ion concurring in the judgment without explanation, rather than joining an opinion that does
not reflect her sincere position. Not long ago this was common practice. See, e.g., Hansberry
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 46 (1940).
75. Some commentators have suggested that insincere coalition-formation is counter-
productive to the extent it merely hides fissures within the coalition that will emerge later in
related cases, thus decreasing the predictability of future legal developments. See, e.g., Earl
M. Maltz, The Concept of the Doctrine of the Court in Constitutional Law, 16 GA. L. Rlv.
357,401-03 (1982); Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. Sup. CT. HIsT. 33, 35, 38;
Skeel, supra note 72, at 148 & n.61. A Justice unwilling to pledge future fidelity to the rule
she would join in the Instant Case might view such a joinder as compromising such predict-
ability, and hence as institutionally counterproductive in the long run.
Similarly, if Justices vote insincerely to form unanimous coalitions too frequently, these
apparent agreements may come to be viewed as fake, and therefore the signaling value of
such coordination will decline. For a strategically inclined Justice, then, this gambit contains
its own self-dampening mechanism: the Justice would want to cap the frequency of coordi-
nated unanimity in order to preserve its instrumental value.
76. Interestingly, while the text discusses situations in which a Justice is willing to vote
insincerely to forge a desired coalition, there are situations in which a Justice might be willing
to vote sincerely only if doing so would forge a desired coalition.
First, a Justice might want to advocate sincere rule X if and only if the rule were adopted
by (at least) a five-member majority-opinion coalition. This stance would reflect an unwill-
ingness to express X in a "wasted" vote that might appear idiosyncratic and hence destabi-
lizing. Such a Justice would communicate this stance by circulating a "Join-Four"
memorandum, indicating her willingness to join four colleagues in the proposed opinion. For
expression of such a sentiment in a published opinion, see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651-
52 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (expressing disapproval of existing precedent but also
willingness to follow it until four colleagues join him in overruling it).
Second, a Justice might want to advocate sincere rule X if and only if the rule were
adopted by an (at least) six-member majority-opinion coalition. This stance would reflect a
desire to have rule X prevail only in a supermajority rather than in a bare-majority victory,
based on the concern that adoption of this particular rule by a bare majority would under-
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C. Strategic Voting to Improve the Content of Legal Rules
Due to conventional voting protocols, appellate courts offer in-
dividual judges fewer opportunities to engage in content-driven
strategic voting than are available to members of many other colle-
gial bodies. For example, legislatures often decide issues through a
series of votes comparing two options at a time, sometimes called a
motion-and-amendment process, such that savvy, sophisticated vot-
ing on early choices frequently can manipulate the ultimate path of
alternative pairings and hence the substantive outcome.77 On the
Supreme Court, each Justice typically registers a single vote to dis-
pose of the entire case, rather than a vote resolving each issue
raised by the case.78 Thus multiple-issue cases do not generally
present a Justice with an opportunity to misrepresent her views on
mine institutional values. For example, a Justice might want to overrule a landmark prece-
dent (say, Roe v. Wade), but fear that doing so by a 5-4 majority would make the decision
seem too "politicized" or otherwise compromise its popular reception - better to wait for a
supermajority so as to act with greater perceived authority. Such a Justice would communi-
cate this stance by circulating a "Join-Five" memorandum, indicating her willingness to join
five colleagues in the proposed opinion. She would thus thwart a majority coalition willing to
adopt her sincere rule if only four colleagues were willing to join with her. See Boa
WooDwARD & Scoi- ARMSTRONG, Tim BPa-RmEN 406 (1979) (observing that Justice Stew-
art had an unwritten policy not to join Nixon-appointed Justices as the fifth vote in favor of
overruling a Warren Court precedent, even if he had dissented in the earlier case).
77. See Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Par-
adox, 75 VA. L. REv. 971, 1012-23 (1989).
78. In a handful of cases involving two discrete issues, a Justice who found herself in the
minority on Issue One treated the majority's position on that issue as binding, and used it as
a baseline from which to consider Issue Two. For example, in Commissioner v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619 (1937), Justice Cardozo authored an opinion for the Court joined by six Justices
rejecting a challenge to the Social Security Act on the merits. Cardozo stated that he and
three others believed the suit was nonjusticiable, but observed that "a majority of the court
have reached a different conclusion," and "[u]nder the compulsion of that [majority] ruling,
the merits are now here." 301 U.S. at 639-40; see Suzanna Sherry, Justice O'Connor's Di-
lemma: The Baseline Question, 39 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 865, 882-90 (1998) (describing
similar phenomenon in five other cases, including two in which a Justice's deference to a
majoritarian baseline on one issue changed both his and consequently the Court's collective
vote on the disposition). In such instances, the baseline-adhering Justices (but not necessarily
the others) acted as if the case should be decided through two separate, issue-by-issue votes.
This practice is clearly exceptional, however. See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 51, at 136-141;
Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 1, at 20. In other words, in multiple-issue cases Justices
generally vote once, in a manner consistent with their internal resolution of all of the issues
presented.
Of course, when an identical issue arises in a Future Case, the doctrine of stare decisis
holds that a Justice should, at least presumptively, defer to the prior majority rather than to
her own dissenting position. But the normative justifications for stare decisis, see supra text
accompanying notes 28-30, do not similarly impel a Justice's deference to majoritarian resolu-
tions of separate issues in the same case. Cf Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts II, supra
note 22, at 452 n.15 ("[A] practice that requires judges to respect decisions reached on issues
in previous cases does not necessarily imply that . . . each judge ought to respect the
[majoritarian] resolution of each issue in the case as it is decided."). This may explain why
insincere deference to a majoritarian position within a single case may strike some as vaguely
troubling, whereas deference to a majoritarian position established by a Prior Case is pre-
sumptively appropriate. To put the point another way, the relational judgment criterion of
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one or more issues just to dictate the preferred resolution of the
case as a whole.79 For this reason, perhaps the most frequently hy-
pothesized scenario of strategic voting - in which a Justice insin-
cerely votes to dismiss a case on jurisdictional grounds to avoid a
decision on the merits with which she would strongly disagree 0 -
is much more complicated than advertised.81
This said, a Justice may still have the opportunity to guide the
Court's collective output toward her sincere view through various
forms of strategic voting behavior. I will focus primarily on two
such scenarios, one unilateral and one bilateral.
1. Unilateral Strategic Voting to Influence a Discrete Legal Rule
Sometimes a Justice, by supporting a legal rule with which she
disagrees, can unilaterally prevent a collective outcome that she
considers even worse. Such a unilateral strategy might be attractive
in either of two circumstances, both of which can helpfully be ilus-
consistency becomes uniquely relevant in the two-case scenario, thus becoming part of the
Justice's "sincere" assessment in Case Two.
79. See, e.g., David Post & Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the 7dewater: A Theory of
Voting by Multijudge Panels, 80 GEo. L.J. 743, 750-58 (1992) (illustrating how, if cases were
resolved through an issue-by-issue vote aggregation, a Justice with a strong preference for a
particular outcome might promote that outcome by voting strategically on one of the compo-
nent issues); see also STEARNS, supra note 1, at 189-90 (arguing that the desire to avoid incen-
tives and opportunities for such strategic behavior underlies the decision to employ outcome
voting rather than issue-by-issue voting).
80. See, e.g., Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 1, at 53.
81. Suppose three factions have the following sincere views. J1 believes the Court has
jurisdiction, and should affirm. J2 believes the Court has jurisdiction, and should reverse. J3
believes the Court lacks jurisdiction, but if the Court had jurisdiction it should reverse. If the
Court engaged in issue-by-issue voting and the factions voted sincerely, then the Court would
assert jurisdiction (supported by J1 & J2) and reverse (supported by J2 & J3). J1 could avoid
what she perceives as an erroneous merits decision by strategically voting against jurisdiction;
then the collective outcome would be a jurisdictional dismissal (supported sincerely by J3 and
strategically by J1).
But the Court in fact votes by outcome rather than issue-by-issue. If each faction votes
sincerely, the Court ends up deadlocked among the three possible outcomes: affirm (J1),
reverse (32), and dismiss (3). See supra section II.B.1 (discussing the problem of initially
deadlocked cases). J1 might decide to vote strategically for dismissal (to avoid the possibility
that J3 will switch over to J1's third-ranked outcome of reversal); but she then forgoes the
possibility that either J2 or J3 will switch over to her top-ranked outcome of affirmance. Her
strategic response depends on her assessment of her colleagues' strategic responses. Thus the
oft-heard scenario - voting insincerely against jurisdiction to avoid a bad merits decision -
is more complicated than it first sounds. Cf H.W. PERRY, JR., DECmING TO D CDE:
AGENDA SETrING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 198-207 (1991) (discussing the
occasional strategic practice of "defensive denials" of cert. petitions, when a Justice fears that
the Court will decide a case unfavorably on the merits).
It is interesting that, of the initially deadlocked three-disposition cases identified above in
which one option was a jurisdictional dismissal, see supra note 52, in each case the faction
favoring dismissal switched to a merits disposition, not the other way around.
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trated by focusing on Justice Brennan's behavior in Craig v.
Boren.82
Under an intentionally simplified version of the case, the rele-
vant legal issue was whether discrimination on the basis of sex
should be subject to strict scrutiny (SS), intermediate scrutiny (IS),
or rational basis scrutiny (RBS). Suppose the Justices' first-rank
judgments divided them into three equal-sized factions as follows:
Justice Brennan's faction preferred SS; Justice Powell's faction pre-
ferred IS; and Justice Rehnquist's faction preferred RBS. Justice
Brennan's first-rank judgment can be gleaned from the fact that he
recently had advocated SS in Frontiero v. Richardson,83 though he
had failed to convince a majority.84 But in Craig, Brennan circu-
lated a draft opinion for the Court that advocated intermediate
scrutiny, a view that ultimately won the day.
Brennan apparently concluded that it was preferable to vote
strategically to establish a durable precedent now for IS, rather
than to vote sincerely for SS. There are two different scenarios
under which such a strategic maneuver makes sense. The first
("Craig I") involves an effort to influence the precedential signifi-
cance of the decision, assuming that all other Justices remain
steadfast; and the second ("Craig I") involves an effort to influence
the collective outcome by encouraging another Justice to change
her vote.
First, Brennan might have assumed that the Court would remain
fractured across the three tests as described above, and that Powell
and his faction would join the Brennan faction in invalidating the
sex-based classification. If so, Powell's IS test would have estab-
lished a precedent of sorts under the narrowest-grounds rule.85 But
Brennan might plausibly have feared that an increasingly conserva-
tive Court would embrace RBS in a Future Case, brushing the weak
82. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Others have described Craig as an archetypal example of unilat-
eral strategic voting. See, e.g., EprmiN & KNrGrrr, supra note 5, at 1-9; Cross, supra note 9, at
551-52 ("Craig is a convincing illustration of how Justice Brennan compromised his desire for
a strict scrutiny standard for gender discrimination in order to command a majority."). But
none have fully explained the strategic opportunities and incentives facing Justice Brennan.
Of course, no observer can know for certain whether or precisely why Justice Brennan
behaved strategically in Craig. The case does, however, usefully illustrate hypothetical incen-
tives for such behavior.
83. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
84. See BERNARD ScHwARTz, TnE AscENT oF PRGMATSM 222-27 (1990).
85. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. Note that Brennan has no strategic
incentive to join Powell in advocating IS unless Powell would invalidate (rather than uphold)
the statute under that standard; Brennan's vote can influence the precedent established only
if he is in the majority-disposition coalition.
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Craig precedent for IS aside.8 6 Brennan could then try to pretermit
this most disfavored possibility by strengthening the Craig prece-
dent, through joining Powell's position to forge a majority-opinion
coalition invalidating the statute under intermediate scrutiny. This
Craig I scenario illustrates Brennan's ability to forestall a highly dis-
favored outcome (a majority-backed precedent for RBS in a Future
Case) by influencing the precedential significance of the Instant
Case.87
86. Recall that the Court has traditionally accorded little stare decisis weight to its own
previous narrowest-grounds decisions. See Thurmon, supra note 60, at 437-38.
87. Sometimes a Justice might try to influence the precedential significance of a case even
without forging an insincere majority-opinion coalition. Consider Edward Lazarus's account
of Justice Brennan's behavior in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). See
EDWARD LAZARus, CLOSED CHAmBERS 306-25 (1998). The relevant legal issue was whether
racial workplace harassment constitutes a violation of 42 U.S.C § 1981's prohibition against
racial discrimination in the "making" of a contract. At the Conference vote, Justice Brennan
led a group of four who said yes, Justice White led a group of four who said no, and Justice
Kennedy tentatively agreed with the Brennan faction. Brennan circulated a draft opinion
holding that harassment-victim-and-plaintiff Brenda Patterson stated a § 1981 claim, and
Justice White circulated a draft dissent (which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined) holding that
Patterson did not state a claim. Over time, Justice Kennedy was persuaded to abandon his
tentative Conference position and conclude that § 1981 afforded Patterson no cause of action
on these facts. Justice Kennedy circulated a draft opinion to this effect, which was quickly
joined by Justices O'Connor and Scalia. At that moment it appeared that the Court would
rule against Brenda Patterson based on a fractured opinion, since the Kennedy faction of
three embraced a somewhat different rule and rationale than the White faction of two.
Under these circumstances, Brennan's sincere dissent for four Justices ruling for Patterson
would have no precedential consequence.
In an apparent scheme to alter the case's precedential significance, Brennan circulated a
new draft that maintained his sincere legal rule (that postcontractual harassment could vio-
late § 1981) but switched the disposition, holding against the victim on the ground that she
failed properly to plead the facts relevant to this legal rule. If Brennan could keep his faction
together, then the Court would be unanimous on the disposition in rejecting Patterson's
claim. But Brennan's position would have more votes than any other in the 4-3-2 split, and
thus he would still write the lead opinion. I put aside here the complicated question of
whether any of the three positions would have any precedential status under the narrowest-
grounds rule; suffice it to say that Brennan might reasonably have believed that - at least
with respect to lower courts if not a future Supreme Court - a lead opinion for four Justices
ruling against Patterson but embracing an expansive view of § 1981 would mute the deci-
sion's conservative cast.
But Brennan's gambit failed. Justice White responded by withdrawing his separate opin-
ion and joining Kennedy's, and Rehnquist quickly followed suit. Kennedy now commanded
a majority-opinion coalition, and thus his position would clearly establish precedent no mat-
ter what Brennan did. Predictably, once the strategic opportunity evaporated, Brennan im-
mediately switched back to his original position vindicating the plaintiff's claim. While short-
lived, Brennan's Patterson ploy thus illustrates the possibility that a Justice might strategically
mold a decision's precedential significance even without forging a majority coalition, as in the
Craig I scenario.
Justice Brennan's gambit in Patterson has been described differently, as an effort to sway
Justice Kennedy's position on the merits. See JAMEs F. SIMoN, THE CENTER HOLDS 19-81;
iL at 64 (1995) (suggesting that Brennan was trying to "entice Kennedy to rejoin Brennan's
[strategically reconfigured] majority," because it reached the result Kennedy wanted to reach
even though it set the legal precedent Brennan wanted to set by interpreting the § 1981 cause
of action relatively broadly). I find this explanation for Brennan's strategic behavior implau-
sible, both because I agree with Lazarus that Brennan knew full well by this time that
Kennedy would reject a broad reading of § 1981, see LAZARUS, supra, at 317 n.*, and also
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The Craig II scenario involves an effort by a strategic-minded
Justice to induce a colleague to change her articulated position, thus
changing the collective outcome in a favorable direction. Such an
opportunity may arise whenever the colleague's preference is mul-
tidimensional, meaning there are two or more variables that drive
her ranking of rules. In such circumstances a Justice sometimes
can, by strategically repositioning himself, create or destroy mul-
tidimensional options and thus influence the colleague's selection
from among the available options.88
For example, suppose Justice Powell and his faction are con-
cerned with both the substance and form of the collective decision
in Craig. Powell favors IS, but he also favors construction of a
majority-opinion coalition to secure the concomitant institutional
benefits. Suppose further that Powell's form-driven preference
dominates, such that he prefers to forge a majority opinion even at
the cost of abandoning IS. If Powell prefers RBS to SS, then he
would be inclined to join the Rehnquist faction at RBS to secure
the institutional values of a majority-opinion coalition.89 Brennan
could rationally try to forestall this most disfavored possibility by
embracing IS rather than SS. This strategic maneuver would induce
Powell to stay with IS rather than shift to RBS, by enabling Powell
to secure both his preferred substance (IS) and form (joining
because there is no reason to suspect that Kennedy cared about the Court's disposition
(whether Patterson won or lost) as an independent aspect of the case.
88. No similar opportunity arises if one assumes that the Justices' ideal points line up
nicely along a single dimension, say, liberal to conservative ideology, or zero to large mone-
tary damages. If so, then the collective outcome will be determined by the position of the
median Justice. See supra note 65. This position may or may not articulate a narrowest-
grounds precedent governing Future Cases, but either way it will dictate the disposition of
the Instant Case. There is no reason to think that a strategic-minded Justice could, merely by
altering his own articulated position along that spectrum, induce the median (or any. other)
Justice to deviate from her sincere position. Suppose Justice Wapner's top-ranked rule lies at
the far left end of the single-dimensional spectrum. Whether he deviates from that sincere
position by moving farther to the left away from the median, or farther to the right and
toward (but not across) the median, his movement neither reconstitutes the median spot nor
provides any incentive for the median Justice (or any other) to move from her sincere posi-
tion. The median Justice still has the ability to control the disposition, and therefore she
should continue to vote sincerely. Justice Wapner can in theory change the median point on
the spectrum only by repositioning himself to the right of the initial median spot - but of
course this would worsen rather than improve the resulting collective outcome from
Wapner's perspective, and thus would be self-defeating.
89. Presumably Powell, like Rehnquist, would uphold the statute under RBS. This is not
only because statutes almost always satisfy rationality review, but also because Powell's fail-
ure to support Rehnquist's disposition as well as his rule would thwart Powell's self-conscious
effort to secure the institutional values of a majority-opinion coalition.
Some readers might be troubled by the notion that Justice Powell would willingly support
a less-preferred substantive rule when doing so alters the disposition of the case (upholding
rather than invalidating the statute, and hence ruling against rather than for the plaintiff). I
explore this intuitive discomfort at infra section III.A.l.a.
HeinOnline  -- 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2327 1998-1999
Michigan Law Review
Brennan in a majority-opinion coalition). This Craig II scenario il-
lustrates Brennan's ability to avert a highly disfavored outcome (a
majority-backed precedent for RBS in the Instant Case) by influ-
encing a colleague's vote in this case.
In both scenarios illustrated through Craig I and II, Justice
Brennan could rationally conclude that the project of best imple-
menting the law according to his intrinsic and relational judgment
criteria dictated a strategic choice to eschew his sincere position SS
and enshrine his second-ranked rule IS now, thereby averting the
present or future possibility of his third-ranked RBS. This arche-
typal scenario of unilateral strategic behavior can be modelled as
follows, applying the "magnitude of perceived error" concept de-
veloped earlier.90 According to Justice Brennan's intrinsic and rela-
tional judgment criteria, his ranking of the three rules proposed in
Craig is as follows: R1 = SS, R2 = IS, and R3 = RBS. When decid-
ing whether to vote strategically, Brennan should consider both the
likelihood of the Court ultimately settling on each option and the
MPE represented by the two suboptimal rules, R2 and R.3. With
respect to the former variable, the more confident Brennan is that
unless he forges a majority opinion coalition for IS in the Instant
Case a majority will embrace RBS in a near Future case (Craig I) or
even the Instant Case (Craig II), the more willing he should be to
vote strategically. With respect to the latter variable, the more he
views R2 as a minor error and R3 as a major one, the more willing
he should be to vote strategically and create a minor error in order
to prevent a serious one.91
The unilateral strategic ploy in which a Justice votes for R2 to
forestall a collective outcome of R3 is likely a common occurrence,
even though the strategy typically cannot be detected by outside
observers or perhaps even colleagues. Justices quite frequently
change their views over the course of a decision.92 Of course, this
90. See supra section II.A.
91. The above analysis assumes that, if a majority-opinion coalition forms around R2 in
the Instant Case, this will establish a durable precedent. A Justice favoring R1 might be even
more willing to vote strategically for R2 in the Instant Case if he still felt free, consistent with
his own commitment to stare decisis principles, to fight for R1 in a Future Case if he sud-
denly thought (perhaps due to personnel changes) that R1 had become a feasible alternative.
On the other hand, the Justice might be less willing to vote strategically for R2 in the Instant
Case if he believed that victory would be short-lived because other members of the coalition
would likely defect to R3 in a Future Case. The Justice's assessment of R2's durability given
his own and others' stare decisis commitments, coupled with his prediction of the Court's
future trends, thus could also play a role in his decision whether to vote sincerely or strategi-
cally in the Instant Case.
92. For an overview of the literature discussing this phenomenon, see Saul Brenner, Flu-
idity in Voting on the United States Supreme Court A Bibliographic Overview of the Studies,
2328 [V7ol. 97:2297
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sometimes reflects a change in sincere views. Sometimes this
behavior is driven by the institutional benefits of a majority opinion
coalition, but anecdotal evidence suggests that this is not the pri-
mary motivation. Most of the time, I think Justices care about forg-
ing a majority coalition only if it settles on a rule they support - at
least support enough. If asked whether they would prefer a
majority-opinion coalition to coalesce even if they would be left in
dissent or concurrence, I'd bet most often they would say no. If my
surmise is correct, then much of the documented position jockeying
and concession granting on the Supreme Court reflects strategic
behavior designed to improve the content of legal rules.93
To make the normative discussion in Part I as clean as possi-
ble, I will focus on the archetypical Craig scenarios when exploring
the propriety of unilateral maneuvers. It is worth noting, however,
that other plausible content-driven unilateral strategic voting scena-
rios can be identified. For example, a Justice might try to move the
law a great distance through small incremental steps, securing the
most favorable victory feasible on the Court at each point in time.94
Second, a Justice might articulate a sincere view, and yet because it
fails to win the day, also articulate an alternative lower-ranked rule
in an effort to move the law as close as feasible to his sincere view.95
Third, occasionally a Justice will seemingly waffle back and forth
over a series of cases as she sometimes embraces, and then some-
87 LAW LIBRARY J. 380 (1995). For various anecdotal stories concerning such fluidity, see
LAZARUs, supra note 87; SCHWARTZ, supra note 84; SiMoN, supra note 87.
93. See Lawrence Baum, What Judges Want: Judges' Goals and Judicial Behavior, 47 PoLt
REs. Q. 749, 759 (1994) ("The extent to which Supreme Court Justices engage in strategic
behavior is uncertain. It does seem clear that such behavior is not rare, particularly in the
form of strategy to influence collective decisions of the Court."). Of course, content-driven
and form-driven motivations are not mutually exclusive. In a given case a Justice might be
motivated to vote insincerely to form a coalition both to secure particular institutional values
and to avoid a substantively worse outcome.
94. To illustrate, suppose a Justice wants to move the law a great distance from where he
finds it, say R5 in his view, to his Ri. Rather than voting for R1 in the first case raising the
issue and creating a fractured set of opinions, this Justice would advocate and secure a major-
ity coalition for R4 in that case, and then advocate and secure a majority for R3 in the next,
and so on until he finally gets a Court for Ri. This strategy is designed in each case to nudge
his reluctant colleagues as far as they can be moved, so that the next case provides a closer
jumping-off point from which to leap finally to R1.
95. For example, consider Justices Brennan and Marshall's longstanding adherence to
their sincere view that the death penalty is, in all circumstances, cruel and unusual punish-
ment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 229 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 428 U.S. at
231 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In numerous cases Justices Brennan and Marshall joined or
even authored majority-opinion coalitions invalidating a death sentence on specific, narrow
grounds, but also included a separate statement maintaining their opposition to the death
penalty on their sincere and broader ground. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 364-
65 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433-34 (1980) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring).
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times abandons, a particular legal rule. It is possible that the
Justice's sincere view has changed back and forth over time; but it
seems more likely that one view is sincere, and the other is ex-
pressed only when and because it is strategic to do so.96 Fourth, a
Justice might threaten to write a dissenting opinion unless the ma-
jority modifies its opinion so as to move the announced rule closer
to the threatening Justice's top-ranked position.97 I suspect that
these additional examples of unilateral strategic voting beyond the
archetypal Craig scenario are quite common, though precise quanti-
fication is difficult. 98
96. For example, consider Edward Lazarus's account of Justice O'Connor's reasoning in
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), pertaining to the proper level of
scrutiny applied to a state affirmative action program. According to Lazarus, O'Connor in-
sincerely articulated an argument (that state programs should be more strictly scrutinized
than federal programs) in order to distinguish Croson from Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448 (1980), and then abandoned the argument again when she could secure a Court for her
sincere position in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying the
same strict scrutiny to federal as to state programs). See LAZARuS, supra note 87, at 299-301.
For another example, consider Don Regan's account of Justice Powell's wavering dor-
mant Commerce Clause reasoning in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), and CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987), concerning application of the bal-
ancing test established in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Powell's vote was
expressly insincere in one sense. See Edgar, 457 U.S. at 646 (stating his belief that the "case
is moot," but deciding to reach the merits because of "the decision of a majority of the
Court" to do so). Regan argues that Powell's merits position supporting the Pike balancing
test was strategic as well. Without Powell's vote there was a majority-disposition coalition
invalidating a state statute but no majority-opinion coalition, with a plurality embracing sev-
eral different doctrinal arguments. Powell joined only the plurality's Pike balancing analysis
- thereby forging a majority-opinion coalition for this argument alone - in order to estab-
lish a precedent that was as little restrictive of state authority as possible given the options.
Subsequently in CTS, Powell distinguished Edgar and upheld a state statute without engaging
in the Pike balancing that his own precedent-creating joinder in Edgar would appear to have
dictated, and without explaining this omission. See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court
and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mici. L. Rv.
1091,1278-83 (1986); Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (1) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
American and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (11) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85
Micr. L. R-v. 1865, 1866-68 & n.18 (1987).
97. The majority might be willing to move either to increase the coalition size for institu-
tional reasons or for personal, non-judgment-based reasons (such as to avoid public criticism
or ridicule). Either way, the would-be dissenter ends up joining the majority in a strategic
vote for a suboptimal, but still better-than-before, legal rule.
The threat of a dissent probably has greater force on intermediate appellate courts,
because unanimous opinions are less likely to be reviewed. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson
H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Fed-
eral Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998) (arguing that a judge in the minority can
encourage the majority members to modify their proposed views by threatening to dissent,
thereby signaling to the Supreme Court that the case should be reviewed).
98. I would not count as strategic voting the common practice of a dissenting (or even
concurring) Justice intentionally misdescribing the rule announced in a majority opinion in
an effort to influence its interpretation in subsequent cases. The dissenter's maneuver is an
attempt to move the meaning of the majority's rule closer to the dissent's sincere position,
but does not require the dissenter to embrace a suboptimal rule himself.
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2. Bilateral Vote Trading
Justices will sometimes confront an opportunity to trade votes
with one another; each of two Justices votes for the other's sincere
view on one issue in exchange for the other's support of his sincere
view on another. Such an agreement can be either explicit or tacit.
a. Explicit Vote Trades. Consider the following "vote-trading
exemplar" illustrating explicit vote trading across two separate
cases.99 Suppose the Court's docket contains two separate cases,
Case Search raising the question whether a particular search vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment, and Case Cruel raising the question
whether a particular mode of execution violates the Eighth
Amendment. The tentative Conference vote in Case Search is 5-4
for the criminal defendant, with Justice Wapner in the majority and
Justice Judy in the dissent. The tentative Conference vote in Case
Cruel is 5-4 for the state, with Justice Judy in the majority and Jus-
tice Wapner in the dissent. Suppose Wapner is close to indifferent
about his apparent victory in Case Search, but is very troubled by
his apparent loss in Case Cruel; conversely, suppose Judy is close to
indifferent about her apparent victory in Case Cruel, but is very
troubled by her apparent loss in Case Search. Wapner and Judy
then agree to trade votes across the two cases: Wapner switches to
vote for the state in Case Search, and Judy switches to vote for the
criminal defendant in Case Cruel. From the perspective of each
Justice, the trade has improved the overall state of the law; each
views the trade as creating what he or she considers a minor error
but corrects what he or she considers a more major error. Justice
Wapner is willing to sacrifice his feasible victory in Case Cruel (the
"sacrificed case") for a more meaningful victory in Case Search (the
"acquired case"); for Justice Judy, the "sacrificed" and "acquired"
cases are reversed. 100
It is very difficult to identify clear examples of explicit vote trad-
ing. My own sense, in accord with that of other scholars, is that
explicit vote trading rarely - and perhaps never - takes place.101
99. In theory, Justices might trade votes across two discrete legal issues arising in a single
case. I focus on two-case trades because plausible opportunities for such trades are more
likely to arise.
100. The Justices might consider the durability of each rule as well as its substantive desir-
ability; the shorter an acquired rule will likely reign, the more its law-improvement value
should be discounted.
101. See ROBERT A. CiP & RONALD STIHAm, THE FEDERAL COURTS 177 (2d ed.
1991) ("[T]here is virtually no evidence for [logrolling] in the judiciary. Bargaining does
indeed take place, but it is more subtle and does not involve vote-swapping."); STEARNs,
supra note 1, at 115 ("[A]ppellate courts ... generally eschew vote trading across issues
within cases and across cases ...... "); Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 10, at 84 ("There is
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b. Tacit Vote Trades. On the other hand, my sense (again in
accord with others) is that a form of implicit and informal vote trad-
ing is common. Sometimes, a Justice - let's again use Justice
Wapner - quickly joins a draft opinion circulated by a colleague
even though the doctrinal rule articulated does not reflect his sin-
cere position. Justice Wapner nevertheless joins quickly and with-
out criticism, indeed perhaps with praise - because (a) he thinks
the error is relatively minor, and (b) he wants to encourage the au-
thor to sign onto an opinion in a completely separate but more sig-
nificant case that Wapner has recently or will circulate soon.1o2
Of course, such tacit back-scratching "agreements" are not for-
mally enforceable. The social norms of cooperation and congenial-
ity prevailing on the Court, however, might strongly encourage a
practice of presumptive reciprocity. 0 3 Thus, while explicit vote
trading seems to be shunned in word and deed, a softer form of
tacit trading may well be commonplace. 0 4 Either form enables a
precious little evidence of naked vote trading on the Supreme Court."); Mark Tushnet,
Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 748, 764 n.86 (1995) (noting his
perusal of Brennan's papers over three decades and finding "nothing indicating an explicit
'deal' for votes"); cf. PERRY, supra note 81, at 163-65 (reporting interviews with both Justices
and law clerks about the certiorari granting process, and observing that with respect to this
process "[n]ot a single informant mentioned anything resembling horse trading, and many
said explicitly that it never occurred"); Patricia M. Wald, Collegiality on a Court, 40 FED.
BAR NEws & J. 521, 524 (1993) (referring to intermediate appellate panels, "[b]argaining
seldom - I would almost say never - takes place between cases").
102. John Jefferies nicely illustrates this tacit back-scratching practice. Justice Powell, he
reports, joined an opinion circulated by Justice Blackmun in a tax case despite Powell's view
that the opinion was "lamentable." The reason for the joinder: Justice Blackmun had not yet
taken a position on Justice Powell's circulated draft opinion in the much more important
affirmative action case Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978),
and as Poweli reportedly said, "We don't want to upset Harry in Bakke." JomH C. JEFFERiEs,
JR., JusncE Lawis F. PowEu., JR. 490 (1994); see also Cross, supra note 9, at 566-67 (sug-
gesting Justices "may quietly and implicitly" engage in such "tacit exchange"); Cross & Tiller,
supra note 97, at 2175 ("One would expect [a judge] who did not care about the issue to defer
to [a colleague] who did care about the issue, in anticipation of complementary deference
when their roles were reversed.").
103. See Gregory A. Caldeira & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Of Time and Consensual Norms
in the Supreme Court 42 Am. J. POL. Sc. 874, 877 (1998) ("Reciprocity is an important norm
on the Court, and if a Justice refrains from dissent, he or she may well expect the same
treatment in the future from the current opinion-writer."); Forrest Maltzman et al., Strategic
and Judicial Choice: New Institutionalist Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in
SuPR~ms COURT DECISION-MAKING 43, 56-57 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gilman eds.,
1999) (reporting studies showing that Justices are "likely to engage in tit-for-tat behavior,"
for example, by "join[ing] majority opinions more quickly if the opinion's author has cooper-
ated with them in the past").
104. See MuRPiy, supra note 2, at 52-53 (illustrating such "reciprocal favors"). I suspect
that tacit trades are likely to involve smaller error-magnitudes than explicit trades. With a
tacit trade the joining Justice cannot be certain her sacrifice will be reciprocated with respect
to a specific Other Case (rather than any other one of the joined Justice's choosing). There-
fore, she will likely be less willing to make a very large concession than she would if she could
guarantee (through an explicit trade) a major concession in return. Recall the example in
supra note 102 of Justice Powell allegedly joining Justice Blackmun's "lamentable" tax opin-
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Justice, to some degree, to improve one legal rule at some cost to
another. 0 5
I. NoRMATrvE CONSTRAINTS ON STRATEGIC VOTING
Part II developed prima facie justifications for various types of
form-driven and content-driven strategic behavior on multimember
courts. Form-driven strategic voting appears relatively uncon-
troversial; people might disagree over the occasions and extent to
which insincere coalition building is desirable as a matter of pol-
icy,'0 6 but there appears to be a consensus that the general practice
is legitimate. Content-driven strategic voting engenders much
greater controversy. Explicit vote trading is frequently denounced,
though generally without clear explanation. The more common but
subtle forms of tacit vote trading and Craig-like unilateral maneu-
vering either are ignored or provoke lukewarm concerns. My
strong sense is that there is considerable disagreement about the
proper line between acceptable and unacceptable strategic behavior
and the reason for drawing it.
One might try to capture the reasons for intuitive discomfort
with some categories of strategic voting from two different perspec-
tives. First, one might start with a familiar conception of the solo
adjudicatory process and then challenge certain strategic maneu-
vers as being inconsistent with this conception. The premise here is
that the purpose of having multiple instead of single judges - the
ion in the hope Blackmun would reciprocate by joining his Bakke opinion. In the end, Black-
mun did not reciprocate, at least in the Bakke case.
105. In Part I, I modelled solo adjudication as if judges decide cases by first determining
the optimal legal rules to address the legal issues raised, and then announcing whatever dis-
position is dictated by fair application of those legal rules. I believe this accurately describes
most, perhaps almost all, Supreme Court decisions. But suppose a Justice instead decides
cases by first determining the optimal disposition, and then selecting the optimal rule (ac-
cording to her intrinsic and relational judgment criteria) from among those available that
support the preferred disposition. What strategic opportunities would such a Justice face on
a multimember court?
Unilateral opportunities arise only when the Justices' sincere positions would lead to a
three-disposition stalemate. If only two dispositions are in the running, then each Justice will
always maximize the likelihood that his preferred disposition will be the collective choice by
voting for it (i.e., voting sincerely for strategic reasons). If three or more dispositions are in
play, then a Justice might well decide to vote strategically for his D2 disposition in order to
minimize the likelihood that the collective choice will be his D3 disposition. While the choice
of the suboptimal disposition is content-driven, the decision can be modelled identically to
the form-driven three-disposition deadlock scenario discussed at supra text accompanying
note 53. Justices can also improve dispositions through bilateral vote trading. In theory, the
trade hypothesized between Justices Wapner and Judy across Case Search and Case Cruel
could be driven by each Justice's desire to improve the disposition in one case, even at the
expense of a less favorable disposition in the other.
106. See supra note 75.
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teleology of multimember courts - is quite minimalist: it consists
simply of creating a deliberative environment, and nothing more.
Once deliberation has ceased, each Justice is expected to adjudicate
the case according to the same norms that would constrain her deci-
sionmaking even were she sitting alone.1°7 I embrace this minimal-
ist teleology in section llI.A, exploring various objections to vote
trading and other maneuvers based on familiar solo adjudication
norms.
One can instead start with a more robust teleology of multi-
member courts, which might lead to a different set of adjudicatory
norms than those governing judges sitting alone.108 I later consider
several alternative teleologies in sections IL.B, III.C, and III.D. I
proceed in this order for two reasons. First, it makes sense to begin
at the beginning, to view the adjudicatory process through the thin-
nest teleology of collegial courts before exploring the implications
of richer teleologies, even if the latter might eventually call into
question implications of the former. Moreover, precisely because
we have no generally shared account of a teleology of collegial
judging or even a robust conversation about one, this part of my
inquiry will be even more exploratory and tentative and thus seems
appropriately left for last.
A. Solo Adjudication Norms in a Collegial Context
For purposes of this discussion I take as given certain a priori
choices structuring the collegial decisionmaking process, such as
majority rule. 0 9 I focus primarily on bilateral explicit vote trading,
107. An apt analogy is competitive bowling, a sport playable by individuals or teams. In
team bowling, the scores of each team's members are summed, and the team with the higher
sum wins. Once each individual toes the mark, she views the activity of bowling just as she
would were she competing alone; the same rules, strategies, and other norms apply in each
circumstance. The teleology of team bowling thus asks players to behave consistently with
the teleology of individual bowling.
108. Here an apt analogy is competitive rowing, another sport playable by individuals or
teams. Team rowers are not expected to embrace the same strategies and norms as are solo
rowers. For example, a single rower focuses solely on absolute speed; rowers on a team must
focus on relative speed as well, lest one side row faster than the other causing the boat to
turn. See generally Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 1, at 3-5 (distinguishing between distrib-
uted and team group enterprises).
109. Majority rule is not inevitable. One could readily imagine alternative aggregation
mechanisms. Perhaps in each case there could be a single final decisionmaker, either the
senior Justice in all cases, the presiding Circuit Court Justice over every case arising from her
Circuit(s), a rotating Justice for a fixed term, a randomly selected Justice for each case, a
designated "expert" appropriate for the subject matter, or the first Justice to circulate a com-
pleted opinion. The relevant single decisionmaker would decide the case and write the sole
opinion. By tradition, of course, we employ no such system; we employ majority rule across
a set of nine Justices, each of whom has one vote per case.
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and then extrapolate implications to other forms of strategic voting
as well as sincere judicial behavior.
1. Litigant-Focused Constraints
a. Sacrosanct Disposition Objections. The primary function of
even appellate adjudication is commonly said to be resolving a con-
crete legal dispute between two or more litigants, with the articula-
tion of legal principles being incidental to that task.110 Even
assuming as I do here that Justices identify governing legal rules
first and derive dispositions from them,'11 one might believe that
once the proper resolution of the dispute is identified, the puta-
tively victorious litigant becomes "entitled" to that resolution. As
explained by Walter Murphy:
the Justices have an obligation not merely to lay down wise policy to
cover all similar situations, but also to guard, to the extent they are
able, the rights of the litigants. Protection of the legal rights of liti-
gants is not the only concern of the Court, but it must be a major
concern as long as this institution functions as a court of law as well as
a policy-making branch of the national government and not solely in
the latter capacity.112
This view underlies what I call the sacrosanct disposition con-
straint on strategic behavior: a Justice may vote strategically for a
suboptimal rule only if her insincere vote leads to the same disposi-
tion as her sincere vote would have done. Legal rules are fair fod-
der for strategic play, but sincerely derived case dispositions are
sacrosanct; a litigant who "deserves" to win (under a sincere voting
regime) should not be deprived of victory just to serve lawmaking
interests.113 In the vote-trading exemplar, for example, both
Justices Wapner and Judy violate this constraint because each votes
and secures victory for the litigant he or she sincerely believes
should lose.
Depending on whether one believes this sacrosanct disposition
principle should be unyielding or merely presumptive, a sincere dis-
110. See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 81 IowA L. RFv. 1267, 1273 (1996); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and
the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1001, 1006 (1965). But see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article
III's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NoTRE DAME
L. RFv. 447 (1994) (suggesting federal courts are properly focused more on law declaration
than on dispute resolution in Article I "cases," though not in "controversies"). See gener-
ally Hartnett, supra note 51 (defending the primacy of judgments over judicial opinions).
111. See supra text accompanying note 21.
112. See MuRPiY, supra note 2, at 187.
113. In other words, strategic voting that alters the sincere disposition makes dispute res-
olution essentially incidental to judicial lawmaking, contrary to the initial premise that law-
making is incidental to case deciding.
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position might impose either a "hard" or a "soft" constraint on
rule-focused strategizing.
i. Hard Disposition Constraint. The hard version, which holds
resolutely that strategic voting cannot alter the disposition, follows
the adage that courts should "do justice in the individual case."
Many people, were they a litigant in Case Search or Cruel, would
be quite disturbed if they would have won had a Justice voted sin-
cerely, but lost because the Justice voted strategically to improve
the collective legal rule.
The strength of this underlying intuition, however, can be ques-
tioned on its own terms. To begin with, the intuition confronts an
interesting temporal question. By hypothesis, strategically improv-
ing the legal rule today affects not only who wins the Instant Case
but also who will win Future Cases, changing future winners (under
the sincere rule) to future losers and vice versa. Why should the
entitlement of today's would-be winner under sincere voting trump
the entitlement of the future's would-be winner under the strategi-
cally secured improved rule? The intuition that courts should re-
spect litigant entitlements when resolving disputes can perhaps be
matched by a counterintuition that courts should first define the law
in an optimal fashion - whatever methodology that may entail -
in order best to secure litigant entitlements over the long run.114
Moreover, the intuition seemingly presumes that litigants care
more about winning than about establishing favorable legal rules.
This is not always so. Some litigants expect to be repeat players in
similar Future Cases, and they may be willing to sacrifice a particu-
lar victory for a more favorable legal rule over the long run.115
Some litigants who do not expect repeat play may nevertheless care
more about establishing favorable legal principles than about win-
ning the discrete dispute, either because they are representing
114. Query whether the plaintiffs in the early desegregation cases did or should have
supported the Court's "all deliberate speed" remedial edict if they believed it would help
their cause in the long run, though it precluded meaningful remediation in the short run.
More generally, perhaps people who instinctively flinch at the notion of a disposition-
changing maneuver might feel differently if they were asked about a hard disposition con-
straint while under a "veil of ignorance," meaning before they knew whether they would be a
litigant in the Instant or a Future Case.
115. The government might, for example, care more about setting favorable precedents
in criminal procedure cases than about whether it secures a particular conviction. This same
priority is revealed when a repeat-play litigant, after losing a judgment, offers to settle on
terms favorable to her opponent in return for an agreement to vacate the adverse legal prece-
dent. See Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement,
and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1471
(1994) (discussing and evaluating this phenomenon).
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others in class litigation 116 or because they care about the expres-
sive content of the law.117
If persuasive on its own terms, the hard disposition constraint
would preclude some other common adjudicatory practices besides
vote trading. First, the hard constraint contravenes some well-
accepted norms governing solo decisionmaking that lead Justices to
support locally suboptimal decisions. Even if Justice Solo's intrinsic
judgment criteria incline her to prefer rule RI leading to disposition
D1, her relational judgment criteria might nevertheless lead her to
endorse R2 and D2 either to maintain consistency with, or to com-
pensate for, a Prior Case that she views as wrongly decided. Or, she
might decide the Instant Case suboptimally to establish the best
long-term precedent for a series of cases. Or, if she prefers rules to
standards, she might embrace a rule favoring D2 even though she
would decide the case for DI were it the only one of its kind. In
each of these situations discussed earlier, Justice Solo's sincere
judgment as to how the Instant Case ought to be decided differs
from the judgment she would have reached had her case truly stood
alone. Taken seriously, the hard disposition constraint would ap-
pear to rule out each of these well-accepted adjudicatory practices.
Now, some readers might stop at this point and protest "that's
different; it is perfectly legitimate for Justice Solo to rely on such
relational judgment criteria." But this protest begs the question
under consideration. The hard disposition objection, by itself, does
not render illegitimate strategic efforts to improve the content of
legal rules. The "that's different" intuition, strong though it might
be, must come from another source.
Second, the hard disposition constraint also rests in tension with
some more controversial norms governing solo decisionmaking. As
earlier discussed, Alexander Bickel's "passive virtues" sometimes
lead Justices to deny favorable judgments to would-be winners;118
concerns about public resistance sometimes lead Justices to deny
immediate remediation to victorious litigants; concerns about con-
gressional overruling might lead Justices to shy away from sincere
rules in a manner depriving a would-be winner from a favorable
116. Cf Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (holding that the named plaintiff has standing
to continue representing a certified class despite the mootness of her personal claim).
117. See, e.g., Pildes & Anderson, supra note 32, at 2204 (submitting that litigants some-
times have a strong interest in the expressive content of an opinion, rather than merely the
ultimate disposition).
118. See BicKr, supra note 37, at 173 ("Whe policy of avoidance ... must prevail,
despite hardship to the litigant .... ).
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judgment.119 Moreover, consider the recent literature endorsing
"metademocratic" canons of statutory construction that are strate-
gically designed to induce a particular short-term or long-term leg-
islative response.1 20 Such canons are designed to shape future
legislative decisionmaking in a particular way, not to discern indi-
vidual entitlements through a "sincere" interpretation of the ex-
isting statute. These metademocratic strategies therefore
compromise the sacrosanct disposition principle as well. 12 1
Third, the hard disposition constraint would appear to rule out
form-driven maneuvers in certain contexts. When a Justice strategi-
cally forms a majority-disposition coalition to avoid a three-
disposition impasse, by definition she votes for a disposition other
than her sincere choice.122 With respect to strategic voting designed
to forge a majority-opinion coalition, a majority might coalesce
around a compromise rule supporting the same disposition that
each accommodating Justice would have sincerely supported. But
this is not always true; sometimes one or more Justices might di-
verge from their sincere disposition in order to fashion a majority
opinion. 23 The hard disposition constraint would rule out such
form-driven maneuvers.
ii. Soft Disposition Constraint. A softer version of the sacro-
sanct disposition principle holds that a Justice should consider a dis-
position switch to be a substantial cost of strategic voting, against
which the putative benefits of coalition formation or an improved
legal rule should be weighed. The intuition here is that, while the
Supreme Court (like all courts) decides cases, the articulation of
legal precedents is also an important institutional function. Thus
getting the judgment right and establishing an optimal rule are both
119. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
120. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Stat-
utory Construction, 108 HARv. L. REv. 593 (1995) (canvassing and evaluating arguments
proposing that courts use various interpretive canons in an effort to mold democratic deci-
sionmaking in desirable ways, such as by interpreting statutes narrowly in order to discipline
legislatures to speak with greater clarity).
121. For a provocative argument that such "instrumentalist" interpretive strategies are
problematic for precisely this reason, see Bernard W. Bell, Metademocratic Interpretation and
Separation of Powers, 2 N.Y.U. J. LEG. & Pun. PoLY. 1, 7-18 (1998-99).
122. One might argue that the apparent necessity of deciding the case through a vote
switch trumps the sacrosanct disposition principle, but this abandons the notion that the con-
straint is "hard." Such a necessity argument also presumes that the Court must decide the
case, rather than enter a judgment of "affirmed by a deadlocked Court." See supra note 51.
123. For example, in the Craig II scenario I hypothesized that Justice Powell, in order to
secure the institutional benefits of a majority coalition, might shift from a vote to invalidate
the sex-based classification under intermediate scrutiny to a vote to uphold the statute under
rationality review. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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valued, and when the two goals conflict in a given case a balance
may be struck.124
Because the soft constraint merely requires a sufficiently strong
justification for strategic voting, unlike the hard constraint it is not
clearly inconsistent with well-accepted single-judge or multimember
adjudicatory conventions. Even the apparently matter-of-course
practice of vote switching to avoid three-disposition deadlocks can
reflect a high value placed on deciding every case presented to the
Court. On the other hand, the soft constraint may be less persua-
sive on its own terms than the hard constraint. The premise that a
litigant is "entitled" to win when the sincere legal rule entails a
favorable disposition might strike many as an all-or-nothing propo-
sition. If one buys the premise, it is difficult to understand why this
entitlement may be balanced away. If one rejects the premise, it is
difficult to understand why the so-called entitlement deserves any
weight at all.
iii. Should Individual or Collective Dispositions Be Considered
Sacrosanct? Applying the hard or soft disposition constraint to
multimember adjudication confronts an important conceptual am-
biguity. Which disposition should a compliant Justice consider
fixed: the disposition she would sincerely choose were her vote de-
cisive (the "individual-sincere disposition"), or the disposition that
the Court would choose collectively were all members to vote sin-
cerely (the "collective-sincere disposition")? I have heretofore im-
plicitly assumed (following the vote-trading exemplar) that a
Justice's deviation from her individual-sincere disposition causes
the Court to deviate from its collective-sincere disposition. But this
connection is not inevitable; an individual disposition switch might
124. This appears to have been Walter Murphy's view. See MuRarry, supra note 2, at 188
n.* ("One of the few occasions when this dichotomy [between legal rule and disposition]
would raise major problems of ethics in compromise within the Court would be where a
Justice would engage in logrolling in the sense of switching his vote on one case where it
would change the outcome in exchange for another Justice's switching his vote in a second
case. It is possible that the gravity of the two situations would be sufficiently different to
make this appear a reasonable choice.").
In weighing the value of law improvement against the disvalue of disposition switching, a
Justice would again consider many of the MPE factors described previously. See supra
section II.A. In addition, the Justice might focus on the difference in legal effect of the two
dispositions under consideration. One might value "outcome moderation," which suggests
that a switch from affirm to remand is less troublesome than a more stark switch from affirm
to reverse. Or, one might value "settled expectations," which suggests that a switch toward
the disposition that would have prevailed had the Supreme Court simply denied certiorari is
less troublesome (because it preserves the prereview status quo) than a switch away from
that disposition.
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not affect the collective disposition at all.12 5 If so, is the individual
disposition switch still disconcerting - or should only a change in
the Court's disposition trigger alarm?
To invoke the sacrosanct disposition principle as a constraint
against strategic voting, then, one must first determine whether the
disposition should be considered "fixed" from just the individual, or
just the collective, or perhaps even both perspectives. And this in
turn depends on whether multimember adjudication ought to be
conceptualized as an individualistic or collegial enterprise, and pre-
cisely what the latter means - in essence, the basic inquiry under-
lying my project. Thus even if the sacrosanct disposition principle
seems intrinsically persuasive, it cannot stand alone outside of a
larger conceptual framework.
Identification of the teleology of Court multimembership, for
example, might support the choice of a particular perspective for
invoking this constraint. The more one thinks group accuracy is an
important justification for multimembership, the more sense it
makes to privilege the collective disposition over any single
Justice's perspective. 126 Or, one might favor the collective perspec-
tive because it appears somewhat more consistent than does the in-
dividual perspective with commonly accepted form-driven
maneuvers. For example, when viewed from the individual per-
spective, a disposition switch designed to avoid a three-disposition
impasse is troubling; it is prohibited by the hard constraint and dis-
favored by the soft constraint. When viewed from the collective
125. With respect to bilateral vote trading, one can modify the exemplar as follows. Sup-
pose sincere voting in Case Search would have led a fifth, Justice Mills Lane, to vote for the
government on a procedural technicality (say, the criminal defendant waived her Fourth
Amendment claim), such that the government would have won. Justice Wapner might still
broker a deal with would-be-dissenter Justice Judy, offering to trade her a victory in Case
Cruel if she joins him in Case Search to forge a majority-opinion coalition defining Fourth
Amendment rights narrowly. If Justice Judy agreed, she would switch from her individual
sincere disposition (voting for the government rather than the defendant), but this switch
would not affect the collective disposition because the government would have won anyway
with Justice Mills Lane's vote (albeit through a fractured opinion).
With respect to unilateral voting, recall Justice Brennan's gambit in the Patterson example
discussed at supra note 87. Brennan temporarily tried to mute the conservative precedential
value of the case, through a scheme that required him to vote against rather than for plaintiff
Brenda Patterson even though he sincerely thought she should win. Since it was already
clear that five Justices would rule against Patterson, his individual switch would not have
affected the collective disposition at all.
It is quite possible, therefore, that strategic voting designed to improve legal rules will
lead individual Justices to switch dispositions without coincidentally causing the Court's col-
lective disposition to switch. Note that while an individual disposition switch does not neces-
sarily generate a collective disposition switch, there can be no switch in the Court's collective
disposition unless at least one Justice deviates from her individual sincere disposition.
126. See infra sections III.B and m.C (presenting models suggesting that multimember-
ship improves collective accuracy).
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disposition perspective, such a disposition switch is less disquieting.
Unless one views "affirmance by a deadlocked Court" as a default
disposition worthy of protection, 127 then a collective switch from
"deadlock" to any particular disposition seems unproblematic.
Conversely, one might disfavor the collective perspective because it
is somewhat more difficult to implement in practice. A Justice can
easily self-police a sacrosanct disposition constraint from her own
perspective, simply by stopping herself before deviating from her
sincere disposition. But she cannot as easily police a sacrosanct dis-
position constraint from the collective perspective, because she can-
not always know in advance whether or precisely how her
contemplated strategic maneuver will influence her colleagues'
votes and hence the collective disposition. Perhaps a more practi-
cable collegial norm would preclude a Justice from contemplating a
strategic maneuver that is intended to (rather than actually does in
hindsight) stimulate a peer response that alters the collective dispo-
sition. In any event, this conceptual ambiguity must be resolved
before the sacrosanct disposition constraint can be invoked to rule
out a particular set of strategic maneuvers.
b. The Litigant Participation Objection. This objection starts
with the premise that adjudication is primarily party-driven, in the
sense that the judicial decision is designed to respond to the factual
proofs and reasoned arguments advanced by adversarial parties.
As most famously put by Lon Fuller:
[T]he distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that
it confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation in the
decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a deci-
sion in his favor. Whatever heightens the significance of this partici-
pation lifts adjudication toward its optimum expression. Whatever
destroys the meaning of that participation destroys the integrity of
adjudication itself.128
Concomitantly, the integrity of adjudication also entails a reasoned
decisionmaker, one who will respond to and fairly evaluate the rea-
soned arguments of the parties.
For Fuller, the centrality of litigant participation is essentially
definitional: meaningful participation is simply a sine qua non of
what adjudication means. But one can view the equation in norma-
tive terms. First, participation is valued instrumentally as an impor-
tant means of ensuring that the court's decision is well-informed.
Adversarial presentation of facts and legal arguments, like the pro-
127. See supra note 51.
128. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HA~v. L. REv. 353, 364
(1978).
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cess of collegial deliberation, serves to increase the likelihood that
the judge will consider all relevant, plausible positions and learn of
possible flaws in her tentative reasoning before reaching a decision.
Second, litigant participation might be valued intrinsically, on the
ground that the parties are "entitled" to participate meaningfully in
decisions that directly affect their rights/interests.
Explicit or tacit vote trading partially undermines the meaning-
fulness of party participation in the Instant Case by introducing an
influential element - the Other Case - that cannot readily be
identified in advance. Parties present reasoned arguments based on
the intrinsic and relational criteria that they predict will, or argue
should, be used by the judge. They may easily identify and brief the
significance of Prior Cases, both the decisions themselves and the
proper weight of consistency or compensation norms attached to
them. They also have a fair opportunity to predict what Future
Cases the Justices might think are relevant to today's decision, for
reasons of consistency or complementarity. 129
However, parties cannot fairly be expected to anticipate, let
alone brief, the entire set of Other Cases that might end up influ-
encing the decision in the Instant Case through a vote trade; that
set consists of every other case on the Court's docket.130 Moreover,
the feature that makes another case a possible trading partner with
the Instant Case is not its subject matter, but rather whether two
Justices can secure subjective law improvements through trade
given the specific matchup of their colleagues' sincere views in both
cases. Even assuming arguendo that a party could identify another
129. It is quite common, for example, for parties to advance "slippery slope" arguments
of the following form: "The Court should not rule X today, because such a precedent will
lead inexorably to rule Y tomorrow and rule Z the next day, and rule Z is so undesirable as
measured by intrinsic criteria that the Court should not start down this path." It is more
difficult for litigants today to predict Future Cases that might be complements to today's
alternative rules, because complements can spread out in more directions. Still, a party could
reasonably predict, for example, the illustrations of complementarity provided earlier. See
supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
Of course, sometimes Justices do embrace legal theories that were not briefed by the
parties, perhaps by spontaneously injecting a "new" issue into the case and resolving it based
on self-generated reasoning. See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 446 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("It is unusual, but hardly unheard of, for this Court to decide
significant legal questions on which the parties have not joined issue."); Barbara Palmer,
Issue Fluidity and Agenda Setting on the Warren Court, 52 POL. REs. Q. 39 (1999) (concluding
that Justices on the Warren Court developed new issues in about one-fourth of all cases).
Usually, however, in hindsight the Court's approach was at least foreseeable by sharp counsel
as a plausible resolution.
130. Indeed, if one 6onsiders the most extreme possibility of a bilateral agreement to
trade a vote in the Instant Case for an "IOU," i.e., a promise to trade back a vote in an
as-yet-unspecified case, the set consists of all cases on the Court's docket now and in the
future. The set is equally large for tacit vote trades.
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case that might present trade possibilities, the party could not pre-
dict what arguments about that case would help her cause in the
Instant Case (either by discouraging an unfavorable trade or en-
couraging a favorable trade) without predicting with precision each
Justice's views in both cases. As a result, decisions influenced by
vote trading are arbitrary from the litigants' perspective in the sense
that they cannot participate meaningfully, through reasoned argu-
ment, in the critical judicial determination - the trading Justices'
comparative evaluation of error magnitudes.
This objection drives a wedge between explicit or tacit vote
trading and other forms of strategic behavior, because it is triggered
only by the connection of logically unrelated cases. When Justices
engage in unilateral content-driven maneuvers such as the Craig
scenario, and all form-driven maneuvers, they focus their attention
on the substantive issues raised in the Instant Case and related
cases, not on unforeseeable Other Cases. If they so choose, parties
can even devote some of their argument to the question of whether
a specific-sized majority coalition is desirable for the particular
issues involved. Indeed, if the Instant Case presents multiple issues,
the parties can even choose to discuss the comparative importance
of the issues such that they can guide the Justices's consideration of
any possible bilateral trade among those issues. Only bilateral vote
trading across separate cases starkly raises the specter of arbitrari-
ness that frustrates meaningful party participation.
Whether this objection is powerful enough to explain the con-
sensus antipathy toward vote trading, however, turns on the signifi-
cance one attaches to meaningful party participation through the
presentation of reasoned arguments. The more central one views
this role on either instrumental or intrinsic grounds, the more
troubling vote trading becomes. But the more one disagrees with
Fuller and believes instead that party-driven adjudication, while
perhaps a good idea, is not normatively essential, then the less
troubling vote trading becomes. At the far extreme, if one views
parties as helpful but noncrucial judicial assistants, then the
Justices' resort to decisionmaking means beyond the parties' ken is
not that disturbing at all. Recall that even vote trading does not
devalue or ignore litigant participation entirely; it just values some
nonparticipatory aspects of reasoning as well, much as does sophis-
ticated voting that considers in part the views of nonjudicial
actors.' 31
131. See supra section I.A.2.
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2. Reasoned Justification Constraints
This section explores a series of related objections as applied, at
least initially, to bilateral trading. Each objection reflects a theme
common to many jurisprudential paradigms: when Justices declare
what the law is en route to deciding cases, we expect them to base
that declaration on reasoned argument of a certain form.
a. Adjudication as a Justificatory Practice. Many respectable ju-
risprudential paradigms hold that adjudication is, first and fore-
most, a justificatory practice. According to this view, the legitimacy
of courts' authority turns on the fact that adjudication is a forum of
justification or reason giving, in a way that other forms of decision-
making are not.13 2 If a judge does not have a reasoned justification
for a legal decision, she has no legitimate claim to the exercise of
coercive authority over the litigants.133 As a result, we are rightly
hostile to any adjudicatory practice that undermines the process
and integrity of justification, even if that practice in some sense
"improves" the doctrinal rules ultimately produced. Process, not
result, is paramount.
With this process focus in mind, one might challenge explicit
and tacit vote trading as depriving the two traded decisions of the
type of reasoned justification necessary to judicial legitimacy. After
all, there seems to be an element of arbitrariness to the decision-
making in both involved cases. In the vote-trading exemplar, for
example, Justices Wapner and Judy do not take each of Cases
Search and Cruel into account when deciding the other one because
the result in one case influences their sincere rankings of the avail-
able rules in the other. Rather, they take the Other Case into ac-
count only because of the happenstance that, given the particular
lineup of all nine Justices in both cases, there is an available trade
that both believe improves the set of results. If Justice Wapner
were asked why he voted the way he did in Case Search, he could
not provide a complete answer without mentioning the role played
by Case Cruel. While this reference would partially "explain" his
132. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 128, at 366:
Adjudication is, then, a device which gives formal and institutional expression to the
influence of reasoned argument in human affairs. As such it assumes a burden of ration-
ality not borne by any other form of social ordering.... We demand of an adjudicative
decision a kind of rationality we do not expect of the results of contract or of voting.
133. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Dis-
course, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1997) (describing a legal process conception of the "rule
of law" as requiring, inter alia, a "reasoned elaboration of the connection between recog-
nized, pre-existing sources of legal authority and the determination of rights and responsibili-
ties in particular cases").
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decision, on the surface it would hardly seem to "justify" it, at least
in any sense familiar to the judicial enterprise.
But reliance on familiarity here is dangerous, precisely because
multimember decisionmaking may enable novel but still legitimate
notions of justification. Viewed in isolation, Wapner's decision in
Case Search seems unprincipled; he has seemingly "sacrificed" this
case for law improvement elsewhere. But why view Case Search in
isolation? The mere possibility of bilateral vote trading essentially
allows a Justice to vote on two issues at once as a packaged deal, an
option generally unavailable to judges sitting alone.134 Consider
Justice Wapner's approach to the vote-trading exemplar. Wapner
sincerely supports Rule S+ over Rule S- in Case Search and Rule
C+ over Rule C- in Case Cruel, but if everyone votes sincerely the
Court will endorse Rule S+ in Case Search and Rule C- in Case
Cruel. Wapner can trade across the two cases with Justice Judy,
meaning he can control whether the Court produces rules S+ & C-
(by voting sincerely) or rules S- & C+ (by trading). Put differently,
Wapner can change the relevant "choice set" from a choice among
single rules to a choice among rule combinations.
As illustrated earlier, Wapner can employ the "magnitude of
perceived error" rubric to reason from his jurisprudential premises
to the conclusion that he prefers package S- & C+ to package S+ &
C-. His MPE assessment leads him to view collective outcome S- as
a lesser error than collective outcome C-; he is therefore willing to
endure the former to forestall the latter. He is not merely apprais-
ing the two combinations to see which he prefers in some troubling
result-oriented sense. Rather, he is employing the very same pro-
cess of reasoning that led him to prefer S+ over S- and C+ over C-
in the first instance.13 5
134. But see supra note 38 (describing theoretical opportunity for lower court judges to
bundle issues through strategic protection against overruling).
135. Some might find it helpful to recast this argument from the perspective of a Justice
whose jurisprudential paradigm is that of a Dworkinian coherence theorist. See generally
RONALD DwoRamN, LAW'S EMentm (1986). Viewing Case Search in isolation, Justice
Hercules would rank the available doctrinal rules according to their "integrity," that is, their
consistency with the best set of principles that can justify the most of existing outcomes. The
"right" answer is that with the greatest integrity so measured. The other answers can be
ranked according to how far removed they are from the ideal; an answer that is fundamen-
tally inconsistent with foundational legal principles will be worse than an answer that is
merely in tension with a weaker or lower level principle.
Viewing Cases Search and Cruel as a package, Justice Hercules can still rank each of the
possible combinations of answers according to their "integrity." Of course, assuming no rela-
tional judgment criteria link the two issues, the best combination of rules will be the best
Fourth Amendment rule plus the best Eight Amendment rule, S+ & C+. But Hercules can
still rank the imperfect alternatives, and his coherence model will provide a reason to favor
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To be sure, the comparison of rule packages rather than individ-
ual rules is unfamiliar. But why would this reasoning process,
deemed legitimate when used to favor one rule over another, sud-
denly become illegitimate when used to prefer one rule package
over another? It cannot be problematic just because Wapner finds
neither package ideal. This complaint would have too far-reaching
consequences, as judges frequently must choose between two or
more imperfect options when the optimal option is not feasible to
secure. 136 And it cannot be problematic just because there is a
sense in which, in evaluating the MPEs associated with S- and C-,
Wapner might be comparing "apples and oranges" if the two issues
draw upon very different underlying principles. First, it is unclear
whether such an apples-and-oranges comparison should be troub-
ling from a theoretical standpoint. 137 But in any event, this com-
plaint would also have too far-reaching consequences, as judges
frequently must compare fundamentally different principles in
ranking alternatives.138
Let us return to the initial claim here, that concern for cabining
illegitimate assertions of coercive judicial authority dictates hostility
toward any adjudicatory practice that undermines the process and
integrity of justification, even if that practice in some sense "im-
proves" the doctrinal rules ultimately produced. It is true that vote
one imperfect combination over the next, e.g., package S- & C+ over package S+ & C- over
package S- & C-.
136. See, e.g., supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (tradeoff between intrinsic and
relational criteria, where Justice Solo must rank the imperfect alternatives of maintaining
consistency with an erroneous precedent or correcting the error but undermining consis-
tency); supra text accompanying note 64 (tradeoff between the imperfect alternatives of vot-
ing sincerely and fracturing the Court versus forging a coalition for a suboptimal position);
cf. Schauer, supra note 18, at 869-70 ("[P]erhaps that very striving for the optimal is not part
of what law is, and maybe law, more positivistically conceived, is at bottom a second-best
solution, seeking to optimize in the long term in a world in which the attempt to optimize in
the short-run may yield an unacceptable number of short-run errors.").
137. Perhaps coherence theorists are used to resolving discrete legal problems by invok-
ing a single or connected set of local or intermediate principles to justify the decisions in a
discrete, unified realm of law-for example, drawing upon only Fourth Amendment princi-
ples to decide a novel Fourth Amendment issue. In theory, however, the requirement of
coherence or integrity applies to the entire set of legal materials, such that prioritizations and
accommodations among seemingly different intermediate principles are attainable. But cf.
Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. Rlv. 273, 297-314 (1992) (criticizing
"global coherence accounts" and defending "local coherence," meaning coherence of doc-
trine in discrete fields of law). If the objection to vote trading turns on the distinction
between global and local coherence, then surely the unreflective condemnation of vote trad-
ing is undertheorized.
138. See, e.g., supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text (tradeoff between intrinsic and
relational criteria, where Justice Solo must compare the substantive values underlying the
merits to rule-of-law values such as stability and predictability); supra text accompanying
note 64 (tradeoff between the substantive values underlying the merits and structural values
secured by particular coalitions).
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trading is generally described in terms of improved results, not
proper process. But a Justice can provide the same type of justifica-
tory explanation for a trade as for a single-issue ranking: the out-
come chosen best satisfies his intrinsic and relational criteria taking
relevant MPEs into account. The only difference is that the Justice
in a vote-trading scenario ranks combinations of rules rather than
single rules. This distinction does not appear to make the ranking
process any less an exercise in reasoned justification.139
One might nonetheless argue that the different ways of conceiv-
ing the choice set matters with respect to adjudicatory norms relat-
ing to explanation rather than justification. The next two sections
consider other norms arguably undermined by vote trading: candor
and noncommodification of judgments.
b. The Candor Objection. The majority opinions issued in
Cases Search and Cruel will, on their face, exemplify the reasoned
elaboration of legal principles rather than reveal themselves as the
product of a strategic deal. To be sure, the reasoned argument that
would have appeared as a dissent without the trade now appears as
the opinion of the Court, and vice versa. But, assuming the trading
Justices do not reveal the trade themselves, no one outside the
Court should be able to detect whether the Fourth Amendment de-
cision was influenced by the Eighth Amendment or any other deci-
sion. Thus one cannot complain that there is no publicly
articulated, internally coherent justification for either majority-
backed rule. One might, however, complain that for one of the
joining Justices this justification is merely a charade.
Explicit and tacit vote trading would appear to lead a Justice to
endorse openly a justification different from her true motivation -
the MPE calculation. Thus decisionmaking through vote trading vi-
olates an oft-proclaimed norm of judicial candor.140
This presumption of candor is frequently justified on the ground
that it disciplines judicial reasoning. The act of reducing one's true
thought processes to written form stimulates critical self-scrutiny,
and the act of publication enables peers and the public to evaluate
139. One might view tacit vote trading as somewhat more troubling than explicit vote
trading in this respect. With a negotiated trade, both Justices self-consciously engage in a
precise evaluation of comparative MPEs, an analysis grounded in legal principle. The Justice
initiating a tacit trade by joining a suboptimal opinion in the Instant Case must engage in a
more speculative analysis, because he does not know for sure the precise reciprocal benefit
he will receive. While his decision to initiate the informal trade still reflects principled rea-
soning about the comparative value of legal rules, the uncertainty involved makes the reason-
ing process seem somehow less rigorous and more conjectural.
140. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 47.
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and hold individual Justices accountable for their decisions. This
both improves decisionmaking generally, and also makes it less
likely that impermissible factors will play a role, either subcon-
sciously (because the writing requirement may help to identify such
subconscious motives) or consciously (because impermissible mo-
tives might be difficult to "write around"). 141 Vote trading partly
avoids these disciplining and constraining effects of transparency,
because the driving force behind a Justice's decision to trade - his
comparative MPE assessment of the two rules involved - is not
revealed, let alone publicly explained and justified. Thus in the ex-
plicit vote-trading exemplar, Justice Wapner avoids both the disci-
pline of forced writing and public accountability for the cost-benefit
judgments comparing these particular pairs of Fourth and Eighth
Amendment rules. Similarly, the joining Justice engaged in a tacit
vote trade avoids revealing his even more speculative cost-benefit
analysis.
Second, an obligation of candid opinion writing is frequently
justified on the ground that it enhances the judiciary's legitimacy in
the public eye. In the long run, some assert, a general suspicion
that judges dissemble when articulating and applying rules of law
will tend to diminish popular respect for judges and their decisions,
thus eroding the judiciary's de facto authority.' 42 The argument
here is at least partially prophylactic: if Wapner may falsely en-
dorse arguments in Case Search for this particular (hypothetically
laudable) purpose, he may feel empowered to do so for more dis-
turbing reasons - or so the public might reasonably fear. 43
These justifications for candor carry some analytical and rhetor-
ical force, though their tangible effects are highly speculative. This
said, deciding just how much force to give to such an objection is
difficult. If embraced as a rigid constraint, the obligation of trans-
parency would call into question a number of adjudicatory practices
141. See id. at 737; Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 13, at 193-94. One might quibble
about the extent to which candor truly constrains judicial decisionmaking. First, given the
plasticity of law, frequently Justices can "plausibly justify" multiple positions. Second, while
Justices might be somewhat sensitive to criticism by their colleagues, rarely will a Justice
"receive any sort of critical attention" by members of the public "that might get back to the
judge and alter his future behavior." POSNER, supra note 4, at 127. Moreover, perhaps other
internal norms and institutions propel Justices towards reasoned decisionmaking, rendering a
candor requirement largely superfluous. But for present purposes I accept the conventional
wisdom that candor matters to some important degree.
142. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 47, at 737.
143. See Edwards, supra note 40, at 1369 (emphasizing the importance of public percep-
tions of judicial behavior); Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 18, at 92 (noting that decision-
making processes can be judged by their "tendency... to inspire belief among those affected
by the resulting decisions that those decisions are proper").
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besides vote trading. Some sophisticated behaviors, including many
of Alexander Bickel's "passive virtues," involve judicial dis-
sembling. Moreover, many uncontroversial form-driven strategic
maneuvers designed to forge coalitions of various sizes entail the
suppression of sincere views - indeed, that is the whole point of
forming unanimous-opinion coalitions. Finally, content-driven stra-
tegic maneuvers such as the unilateral Craig exemplar, while gener-
ally thought less controversial than bilateral maneuvers, entail the
same misleading acts. Justices engaging in these practices typically
do not either concede deviation from their sincere views or provide
the reasons therefor. Indeed, taken seriously the obligation of can-
dor might require each Justice to write separately in each case.
Recognizing the tension between absolute candor and these var-
ious non- or less-controversial judicial practices, scholars champion-
ing transparency generally endorse a more flexible presumption
rather than a rigid duty. "Certainly, the art of compromise is not
out of place in the halls of justice. An effective judge must have a
sense of when to settle for less than his heart's desire, either in writ-
ing his own opinion or in joining someone else's."'144 But this con-
cession invites a difficult line-drawing inquiry: How should a
Justice balance the virtues of candor against the virtues of strategic
suppression or misdirection in the Instant Case? David Shapiro has
posited that a judge should "not materially mislead the reader. 1' 45
Others have proposed somewhat different though equally vague
standards.146 Perhaps the line might appropriately be drawn differ-
ently at different points in the evolution of judicial practice; in the
early Republic, for example, Chief Justice John Marshall clearly
believed that individual candor through sincere seriatim opinions
would undermine rather than enhance the Court's prestige and au-
thority, but 200 years' experience with judicial review may well
mollify this concern. 147 In any event, the important point is that
candor is generally considered a presumption, not a fixed con-
144. Shapiro, supra note 47, at 743.
145. Shapiro, supra note 47, at 743 n.54; see also id. at 743 ("[The sticking point can and
should be an unwillingness to make or join in a statement that does not represent the judge's
views and that will mislead the opinion's readers as to what those views are.").
146. Cf. Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 1, at 7 n.12 ("The exact limits of appropriate
judicial behavior are difficult to articulate.").
147. Compare Marshall's early views on the importance of solidarity, see supra note 71,
with Scalia's, see Scalia, supra note 75, at 35 (concluding that solidarity is no longer so impor-
tant for preserving the Court's prestige and authority "at its current stage of development
and in the current age").
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straint.148 As such, the candor objection to vote trading and other
maneuvers leaves open an argument in the Instant Case that the
tangible law-improving benefits of strategic voting outweigh the in-
cremental and speculative loss of judicial discipline, accountability,
and credibility.
Of course, one could approach the candor objection from a dif-
ferent angle, conceding its force but deflecting it by encouraging
Justices to be open about their vote-trading practices. While trans-
parency would defeat the very purpose of certain strategic maneu-
vers (such as forged unanimity to create the appearance of
solidarity), it would not fatally undermine the law-improvement ob-
jective of vote trading. 49 Perhaps the public's awareness of vote
trading would itself undermine its respect for the judiciary; if so,
then a lack of candor might be justified as a sophisticated ploy to
avoid public disfavor. But the premise that open vote trading
would diminish judicial respect, equally speculative as the claim we
started with that dissembling would breed disrespect, remains unde-
fended as of yet.
In the end, it is difficult to decide how much weight to give the
candor objection to vote trading. In general, the candor constraint
is more persuasive when viewed as a presumption than as an abso-
lute. The question with vote trading, as with all of the other forms
of judicial reasoning that involve dissembling to some degree or an-
other, is whether the benefits in terms of furthering judicial goals is
worth the cost. On this point, reasonable minds might reasonably
disagree, and perhaps for many the answer will not turn on the par-
ticular type of strategic maneuver but rather the particular issue
raised by or the context surrounding the Instant Case. 5 0
148. See Shapiro, supra note 47, at 738 (positing that arguments against dissembling do
not "demonstrate the need for candor as an unshakeable rule of judicial behavior").
149. An explicit vote trade could be revealed in two obvious ways. First, the trading
Justices could explain their own insincere votes in separate concurrences. Second, the Court
as a collective entity could reveal the vote trade, perhaps by explaining the trade through a
per curiam opinion. Neither method of vote-trade revelation would undermine the authority
of the rules articulated in either of the traded cases, and hence neither would be self-
defeating.
It is more difficult to imagine complete candor from a Justice initiating a tacit vote trade.
He would have to both admit insincere support for the rule in the Instant Case, and express
hope that he receives a more-valued concession from the author in a Future Case. He cannot
readily provide a full explanation of his comparative MPE evaluation, for he cannot identify
the second case with certainty. In contrast, the reciprocating Justice can be candid because,
coming second, she can identify both traded rules.
150. One might purport categorically to distinguish between vote trading (both explicit
and implicit) and all unilateral maneuvers on the ground that observers cannot even identify
the issues being compared through an MPE assessment with a vote trade, whereas they can
at least identify the concerns being compared with both form-driven strategies (the issue's
merits versus institutional benefits) and content-driven strategies (just the issue's merits).
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c. The Commodification Objection. This objection posits that
adjudicatory processes have expressive as well as functional signifi-
cance, and argues that bilateral vote trading as a means of rule de-
velopment undermines the ideal of adjudication as principled
reasoning. Goods and services - including adjudication - can be
produced, distributed, and used through various social processes,
such as markets, political ordering, and spontaneous or uncoordi-
nated activity. A number of scholars have forcefully argued that
the particular manner in which goods and services are produced
and distributed has expressive consequences for the ways in which
those goods and services, as well as the creators and users, are per-
ceived and valued.151 More pointedly, these scholars suggest that
the "commodification" of certain (heretofore uncommodified)
goods and services, meaning the regulation of their production, dis-
tribution, and use through market regimes, threatens to alter in
troubling ways our valuation of both persons and things.'52
Vote trading can be described in crass transactional terms. A
Justice essentially uses the MPE assessment to ascribe a value to a
given legal error (the difference between RI and Rn), and then de-
cides whether it is worth trading for an unrelated legal correction.
Legal rules (more precisely, errors of legal rules) or judicial votes
can be characterized as goods or services to be bartered within a
judicial marketplace. Such commodification of rules or their pro-
duction might alter or deform our shared cultural understanding of
adjudication and its role in securing the rule of law, by superimpos-
ing on adjudication a preexisting set of cultural norms associated
with market activity.153 Or so many might intuitively fear; markets
and adjudication, the intuition runs, do not mix.
See supra text accompanying note 130 (making the same point in discussing litigant-
participation objection). But this distinction, while perhaps relevant to the public perception
concern, is not fully responsive to the discipline and accountability concerns. The apprehen-
sion that, absent pressure to articulate her thoughts comprehensively, a Justice might more
frequently take positions that are poorly reasoned or ad hoe or reflect impermissible factors
applies whenever any aspect of a decision is left unexplained. After all, the failure to discuss
even the seemingly mundane question of why she feels coalition-building is sufficiently im-
portant to justify insincerity in one case but not the next raises all of these concerns. In this
respect, then, the difference between vote trading and other maneuvers seems one of degree
and not of kind.
151. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, V.rAuE E ETmcs AN ECONOMICS (1993);
MARGARET RADN, CONTESTED COMMODrrEs (1996); see also ANDERSON, supra, at 218
(suggesting a need to "consider whether the ways we produce and exchange goods ade-
quately express the other ways we properly value them or one another").
152. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 151, at 168-216 (applying critique to various issues
concerning women's labor and environmental cost-benefit analysis); RADIN, supra note 151,
at 131-53 (applying critique to prostitution and baby selling).
153. See ANDERSON, supra note 151, at 144-47, 145 (describing the norms structuring
market relations as having five features: market attitudes are "impersonal, egoistic, exclu-
2351August 19991
HeinOnline  -- 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2351 1998-1999
2352 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:2297
To assess the strength of this objection, we must parse more
carefully the fear of commodification in this context. Precisely
what cherished ideals of and attitudes towards adjudication might
be threatened, and why would their loss be so troubling? One
might worry that a market orientation towards judicial decision-
making could shape the following attitudes tracing prevalent mar-
ket norms: (1) what matters is the set of rules produced, not the
process or quality of their production; (2) judicial rulings are essen-
tially private rather than public goods;154 (3) legal judgments articu-
lating what is right and just can be compared to all sorts of "less
exalted" goods and services, through a common metric of monetiza-
tion; (4) judicial decisions direct the exercise of coercive authority
according to comparative wants, desires, or preferences rather than
a clash of principles; and (5) Justices should act autonomously, per-
haps even antagonistically, rather than cooperatively with each
other.
In the abstract, these are serious claims. To my mind, however,
the practice of vote trading as I've described it would not seriously
threaten such profound alterations of social meaning. We are not
talking here about a "literal" market, in which Justices exchange a
commodity (viewed either as the "good" of a legal rule or the "ser-
vice" of voting a certain way) for tangible currency. At the very
sive, want-regarding, and oriented to 'exit' rather than 'voice.' ... [These norms] express a
shared understanding of the point and meaning of market relations recognized by every ex-
perienced participant.").
Scholars sometimes resist commodification through market imagery on the ground that
the metaphor can have a "domino effect" of sorts by changing actual practices to conform to
the underlying imagery. See RADiN, supra note 151, at 13-14, 95-101. But such an effect
seems unlikely here. I doubt anyone would claim that vote trading of the sort I've described
might eventually give way to a literal market in which Justices exchange votes for money or
opera tickets.
One can, I suppose, construct somewhat more plausible slippery slopes. For example,
what if Justice Judy said to Justice Wapner, "I will support your position in Case Cruel, even
though I disagree with it, if you promise to retire from the Court at the end of the Term."
Because Judy believes that Wapner generally creates legal errors in important cases,
Wapner's replacement would likely improve the law in a long-term, global sense. In a loose
sense the "currency" of this trade remains legal principle and such a trade strikes me as more
principled and less commodified than a straightforward exchange of votes for money, but yet
might still be more disconcerting than the vote-trading exemplar.
154. This concern underlies a common objection to the judicial practice of enabling par-
ties to settle cases on appeal with one of the settlement terms being the vacatur of a lower
court precedent. See supra note 115. This practice comes close to the construction of a mar-
ket in which losing litigants can "purchase" and then purge their adjudicatory loss, which
undermines the social construction of precedents as public goods. See U.S. Bancorp
Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994) (declining to implement settlement
calling for vacatur of an appellate opinion with precedential significance, in part because
judicial precedents are public goods and "not merely the property of private litigants"); Res-
nik, supra note 115, at 1526-32 (discussing vacatur practice with respect to the "meaning of
courts as institutions").
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most, we are talking about a "metaphorical" market.155 The bar-
tering of commodities is merely imagery, not reality. This should
not end the normative inquiry, of course, 156 but just as surely it
makes a big difference. 57
In the vote-trading exemplar, Justices trade votes based on their
reasoned (though divergent) assessments of the rightness of two
collective outputs. The "currency" of exchange is legal principle,
not the traders' own or the litigants' preferences or desires. There
is a sense in which two independent products, the rule in the sacri-
ficed case and the rule in the acquired case, are appraised for their
relative value. But Justices appraise and compare the relative value
of competing rules or justificatory positions all the time, without
engendering a sense of problematic commodification. 58 Thus the
comparative valuation of two judicial products, in and of itself, does
not appear to involve a troubling commodification. True, vote trad-
ing adds an element of bilateralism to the picture, certainly more
consistent with market imagery. The mere involvement of two peo-
ple in a mutual exchange, however, does not necessarily conjure up
the image of commodification in the sense that only results rather
than processes and commitments matter.159
Because vote trading is dictated by Justices' rather than liti-
gants' views, it does not suggest that the good produced is private
rather than public in character. As modelled earlier, the motivation
155. See RADIN, supra note 151, at 1-2, 12-15 (describing and distinguishing between "lit-
eral" and "metaphorical" markets).
156. See id. at 83-93 (raising concerns potentially posed by metaphorical
commodification).
157. It appears to make such a difference in the context of legislative activity. The prac-
tice of "vote buying" through political bribery, literally a citizen-driven market, is universally
condemned. See Pamela S. Karlan, Not by Money but by Virtue Won? Vote Trafficking and
the Voting Rights System, 80 VA. L. Rnv. 1455 (1994); Richard Hasen, Vote Buying, (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author). In contrast, the practice of legislative logrolling,
though not without its critics, is generally tolerated. Trading votes for and against different
proposed bills simply does not seem to commodify legislation in the same way as would open
vote buying by the citizenry or legislators.
158. For example, when a Justice resolving a single issue confronts intrinsic and relational
judgment criteria that pull in opposite directions, he must value and compare the strength of
the vectors. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text. And when a Justice considers
whether to vote insincerely to forge a majority-opinion coalition, he must appraise and com-
pare the value of one feasible collective product (a fractured Court articulating his sincere
position among others) with another (a unified coalition supporting a nonoptimal legal rule).
See supra text accompanying note 64.
159. Consider a parent who promises his schoolchild that, if she studies hard and im-
proves her test scores, he will treat her to a day at Disneyland. Some might find resort to this
parental technique disconcerting, pejoratively considering this a bribe. Yet the economic
element does not drive out space for competing social understandings as well; the same act
entails and expresses such values as parental concern, familial communication, academic ded-
ication, a desire to please others, and mutual respect.
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behind vote trading is law improvement as measured by one's juris-
prudential paradigm rather than preference satisfaction with regard
to personal ideology or policy goals. As practiced, it does not util-
ize a common currency suggesting that judicial decisions are "on a
par" with seemingly more mundane and tangible commodities.
And it need not conjure up an image of Justices acting with indiffer-
ence or antagonism towards each others' views, rather than acting
with a cooperative spirit to produce the optimal overall set of rules
and justification therefor.160
Concededly, social meaning reformulation is not an on-off
switch, and commodification can range on a continuum from com-
plete to less-complete forms which "bear some indicia of com-
modification but are more attenuated.1 61 Thus even if one agrees
that the vote-trading exemplar is a far cry from a prototypical mar-
ket exchange, she might still be somewhat troubled by indicia of
commodification still remaining. The question is whether a qualm
that vote trading might undermine a worthy ideal of adjudication by
superimposing on it a set of market-based norms is sufficiently
strong to justify a strict anticommodification rule. I would not think
so, but I recognize both that others might disagree and that analyti-
cal argument cannot wholly resolve the dispute.
3. Judicial Lawmaking Constraints
This final set of solo adjudication-based objections revolves
around a common intuition: vote trading crosses a conceptual or
even constitutional line dividing adjudication and legislation. At
one time this intuition might have been captured by the claim that
courts "declare" rather than "make" law, and that focus on law-
making is an ultra vires judicial function. A more sophisticated and
modem version would propose that, in a meaningful sense, courts
do make law, but do so in a peculiarly judicial manner.162 Some-
160. See the example provided in supra note 159.
161. RADiN, supra note 151, at 117. Thus, for example, one might argue that the "indicia
of commodification" are even more "attenuated" for tacit than for explicit vote trading.
While the participants engage in an informal trade, there is no explicit bartering process in
which they simultaneously compare their relative valuations of nongermane rules. The trade
is still based on the rational calculations of each Justice, but it feels less like an economic
exchange and more like the informal tit-for-tat relationship of neighbors, each of whom does
favors for the other based on the expectation that the other will respond in kind within a
reasonable time such that the relationship is mutually beneficial.
162. See James Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring):
[The judicial power] is "to say what the law is," not the power to change it. I am not so
naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware that judges in a real sense
"make" law. But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as though they were
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thing about vote trading makes it seem as though Justices are mak-
ing law in an inappropriate manner, and therefore, the practice
transgresses the proper boundaries of adjudication.
This intuition might be parsed in various ways; courts are fre-
quently charged with "acting like a legislature," with the accusers
meaning different things. Many of the conventional bases of accu-
sation can be dismissed summarily, either because the claim is un-
persuasive or because it does not apply to vote trading, or both.163
Four charges deserve more attention.
a. The Legislative Association Objection. We generally associ-
ate vote trading with legislative activity. A common defense of vote
trading in legislative bodies (there called "logrolling") is as follows
(with defenders disagreeing on some of the particulars). The aim of
the legislative enterprise is to promote preference satisfaction. By
trading votes across discrete issues on the agenda, legislators reveal
the relative intensities of their preferences (or the preferences of
their constituencies) with respect to the set of issues under discus-
sion. 64 The weighing of relative intensities of the support and op-
position to a particular legislative proposal is a normatively
"finding" it - discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing what it is today changed
to, or what it will tomorrow be.
(citation omitted).
163. One common accusation of "judicial legislating" charges that a particular Justice has
based her decision in a case on nonlegal factors, such as her personal values and policy pref-
erences. This charge is inapt here; in the scenarios under discussion, vote-trading Justices rest
their decisions on their intrinsic and relational judgment criteria supplemented with a magni-
tude of perceived error assessment.
A second common refrain is that judges "act like legislators" when they articulate a de-
tailed and complicated doctrinal formula, such as Roe's trimester distinctions and Miranda's
detailed police warnings. This charge is conceptually weak, for the reasons explained in
Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest" Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL.
L. Rnv. 1309, 1390-92 (1995), and David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55
U. Gin. L. Rnv. 190 (1988). In any event, it is inapt here; traded rules can be simple or
detailed just as sincere rules can be simple or detailed, and there is no reason to suspect any
connection between trading and complexity.
A third frequent refrain is that judges "act like legislators" when they pronounce legal
rules unnecessarily, either by ignoring the case-or-controversy requirement, by reaching is-
sues that are not necessary to resolving the dispute, or by making sweeping statements of
dicta. All three phenomena ignore the injunction that courts, unlike legislatures, should not
set their own agenda. See Stearns, supra, at 1389 ("Not only are courts limited to and by
actual cases in their lawmaking capacity, but in deciding cases, they are generally expected to
abstain from creating positive law unless necessary to resolve the case before them."). This
concern is also inapt here; there is no necessary connection between vote trading and agenda
setting. In the vote-trading exemplar, for example, I have assumed that the rules traded
across Cases Search and Cruel are rules necessary to the decision in both disputes. There is
no good reason to think that Justices engaged in vote trading would ignore intrinsic judgment
criteria dictating narrow or cautious decisionmaking any more than those not so engaged.
164. See, e.g., WiLLiAM J. BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE
STATE 45 (1965) ("[L]og-rolling transforms voting from a procedure which takes into account
only ordinal preferences into one which can reflect the strength of feeling."). See generally
JAMEs M. BuCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONsENT 131-45 (1962)
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defensible method of aggregating votes; rather than necessarily
identifying the "decision 'preferred by most members,"' the
method identifies the "decision 'most preferred by members." 165
Some people find judicial vote trading intuitively illegitimate, I
believe, because they mentally associate the practice with the more
familiar phenomenon of legislative logrolling. Based on this con-
nection, they wrongly assume that the rationale for judicial vote
trading would mimic that for legislative vote trading, and they
(rightly) find the preference-satisfaction rationale anathema to judi-
cial reasoning. The first assumption is wrong because, as explained
in section II.B, judicial vote trading can be supported by reference
exclusively to legal concepts and principles, and without necessary
resort to problematic objectives such as preference satisfaction.
Upon reflection, therefore, the instinctive and disconcerting mental
association between judicial and legislative vote trading provides no
normative foundation for criticizing the judicial practice.
b. The Forward-Looking Law-Creation Objection. Some might
object that vote trading feels legislative in nature because it seems
to focus on forward-looking law improvement rather than
backward-looking law interpretation. "Law improvement" sounds
like a legislative task, whereas faithful interpretation of exoge-
nously provided law, whether that law seems good or bad, sounds
like an adjudicative task.
This way of characterizing the judicial lawmaking constraint is
rhetorically powerful. However, it ignores the significant extent to
which well-accepted interpretive practices already contain a
forward-looking, improvement-oriented element to them. As ex-
plained earlier, relational judgment criteria require Justices to look
forward as well as backward, to select a rule that is optimal over a
run of related cases even if it might be suboptimal for the Instant
Case viewed in isolation. The consistency criterion, for example,
requires Justices to envision the Future Cases in which today's rule
might apply and to fashion a rule today that traces the optimal tra-
jectory. Similarly, Justices such as Scalia whose intrinsic judgment
(modelling legislative logrolling); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY
90-123 (1956) (discussing issues raised by variable intensities).
165. WVillmoore Kendall & George W. Carey, The "Intensity" Problem and Democratic
Theory, 62 AM. POL. Sca. REv. 5, 6 (1968).
Whether this defense of vote trading is persuasive or not is the subject of a sizable polit-
ical theory literature. Cf. DAnt, supra note 164, at 119 (arguing that no enduring solution
exists to the problem in democratic theory of whether relative intensities ought to be
weighed). As a normative matter, the practice of legislative logrolling is generally accepted,
even if sometimes begrudgingly. See BuC'HANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 164, at 140.
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criteria favor bright-line rules over standards self-consciously
choose rules that will optimally govern the run of cases to which
they will apply in the future.166 Of course, Justices employ such a
forward-looking analytical lens as a means of fashioning law to re-
solve a dispute that has already occurred (and the decision is in this
sense backwards-looking), whereas legislation is generally designed
prospectively to govern events that have not yet transpired. But
like these well-accepted interpretive approaches, vote trading also
employs forward-looking law-declaration techniques to make back-
ward-looking judgments about existing disputes. Unless we are sig-
nificantly to revamp our approach to conventional solo
interpretation, therefore, it cannot be merely the forward-looking
nature of vote trading, or its professed goal of improving the law,
that crosses the line between adjudication and legislation.
c. The Comparative Competence Objection. A third objection
deserves even greater consideration. I start with the premise that,
like legislatures, appellate courts "create" law in the loose sense in
that they routinely engage in forward-looking reasoning to "im-
prove" doctrinal rules or sets of related rules.167 Unlike legisla-
tures, they do not set their own agenda as to when they issue rules
governing what substantive issues.168 Nevertheless, their project -
certainly the Supreme Court's project - is to decide the cases
presented to them by fashioning rules that are optimally adapted to
govern future as well as the current disputes.
This objection adds the following premise: due to institutional
distinctions between courts and legislatures, the goal of competency
in lawmaking requires courts to employ a different lawmaking
methodology than do legislatures. Legislatures are comparatively
well-designed to consider and study societal problems comprehen-
sively, and to devise optimal forward-looking solutions thereto.
Congress, for example, has factfinding resources, access to expert
advisers, and control over its own decisionmaking timing, and each
feature is nicely suited to competent forward-looking planning. In
contrast, courts are not structured to be as proficient at seeing far
into the future, or at perceiving and comprehensively considering
166. See supra note 30.
167. See PosNER, supra note 4, at 131 ("Many cases cannot be decided by reasoning from
conventional legal materials. Such cases require the judge to exercise a legislative judgment,
although a more confined one than 'real' legislators are authorized to exercise.").
168. Given the Supreme Court's certiorari discretion, the Court has close to plenary
power to set its agenda negatively in the form of a decision not to hear a particular case or
issue. But the Court still lacks affirmative agenda control because it cannot create a vehicle
for deciding a particular issue; it must await one.
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all of the ramifications and interests affected by proposed doctrinal
rules.1 69 While certainly helpful, amicus and Brandeis briefs are not
dependable substitutes for the legislative process. Perhaps more
significantly, the doctrine of stare decisis makes it more difficult for
courts to reverse their direction if subsequent events reveal a
misstep.170
Given these observations, the argument continues, we have
much more confidence in Justices' ability to develop optimal
forward-looking rules when the Justices focus their attention on
fashioning a direct response to the facts and context of the dispute
before them, rather than when they engage in a self-conscious pro-
ject of abstract law improvement. I do not mean to suggest here
that Justices are more competent or trustworthy at determining re-
sults rather than rules, although some may take this view as well.171
I mean rather that Justices are better at fashioning case-tethered
rules than they are at fashioning rules in the abstract. This case-
focused tethering or mental discipline is what gives us some confi-
dence in the soundness of judicial rulemaking, to the point where
we have sufficient confidence in a rule forged under these con-
straints that we are willing to give it significant (though not rigid)
future effect via stare decisis.' 72 But we ought to get very nervous
when judges, even appellate judges, get so focused on "law im-
provement" that they consider cases to be mere convenient occa-
sions for abstract lawmaking rather than focal points for legal
reasoning. In short, we are rightly concerned that courts are much
less likely really to "improve" the law when they lose sight of and
wander mentally away from the context, facts, and litigants in a par-
ticular case. Therefore, the objection concludes, vote trading (and
perhaps other strategic maneuvering) is problematic because it en-
courages Justices to engage in abstract rather than case-tethered
169. See Steven D. Smith, Courts, Creativity, and the Duty to Decide a Case, 1985 U. ILL.
L. REv. 573, 594 ("Critics of judicial creativity assert that courts lack the information-
gathering ability, the representative base, the time and administrative resources, and the
political wisdom to make policy.").
170. See Frank Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L.
REv. 422, 423 (1988) (noting the tension between stare decisis and the benefit of hindsight).
171. See PHInP B. KURLAND, POLrncs, THE CONSTITUTION, AND TIE WARREN COURT
94 (1970) (quoting Lord Mansfield as advising "new judges to state their judgments and with-
hold their reasons, since their judgments were probably right and their reasons probably
wrong"); Cass, supra note 13, at 992 (noting that the common law's traditional "preference
for incrementalism reflects the view that rationales become less trustworthy guides to future
decisions the more they extrapolate from the base of known fact-settings to which they
apply").
172. See ANTHONY KRoNmAN, THE LosT LAWYER 318-19 (1993).
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reasoning, even as they properly attend to forward-looking law
improvement.
While the premise of this objection - that courts should remain
focused on contextualized decisionmaking - is both analytically
and rhetorically powerful,173 the deduction that vote trading vio-
lates this norm demands greater scrutiny. First, each of the two
cases involved in a vote trade satisfy the normal requirements for
concreteness and adverseness. The trading Justices (and the rest),
therefore, start from a factbound, contextual setting and can reason
outward when they construct their initial rankings of, and assess
their magnitudes of perceived error for, the proposed rules in each
case. In the vote-trading exemplar, for example, both Justice
Wapner's and Justice Judy's rankings of proposed rules governing
the search and punishment issues will be fully informed by the pre-
cise nature and context of the two disputes as well as the facts and
legal arguments developed by the litigants. There is nothing in the
methodology of vote trading that should affect these aspects of judi-
cial reasoning; both the trading and nontrading Justices follow the
same analytical path to their rankings in the individual cases.
One might characterize the next reasoning step in the vote-
trading process - the comparison of MPEs in the two cases - to
be somewhat abstracted from the case contexts. When Justice
Wapner considers whether the perceived sacrifice in Case Search is
more than compensated by the perceived improvement in Case
Cruel, he might ponder some seemingly abstract questions like the
following: Is it more important for wrongful death sentences to be
avoided than for wrongful privacy invasions to be allowed? This
question (and others like it) is not tethered to a specific case. And
yet, Justice Wapner would certainly be aware of how his answer to
this question would ultimately affect his vote and therefore the dis-
position of these two concrete cases with identifiable parties. In
other words, the case-specific consequences of his abstract reason-
ing would be readily perceptible, at both intellectual and visceral
levels. This remains a far cry from the sort of abstract legislative
rulemaking against which the judicial practice is being measured.
Moreover, this sort of abstraction seems implicated even by the
less-controversial forms of strategic maneuvering. Consider, for ex-
173. It is not, however, beyond question. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47
STAN. L. REv. 633, 655-66 (1995) ("Although there may be good reasons to worry about the
distorting effects of uninformed speculation, there may be equally good reasons to worry
about the distorting effects of decisionmaking overinformed by the grip of a particular
instance.").
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ample, form-based strategic voting designed to forge a majority-
opinion coalition. A Justice must construct a ranking of rules on
the merits, assess the importance of solidarity in the context of the
case, and then compare the strength of the two vectors. This latter
comparison is no more or less "grounded" in the underlying case
than the comparison of MPEs across two cases is grounded in the
vote-trading scenario.
Perhaps a slightly different concern animates the comparative
competence objection. One might argue that the acceptance of
vote trading as a legitimate practice will lead Justices to shift the
way they approach adjudication in all contexts, involving vote trad-
ing or not. Perhaps consideration of potential vote trades will, over
a period of time, encourage Justices to focus their attention more
and more on the forward-looking law-improvement aspect of adju-
dication and less and less on the backwards-looking case-deciding
function. In other words, the more Justices start thinking about ad-
judication in terms of optimal rulemaking, a mental perspective fa-
cilitated by the constant search for potential gains from trade, the
more they will become emboldened to make less case-tethered and
context-disciplined decisions generally. This, again, moves them
away from their arena of special rulemaking competence.
This feared transformation is certainly not fanciful; indeed,
some might think Justices are already prone to the disease of imag-
ining themselves as unconstrained lawmakers and thinking about
litigants as inconvenient obstacles. But neither is the transforma-
tion inevitable. Surely one can imagine that, even as Justices self-
consciously engage in vote trading, they also remind themselves of
the importance of self-disciplined focus on case contexts, facts, and
parties. The question becomes whether, as a prophylactic measure,
a norm against vote trading should be articulated and internalized
to forestall the risk of a concomitant shift in the Justice's self-
understood job description. In my view, the prophylactic seems un-
necessary, but I recognize this is a subjective and speculative
judgment.
d. The Complementary Task Objection. The comparative com-
petence objection presumed that, in contradistinction to legislative
bodies, courts are better at contextual rather than abstract lawmak-
ing. But even if one believes that courts can engage in abstract law-
making as competently as can legislatures (in other words,
dismissing the assertion of legislative superiority due to institutional
design), one might still not want courts to do so. Perhaps there is a
virtue in having two different institutions engage in two different
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but complementary types of rulemaking - one taking a broad, pro-
spective view and the other taking a narrow, case-centered view.
One might differentiate between legislative and judicial law-
making in two distinct but related respects. First, leaving compara-
tive competencies aside, it might be desirable to have one
governmental institution make abstract judgments and another
make contextualized ones. Second, it might be desirable to have
one make global determinations about large areas of the law, and
have the second make focused decisions about narrow aspects of
the law viewed in isolation from one another, in essence "un-
bundling" the global package.174
Optimal rulemaking is difficult, and both courts and legislatures
can make mistakes. But, this argument continues, the likelihood of
ultimate error might be reduced if problems are approached from
two different perspectives. If judges act too much like legislatures
in the sense of making abstract and global decisions, then society
loses a unique benefit of a dual set of complementary lawmaking
functions.
Much of my assessment of the comparative competence objec-
tion applies here as well. It is unclear whether, to any appreciable
extent, an accepted practice of vote trading would lead Justices to
focus any less on the contexts and applications of alternative rules
in each of the two involved cases. And while it is true that vote
trading involves "bundling" two rules together for packaged consid-
eration, this notion is not unique to this practice. As explained ear-
lier, Justice Solo essentially considers two or more rules or rule
applications together whenever she invokes a relational judgment
criterion in resolving the Instant Case.175 Moreover, a trading
Justice still considers the desirability of each rule in isolation,
before concluding that a trade will result in an overall improvement
of the law.
Of course, the "overall" here means that each trading Justice is
willing to sacrifice optimality in one particularized, local realm of
law in exchange for improving another. One might still therefore
object that vote trading is inconsistent with an institutional teleol-
ogy of optimizing local responses to discrete issues, in juxtaposition
174. Legislatures frequently consider various issues together in single bills, either in an
effort to deal comprehensively with an issue or as a result of logrolling. One might want an
independent body, when addressing these issues, to separate particular parts of laws from
each other and particular applications of laws from each other.
175. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text; see also note 34 (noting that relational
criteria can generate multiple equilibria in rule optimization, where Justice Solo is perfectly
indifferent between two sets of complements).
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to a legislative focus on optimizing the big picture. But this objec-
tion begs an important question concerning how one defines "local"
law improvement. Consider the vote-trading exemplar. While
Justice Wapner views the move from R1 to R2 in Case Search as a
sacrifice, Justice Judy views the same move as an improvement.
From the Court's collective perspective, then, whether the vote
trade worsens or improves the Fourth Amendment rule presents a
difficult question. The answer ultimately turns on whether one
should count each Justice's comparative judgment equally (in which
case more Justices than not view the move from R1 to R2 as wors-
ening the local rule), or should weight their intensity of conviction
(in which case Judy's conviction of rule improvement may outweigh
Wapner's concession of rule sacrifice). I consider this aggregation
quandary in secion IHl.B.3. If one views the weighted-intensity ap-
proach as appropriate, then vote trading appears to improve both
local rules at issue. If so, then the practice does not eradicate the
benefits of having two separate lawmaking institutions make law at
different levels, wholesale and retail.
B. Accuracy Through Pure Redundancy
Section II.A assumed a minimalist teleology for multimember
courts, and explored how and when certain norms traditionally
thought to govern solo decisionmaking might prohibit Justices from
engaging in vote trades or other strategic maneuvers. This section
and the two that follow approach strategic voting from the top
down, considering whether particular conceptions of the teleology
of multimember adjudication might argue against these practices.
Here I posit that the basic purpose of multiplicity is to enhance the
accuracy of the Court's collective product.
1. The Redundancy Theorem
It is conventionally assumed that at least one, if not the central,
purpose for multimembership on an appellate court is to enhance
the accuracy of the collective product. The motivating premise is
that judges reach divergent answers to legal questions because of
human error; even good judges sometimes make mistakes.
On a single-judge court, every error of the sole judge translates
directly into an error of the court with case-disposition and rule-
precedential significance. On a collegial court, however, redun-
dancy within a majority-rule regime minimizes the impact of indi-
vidual judgment errors on the Court's output. Indeed, the more
judges there are, the more likely the majority-winning position will
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be correct. An intuitive proof of this axiom is quite simple. If there
are three judges choosing between rules A and B, the court will
reach the "correct" result (let's say A) even if one judge errs and
chooses B. If there are five judges, the court will reach the correct
result even if two judges err and choose B. And so on. Rigorous
mathematical models lead to the more refined conclusion:
It will . . . be true for a fixed number N of judges that as the
probability of each judge's reaching a correct decision increases, the
probability of the panel's arriving at a correct decision also increases.
Moreover, if each judge is more likely than not to reach a correct
decision, then, as N increases, the probability of the panel's reaching a
correct decision also increases. 176
This phenomenon might be called the "theorem of redundancy the-
orem": multiplicity with majority rule enhances the likelihood of
group accuracy by overwhelming individual errors.
2. The Redundancy Theorem Applied
a. A Sacrosanct-Majority Principle. Because Justices occasion-
ally confront multiple rather than binary alternatives in a given
case, the definition of an "accurate" group decision is somewhat
ambiguous. Obviously, if the Justices confront a binary choice be-
tween A and B, the position supported by majority rule is properly
deemed "accurate" because the redundancy theorem makes it more
likely to be so than the option receiving minority support. If the
Justices confront multiple options A... n and a majority embraces
a single option, say A, then the redundancy theorem still supports
the accuracy of that collective choice.177 Thus, once a majority of
the Justices' sincere views converge on a decision, that majority-
176. Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 18, at 99. For proof, see id. at 97-99, and sources
cited in id. at 98 n.20. See also I.J. Good & Gordon TIlock, Judicial Errors and a Proposal
for Reform, 13 J. LEGAL S=-uD. 289, 291-94 (1984).
The basic model assumes that, on average, each Justice on the Court is more likely than
not to reach the "best answer" to every legal question. Even if different Justices have varying
degrees of probability of reaching the correct answer, the probability of the group majority
being correct still increases as the group gets larger so long as the average accuracy rate
exceeds 50%. See Bernard Grofman & Scott L. Feld, Rousseau's General WilL A
Condorcetian Perspective, 82 AM. POL Sci. Rnv. 567, 570 (1988). Note that while redun-
dancy with majority vote enhances accuracy, depending on the vote, it does not come close to
guaranteeing it. See, e.g., Good & MTulock, supra, at 293-94 (noting that for example, under a
certain set of assumptions, with a 5-4 vote "the probability that the Court's decision is wrong
is at least 37 percent").
177. Because A receives more votes than the combined sum of its competitors, A is more
likely accurate than not-A, let alone than any individual competitor.
When judgments can be issued in terms of numerical values, then individuals' answers
need not be identical for their choices to "converge" on a single choice through an arithmetic
mean. Consider judges at an Olympics diving event, each of whom scores each dive on a 1-10
point scale based solely on her sincere assessment of the dive. Suppose there are five judges,
and each dive is scored according to the mean of the individual scores, e.g., 9.25. This tally,
August 19991 2363
HeinOnline  -- 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2363 1998-1999
Michigan Law Review
supported decision can be deemed "accurate." Any strategic ma-
neuver that will guide the Court to a different collective choice is
inconsistent with this collegial teleology. This "sacrosanct-majority
principle" constrains every type of strategic maneuver in certain
contexts.
Applied to vote trading, this principle rules out any trade that
would undermine a majority position in either case. Thus the vote-
trading exemplar would be excluded, since there existed a pretrade
majority-opinion coalition in both Cases Search and Cruel. But this
is not always true; depending on the pretrade pattern of sincere vot-
ing, a trade may not undermine any sincere-majority positions.178
The same constraint governs unilateral strategic maneuvering,
but its application is more nuanced. Consider the Craig I scenario,
which supposed that, had Brennan voted sincerely for his R1 strict
scrutiny, the Court would have remained split into three minority
factions supporting different rules. By voting strategically for his
R2, Brennan created a majority for intermediate scrutiny without
undermining a sincere-majority position for any rule. The majority-
sacrosanct principle does not bar this maneuver.
The Craig II scenario is trickier. That scenario supposed that,
had Brennan voted sincerely for his R1 strict scrutiny, Justice
Powell would have provided a fifth vote for rational basis scrutiny
because he was strongly form-driven to forge a majority-opinion co-
alition. Prior to Brennan's gambit a majority coalition supporting
his R1 intermediate scrutiny was not a feasible alternative, and
Powell preferred to build a majority coalition for rational basis re-
view than to vote sincerely and splinter the Court. But Brennan's
strategic vote for intermediate scrutiny enabled Powell to support
that rule as well and to forge a majority coalition for his sincerely
preferred position. Brennan's strategic gambit therefore shifted the
collective outcome from a majority coalition for rational basis scru-
despite an arguably artificial convergence, is more likely to be an accurate collective judg-
ment of the dive than is any other.
Sometimes judges may likewise select from a set of numerical choices arrayed along a
spectrum, for example, the determination of compensation awards in civil cases, or fines and
imprisonment terms in criminal cases. But these types of choices are rarely presented to
multimember panels; usually such decisions are left to single-judge trial courts. For an in-
triguing exploration of strategic voting opportunities in such rare contexts, see Omri
Ben-Shahar, Strategic Behavior in Judicial Panels (June 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
178. For example, suppose that sincere voting in both Cases Search and Cruel leads to
three minority factions supporting a left view, a middle view, and a right view. Members of
the left faction in Case Search might agree with members of the right faction in Case Cruel to
vote for the middle in both cases. This trade would create a posttrade majority for the mid-
dle position in both cases, without undermining a sincere-majority position in either.
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tiny to a majority coalition for intermediate review. However, since
Justice Powell actually preferred the second outcome to the first, it
is dubious whether the apparent sincere majority for rationality re-
view (including Powell's begrudging vote) should be considered
sacrosanct under the redundancy rationale. In my view, it is diffi-
cult to say that either of the two Craig scenarios is barred by the
sacrosanct-majority principle.
The sacrosanct-majority principle also informs the application of
the disposition-constraint principle discussed in section III.A.1.
That principle posited that strategic voting should not alter the sin-
cere disposition in a case, but was ambiguous as to whether the dis-
position to be considered fixed should be the maneuvering Justice's
own sincere disposition or the Court's collective-sincere disposition.
The pure redundancy model suggests that the latter should control,
because it explains why the Court's collective-sincere disposition is
more likely to be accurate than the Justice's personal disposition.179
Finally, the sacrosanct-majority principle does not severely con-
strain form-driven maneuvers. By definition, insincere voting to
construct a majority-disposition or majority-opinion coalition does
not undermine a preexisting majority position. The principle would
constrain insincere voting to construct a unanimous-opinion coali-
tion only in the extreme case in which the unanimous agreement
would diverge from a sincere-majority position.180
b. Further Possible Extensions. If sincere voting would produce
no majority winner but would produce a plurality-supported posi-
tion, an interesting ambiguity results. In one sense, the redundancy
theorem does not privilege the plurality position because a majority
of the Justices thought this position wrong. But in another sense,
the plurality position is still more likely than any other option to be
accurate. 181 If one takes the latter perspective and holds that plu-
rality positions should be privileged as "accurate," then the redun-
dancy model places even further constraints on strategic voting.
Specifically, a sacrosanct-plurality principle would hold that strate-
gic voting cannot undermine a sincere plurality by creating a trump-
ing majority for any competing alternative.182
179. This conclusion follows as well from each of the other two collegial models opera-
tionalizing the teleology of accuracy, discussed in infra sections III.B.3 and III.C.
180. See supra note 72.
181. See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 18, at 99.
182. Strategic voting that converts the sincere-plurality into a winning majority position
is, of course, acceptable.
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To illustrate, if sincere voting produces a 4-3-2 split over rules A,
B, and C, respectively, then Rule A should be considered privi-
leged. The pure redundancy model permits a vote trade with an-
other case if it forges a majority for A, but not if it creates a
majority for B or C. Similarly, the model permits a unilateral stra-
tegic maneuver creating a majority for rule A, but not for either B
or C.183 Finally, the sacrosanct-plurality principle constrains form-
driven strategic voting more than did the sacrosanct-majority prin-
ciple. Justices may vote strategically in order to forge a majority or
larger opinion coalition for A, but not for either B or C. Relatedly,
if the sincere vote creates three minority factions for different dis-
positions, Justices may avert a deadlock by switching to outcome A,
but not B or C. Note that this constraint on form-driven maneuvers
is nontrivial, since as explained earlier it is not inevitable that coali-
tions would naturally form around the plurality disposition and thus
render the constraint irrelevant.'8 4
If the pattern of sincere votes fails to produce either a majority
or plurality winner, there is no convergence on an outcome that the
redundancy theorem privileges as "accurate." Nonetheless, pre-
serving a spectrum of top-ranked positions through a ubiquitous
sincere-voting requirement might be lauded on various grounds. It
would enable litigants to predict better how the Justices individually
(and thus the Court collectively) will approach related issues in fu-
ture cases. 8 5 Moreover, the public's ability to "count heads" to de-
termine the true weight of judicial opinion on a given matter may
strongly influence the public's own perception of the legal princi-
ples at stake.'8 6 Deviations from sincere positions obscure such
signals.
183. This conclusion holds whether some sincere supporters of A shifted to B or C, or
whether some sincere supporters of B or C shifted to the other.
184. The point of convergence depends on the Justices' rankings. It is certainly plausible
that the original supporters of rules (or outcomes) B and C would converge on one of those
two rules (or outcomes) and leave the original plurality winner in the minority position.
185. See supra note 75.
186. Sometimes the Justices themselves use head counting as a means of supporting their
positions. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 912 n.1 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In the last 19 years, 15 Justices have confronted
the basic issue presented in Roe v. Wade, 413 U.S. 113 (1973). Of those, 11 have voted as the
majority does today .... Only four - all of whom happen to be on the Court today - have
reached the opposite conclusion."); see also Meredith Kolsky, Note, Justice William Johnson
and the History of the Supreme Court Dissent, 83 GEo. L.J. 2069, 2085 (1995) ("[Kjnowing
the number of Justices who dissent from an opinion and how they disagree will inform peo-
ple's views about the legitimacy and force of the opinion."). Such revelations are meaningful
only if there is good reason to think that the articulated positions are sincere.
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One might still permit Justices to vote strategically in minor de-
grees, such that the degree of obscurity is low. I think such a bal-
ance underlies some scholars' suggestions that Justices may vote
insincerely so long as they do not "materially" or "significantly"
misstate their true views.187 This is obviously a fuzzy constraint. In
the Craig hypothetical, for example, is moving from strict to inter-
mediate scrutiny a material deviation? Does that depend on how
many hypothesized Future Cases the two rules would decide differ-
ently, or should materiality be defined in some other manner?
Compared to other constraints generated by the pure redundancy
model, this constraint's application is far more subjective.
Even leaving this last extension aside, one might plausibly argue
that the model's sacrosanct-majority and sacrosanct-plurality princi-
ples justify a prophylactic rule barring all strategic maneuvers. This
is because, at the time one or more Justices consider a strategic ma-
neuver, she may not know how a purely sincere vote would come
out, and thus not know for sure whether her strategic gambit would
undermine a majority or plurality winner.'88 The cost of such a pro-
phylactic rule is the loss of some law-improving maneuvers that
would not, in hindsight, have actually steered the Court away from
a collectively accurate determination.
3. Questioning the Redundancy Premise: The Propriety of
Intensity Weighting
The pure redundancy model described above aggregates indi-
vidual judgments into a collective one through a specific mecha-
nism: each Justice's vote in a given case counts the same, and each
Justice must vote once.189 Informally, of course, a Justice can al-
ways underweight his own vote by deferring to a colleague whose
judgment seems more sure or.who cares more about the issue.190
187. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 47, at 743 n.54 ("Perhaps here, and elsewhere, the
[candor] restraint should require that the judge not materially mislead the reader.").
188. In the vote-trading exemplar, for example, Justices Wapner and Judy may recognize
the trading opportunity across Cases Search and Cruel and begin negotiating even before it is
clear whether or not the final postdeliberative sincere-collective vote in either case would
generate a majority-backed outcome.
189. There appears to be an unwritten convention that, unless recused, a Justice may not
vote to "abstain" on grounds of either incertitude or equipoise.
190. See, e.g., PostmNR, supra note 4, at 123 (noting that on a three-judge panel if "one
judge has a strong opinion on the proper outcome of the case ... the other judges, if not
terribly interested in the case, may simply cast their vote with the 'opinionated' judge"); cf.
PERRY, supra note 81, at 169 ("[I]f three Justices feel strongly that cert. should be granted,
sometimes I will give a fourth vote. I will say that if you all feel that strongly, I will vote with
you on that." (quoting an unnamed Supreme Court Justice discussing the cert. petition pro-
cess) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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But the model officially ignores the fact that Justices may have dif-
ferent strengths of conviction or degrees of certitude, and a Justice
who is confident that R1 is much better than R2 will be perfectly
counterbalanced by a colleague who hesitantly believes that R2 is
barely better than R1. Assuming that votes should be equally
weighted, vote trading violates simple majority rule and thus under-
mines the supposed virtue of pure redundancy in improving collec-
tive accuracy.
The premise that Justices' votes should be equally weighted,
however, has been assumed rather than expressly defended. One
might posit instead that group accuracy is enhanced when the
Justices' votes are differentially weighted to reflect varying
strengths of conviction and certitude. This alternative premise ar-
guably blunts the pure redundancy objection to vote trading; in-
deed, this premise actually provides an affirmative justification for
strategic behavior that reveals comparative intensities in the Instant
Case.
Let me be clear: I am not talking about intensities of prefer-
ence, intensities of feeling, or of other such variables sometimes in-
voked to justify intensity-sensitive aggregation schemes in political
or economic spheres. This adjudicatory model focuses exclusively
on a Justice's comparative intensities of judgment about the right-
ness of a legal answer. In some cases, a Justice's intrinsic and rela-
tional criteria will lead her to confidently perceive one rule as
significantly superior to its competitors, and in other cases they will
make her unsure how to rank two rules that appear in virtual
equipoise. 191
While perhaps the notion of intensity-sensitive calculations is
less familiar in the context of judgments than preferences, the no-
tion is certainly coherent. To be sure, such calculations seem un-
helpful in contexts where judges' certitude and convictions about
error are unlikely to vary much. Suppose three basketball referees
are asked whether a potentially game-winning shot was launched
before time expired. If all three had an equal vantage point, it is
difficult to see why their individual judgments should be weighted
unequally: their judgments are equally credible and they perceive
the same stakes. But now suppose referee Amanda had a signifi-
191. In his study of the certiorari-granting process, H.W. Perry confirmed the general
proposition that Justices vary in their degrees of conviction: "Each Justice seems to have
certain areas, large and small, where he feels strongly about how doctrine should proceed or,
for some reason, cares strongly about the outcome of a particular case. It may well be some-
thing about which the rest of the brethren are dispassionate." PERRY, supra note 81, at 280.
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cantly greater vantage point such that she was absolutely certain of
the right answer, and referees Betty and Charlie were both uncer-
tain. Would it not make sense for Amanda's judgment to have
greater sway in the collective decision?192
And consider situations in which judges differ not in certitude
but in conviction about error magnitudes. Suppose NASA plans a
moon landing and asks three astronomers to determine the optimal
rocket trajectory. Astronomers Amanda and Betty say, "The right
answer is X, but if you instead use Y the rocket would miss the
target by only a mile, and that does not threaten the mission." As-
tronomer Charlie says, "The right answer. is Y, but if you instead
use X as Amanda and Betty suggest, the rocket would fly past the
moon entirely." Given these judgments and accompanying magni-
tudes of perceived error, couldn't common sense justify choosing Y
over X even though the majority thinks X is a slightly better
answer?
The question remains, of course, whether intensity sensitivity is
a desirable way to measure accuracy in the judicial context. Some
scholars have suggested that where issues of justice are concerned,
equally weighted voting seems appropriate because, out of fairness,
no person's views of justice ought to count for more than her neigh-
bor's.193 But the fairness rationale seems to stem from democratic
impulses concerning questions of self-government, and even in that
realm, the rationale is subject to question.194 It is not clear that
such a fairness rationale applies to courts, at least if one views
Justices as trying to identify accurate judgments rather than repre-
sentative ones. At the very least, rejection of judicial intensity
weighting on this ground rests on a controvertible proposition that
some democratic criterion has a role to play in judicial decision-
making. If one focuses solely on group accuracy, however, then
weighted-intensity voting has much to commend it.
Of course, as political scientists and economists have reported in
other contexts, comparative intensities are difficult if not impossible
to measure directly. Theorists have proposed various theoretical
192. Which is what actually happens in professional basketball: a referee with a clearer
vantage point will often "overrule" her colleagues if they are less sure of their judgment.
193. See, e.g., Pildes & Anderson, supra note 32, at 2133-34 (describing this view).
194. See Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HAgv. L. REv.
434 (1998) (direct democracy distorts popular input by precluding the expression of relative
priorities among issues); Jeremy Waldron, Legislation, Authority, and Voting, 84 GEo. LJ.
2185, 2211 (1996) (noting that while "according equal weight... to individual votes is a way
of respecting persons," it does not follow that "either fairness or equal respect for persons
requires majority decision").
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ways in which to measure group members' relative intensities over
a specific decision, but all are subject in different ways to applica-
tion difficulties. 195 The relevant question here is whether certain
forms of strategic voting provide a plausible way of detecting and
incorporating comparative individual intensities into a collective
judgment of accuracy.
Consider bilateral vote trading first. A single trade alone, such
as the vote-trading exemplar involving Cases Search and Cruel, is
not a trustworthy barometer for the Justices' intensities in each of
those cases.196 But a rich market for trades should (assuming away
significant transaction costs) result in a reasonable aggregation of
weighted intensities in every case.197 Thus the collegial teleology of
accuracy, coupled with the specific premises of the weighted-
intensity model, suggest that explicit vote trading is an appropriate
195. For a general description of several "positional" methods of voting taking relative
intensities into account, see MUELLER, supra note 65, at 113-22; RIKER, supra note 53, at 81-
94. Different methods measure relative intensities differently, however, and self-reporting
methods can generate biases and strategic manipulation. See Pildes & Anderson, supra note
32, at 2134.
196. We cannot be sure that the aggregate intensities of Case Search's posttrade majority
exceed the aggregate intensities of the posttrade minority. Suppose the pretrade lineup was
Wapner plus A, B, C, & D for the criminal defendant, and Judy plus X, Y, & Z for the State.
The posttrade line-up is A, B, C, & D for the defendant and Wapner, Judy, plus X, Y, & Z for
the State (who now wins). It is conceivable that A, B, C, & D are very certain the posttrade
Court is making a big mistake, and X, Y, & Z are both unsure and ambivalent. Thus, even
after the trade, the aggregate intensities supporting the losing criminal defendant might still
outweigh the aggregate intensities supporting the winning State.
197. Consider again the previous example in supra note 196. In a rich market, one or
more of A, B, C, & D would have been motivated and likely able to strike a deal with one or
more of X, Y, & Z to trade this case back to the criminal defendant in exchange for a recipro-
cal trade, such that the result in this case would in fact mirror the hypothesized relative
intensities among the Justices.
Some political science literature suggests that, under certain circumstances, vote trading
to promote preference satisfaction can reduce overall group utility. See, e.g., William H.
Riker & Steven J. Brains, The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67 AM. Pot. Sci. REv. 1235 (1973).
See generally Thomas Stratmann, Logrolling, in PERSPEcrivEs ON PuaLIC CHOICE THEORY
322 (Dennis Mueller ed., 1997); id. at 322 ("Today, no consensus exists in the normative
public choice literature as to whether logrolling is on net welfare enhancing or welfare reduc-
ing ... ."); Hasen, supra note 157, at 18-22. One important aspect of this analysis - whether
mutual trading gains perceived by legislators impose welfare-reducing externalities on third
parties - is inapplicable to the judicial context, where the currency of trade is legal principle
rather than preference satisfaction and thus the same externality does not arise. Still, this
literature at least raises the question (beyond my capacity to answer here) whether judicial
vote trading might still lead some cases to be decided suboptimaliy, as measured by the sin-
cere intensities of the Justices. Of course, the prevailing regime of equally weighted voting
also will occasionally produce this result. It is difficult to imagine how one could measure
whether a trading regime would, on balance, produce more accurate decisions taking inten-
sity into account.
Even if this objection provides a persuasive contemporary policy argument against vote
trading, it cannot account for the longstanding intuitive antitrading norm. Surely many
judges and scholars denouncing vote trading have been unaware of this relatively recent, and
still somewhat contested, finding of political scientists. Rather, their intuitive objection nec-
essarily rests on a more accessible foundation.
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means of enabling Justices to express their relative intensities en
route to enhancing the accuracy of their collective judgment in any
given case.
Tacit vote trading is based on the initiating Justice's assumption
that she will later receive a reciprocal insincere joinder that results,
from her perspective, in overall law improvement. Given the lack
of express bargaining, however, there is some chance of miscalcula-
tion. Perhaps the recipient of her joinder in the Instant Case will
reciprocate on an issue that, in hindsight, she will view as a smaller
concession than the one she initially gave. If this happens too fre-
quently, of course, she will likely refrain from tacit trading in the
future. One would expect, therefore, that while some individual in-
formal trades may turn out not to be mutually beneficial, a general
regime of tacit trading would flourish only if on the whole Justices
believe it reasonably reflects their relative intensities over issues.
Whether the weighted-intensity model supports unilateral ma-
neuvers such as the Craig hypothetical is a more difficult question.
Justice Brennan's gambit reflects the fact that, according to his
MPE assessment, he feels so strongly that his R3 rationality review
is wrong that he is willing to deviate from his R1 and support R2 in
an effort to avert the strongly disfavored outcome. The resulting
coalition for intermediate scrutiny thus reflects, in part, the strength
of his anti-R3 conviction. Because this move does not reflect a
complete market, it is more difficult to claim that the resulting ma-
jority coalition more strongly supports R2 in the aggregate than the
now-dissenting faction supports R3 in the aggregate. However,
given the default pressures on Justices to vote sincerely, perhaps we
might reasonably assume that a Justice will engage in unilateral
strategic maneuvering only if the issue or outcome really matters to
him. If so, we might reasonably assume that when such maneuver-
ing occurs, the resulting coalition does roughly reflect the Justices'
aggregate intensities of judgment. Even so, perhaps counterintui-
tively, the weighted-intensity model provides a firmer foundation
for bilateral than unilateral strategic voting.
Acceptance of intensity weighting would provide further reason
to downplay the strength of the commodification objection to vote
trading, because it provides an alternative - and innocuous - "ex-
pressive" explanation of the practice. As discussed previously, one
might plausibly fear that an important ideal of adjudication would
be undermined if judgments were viewed as marketable commodi-
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ties.198 But consider the expressive difference between these two
explanations: (1) "Five of us Justices really think the criminal de-
fendant should win, but the Court hereby rules against her because
one of us sacrificed this case in order to secure a better decision in
another one;" and (2) "Five of us Justices really think the criminal
defendant should win, but the Court hereby rules against her
because those five are both unsure and ambivalent, and the other
four Justices are certain that she should clearly lose." While the
former explanation of the defendant's loss sounds unfocused and
somewhat arbitrary, the latter explanation sounds both case-
focused and reasoned. If vote trading comes to be perceived as a
means of assessing comparative intensities in individual cases rather
than merely as a means for improving rule packages across cases,
any fear that trading will impute undesirable market norms into the
adjudicatory process might largely dissipate.
My point here is not so much to defend vote trading outright
because of its usefulness in assessing comparative intensities of
judgment. Rather, I mean merely to question any simplistic appli-
cation of the pure redundancy model to prohibit this strategic prac-
tice. The intuitive notion that vote trading undermines the accuracy
of collective decisions by violating the sacrosanct-majority principle
(and perhaps other extended principles as well) rests on an unde-
fended premise that intensity should not count. At the very least,
before strategic voting is rejected on this basis, the long-standing
debate about intensity-weighting in the legislative arena must be
reformulated and engaged in the judicial arena.
C. Accuracy Through Deliberative Reasoning
This "deliberative reasoning" model builds on the assumption
that redundancy enhances accuracy. This model employs the famil-
iar practice of equally weighting voting, but adds a new premise:
that improving the process of collegial deliberation will enhance the
accuracy of individual and hence group decisionmaking. The model
thus provides a teleological argument in favor of strategic behavior
that enhances deliberative reasoning and against strategic behavior
antithetical to such reasoning.
As explained earlier, collegial deliberation can influence and
improve Justices' decisionmaking, whether judgments are viewed as
largely autonomously or collectively derived. 199 One can plausibly
198. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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link the contribution of deliberation to the culture and environment
within which deliberation takes place.20 0 To the extent a Justice
feels well-treated and respected by his colleagues, he may be more
open to engaging in dialogue, hearing new ideas, carefully consider-
ing well-founded criticisms, and perhaps viewing the entire reason-
ing process as collective rather than individualistic.
When Justices strategically deviate from their own sincere views
in deference to their colleagues, they help to promote an internal
culture of congeniality that enables collegial deliberation to flour-
ish. For example, a general practice of minor accommodation, of
reciprocal "going-along" voting, might facilitate feelings of good
will which then promotes decisionmaking accuracy through im-
proved deliberation.20 1
Of course, there is a tradeoff: long-run improvements in the de-
liberative process are purchased at the cost of deviations from im-
mediate accuracy. One plausible balance would permit Justices to
deviate from their sincere views only in minor degrees; thus, for
example, unilateral acts of strategic voting to build coalitions
through mutual deference would generally be permitted.2°2
While the teleology of deliberative reasoning thus might wel-
come strategic maneuvers that reinforce cooperative and intellec-
tual engagement, the same teleology argues against strategic
maneuvers whose effect or spirit foils the deliberative enterprise.
On this basis, one might challenge explicit vote trading in various
respects.
First, one might worry that, as vote trading becomes widely ac-
cepted, this means of deciding cases might come to dominate. Per-
haps a Justice would spend less time trying to persuade his
colleagues to see things his way in the Instant Case if he instead
could try to circumvent any opposition through trading. I doubt
this would have any more than a marginal effect on the quantity of
200. Of course, a cordial working environment might be desirable for purely social rea-
sons. But I do not consider here the propriety of strategic behavior designed to maintain an
amicable environment for its own sake, any more than to secure other personal agendas for
their own sakes. See supra note 46.
201. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 101, at 524 ("Colleagues who are perennially annoyed and
irritated with one another have difficulty listening respectfully and openmindedly to each
other; they have little incentive to seek a middle ground."); id. at 527 (concluding that judges
"can do much to keep personal friction to a minimum," including avoiding unnecessary dis-
sents); cf. Shapiro, supra note 47, at 743 n.54 ("[It is well understood that the interests of
courtesy (and reciprocity) call for a certain amount of deference.").
202. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 47.
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deliberation, since persuasion is always better than dealmaking.203
But, if persuasion is even theoretically unnecessary, perhaps the
character or zeal of deliberative engagement will be subtly im-
paired. A norm against vote trading might then be instrumentally
designed to "force" deliberation that might otherwise not occur.
Second, a regime in which explicit vote trading is commonplace
might engender an atmosphere of conflict and distrust rather than
cooperation and reciprocity. In the vote-trading exemplar, Justices
Wapner and Judy might view each other as respectfully accommo-
dating each other's views in one of the two cases, thus creating an
atmosphere of mutual respect. At the same time, however, (assum-
ing their colleagues detect the trade) Justices Wapner and Judy
would likely anger their four erstwhile partners in their sacrificed
case. Each of these partners might feel forsaken; she loses a case
she thought she was about to win, knowing that she was not "con-
sulted," let alone convinced, and that none of her like-minded col-
leagues was truly persuaded to abandon her position.
Relatedly, colleagues might view vote-trading Justices as trying
to enhance their comparative power in a given case, since as indi-
cated previously, trading operates to give extra weight to the trad-
ers' votes in their acquired cases (though reduced weight in their
sacrificed cases). 20 4 This perception might reinforce a competitive
rather than collaborative spirit.
Thus the teleology of deliberative reasoning provides a defense
for some accommodationist strategic maneuvers, but provides some
basis for opposing explicit vote trading. Its implications for other
strategic maneuvers are somewhat less clear. Tacit trading,
whereby one Justice joins an author's circulated opinion quickly
and uncritically notwithstanding sincere reservations in the hope
that the author will later reciprocate on another case, still operates
in effect to trade votes across cases. Nevertheless, because the af-
front to the nontrading Justices is both more subtle and difficult to
detect, it may not appreciably threaten a commitment to collabora-
tive discourse. Similarly, unilateral gambits such as the Craig hypo-
203. Both means of securing victories in the Instant Case, persuasion and trade negotia-
tion, take time and energy. When successful, however, persuasion leads to a complete victory
and negotiation leads to victory at the cost of a sacrificed case elsewhere.
204. Cf. PosrNER, supra note 4, at 125-26 (referring to vote trading as "power-
maximizing," though in the course of making a different claim). This point highlights the
ways in which various teleological arguments interconnect. If the Justices viewed intensity-
weighting as a proper aggregation mechanism for promoting accuracy, see supra section
II.B.3, then they would not likely view vote trading as "power-maximizing" in any deroga-
tory sense.
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thetical might be difficult for colleagues to detect. In any event,
such maneuvers are more easily perceived as accommodating and
deferential even though they are not actually so motivated. Where
one draws the line, therefore, turns on one's nuanced perspective of
both the importance and the delicacy of an ongoing commitment to
the enterprise of collaborative decisionmaking.
D. Moderation and Stability Through a Competitive Equilibrium
This model, unlike the previous two, does not presume any con-
ception of decisionmaking accuracy whose attainment is improved
through redundancy of views (whether equally or differentially
weighted). It merely acknowledges that different judges embrace
different jurisprudential paradigms, and hence different substantive
first principles and methodologies. Leaving aside any aspiration of
ultimate "accuracy," multiplicity can still serve a valuable purpose:
ensuring some moderation and stability of legal doctrine by gener-
ating a competitive equilibrium among Justices with opposing
views. Justices will push and pull one another, each trying to move
his colleagues toward his sincere position. Oppositional forces will
generate collective decisions that are, by and large, moderate and
stable. They will likely be moderate - in the sense of approximat-
ing the sincere views of the middle of the spectrum of views on the
Court2° 5 - because they will tend to be controlled by the median
Justice.20 6 They will also tend to be reasonably stable. Periodically,
Justices may change their sincere views, or be replaced by others
with different views. But the overall destabilizing effect of belief or
personnel changes is muted by multiplicity, precisely because indi-
vidual position shifts will not necessarily translate into collective
shifts. Thus multimembership might be viewed as serving a central-
izing and stabilizing function, even assuming away any effort to con-
verge on a uniquely "best" outcome.
All forms of strategic voting threaten to disrupt the competitive
equilibrium created by multiple sincere voters, leading to greater
radicalization and instability of legal doctrine. One might plausibly
argue, however, that explicit or tacit vote trading poses an apprecia-
bly greater threat than do unilateral maneuvers, and for this reason
vote trading alone is improper. The argument runs as follows.
205. The more the range of views represented is skewed as compared to the universe of
possible positions, the less "moderate" the middle will be appear. Many-would maintain that
both the Warren and Rehnquist Courts were skewed in this sense, although in different
directions.
206. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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First consider the effect of both form-driven and unilateral
content-driven strategic maneuvers on the moderation of collective
outcomes. As explained earlier, in theory both of these types of
maneuvers might lead to significant shifts away from the median
sincere position toward either extreme wing.207 In other words, de-
pending on relative conviction levels (as to both the importance of
coalition building and the merits), unilateral maneuvering could
generate many more "outlier" outcomes than would sincere voting.
However, observers have noted that most identifiable maneuvers
appear actually to involve marginal factions shifting, if not toward
the median, then at least not in a markedly extreme direction.2 08
Perhaps the best explanation - one consistent with the "attitudinal
model" 20 9 - is that Justices' judgments are quite ideologically in-
fluenced; ideological commitments tend to dominate over institu-
tional concerns, and they also limit the range of favorable content-
based maneuvers.210 If this is so, then not surprisingly unilateral
maneuvers would tend to generate substantively moderate
outcomes.
In comparison, one might worry that bilateral vote trading
would "marginalize" collective decisionmaking by moving more
outcomes towards an outlier rather than median position. It is the-
oretically easier for an outlier faction to draw a more median fac-
tion to it, simply by trading the median faction a victory in some
Other Case.211 But this concern can easily be exaggerated. The
most likely trades will be those in which a Justice moves the Court's
position to one that already enjoys strong-but-minority sincere sup-
207. See supra notes 66-68 & 72 and accompanying text (discussing form-driven shifts);
supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (discussing content-driven shifts).
208. Recall that no single Justice can, by insincerely positioning himself further out on a
wing, move the median of the Court that controls the disposition and (usually) the precedent.
See supra note 88. In this respect collegial adjudication is unlike, say, collegial judging of an
Olympic diving event where the collective output is determined by a numerical mean, and
therefore an outlier judge can unilaterally shift the mean by registering an extremely high or
extremely low score (which is why the highest and lowest scores are conventionally disre-
garded in calculating the mean). Rather, a single Justice can shift the Court's collective out-
put only through at least some degree of convergence with other Justice's positions. No
single Justice can take the Court in a direction lacking substantial support.
209. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 68.
211. Without trading, a median faction would be willing to move toward the margin only
if the perceived error of the suboptimal rule in the Instant Case were small, in comparison to
the institutional gains or the substantive gain from forestalling an ever worse merits outcome.
But with trading, a median faction can be encouraged to move toward the margin even if the
perceived error of the suboptimal rule in the Instant Case is large - so long as in return the
faction acquires a concession in the Other Case that cures an even larger perceived error.
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port (as in the vote-trading exemplar).212 While perhaps vote
trades might (more frequently than unilateral maneuvers) move the
Court away from its sincere median position, trading would still
tend to generate outcomes comfortably far from radical extremes.
Moreover, the fact that a trading Justice must publicly support (and
thus endure potential criticism for) what she believes is a subop-
timal rule in the sacrificed case will likely restrain her from straying
too far from her core set of legal principles.2 13 As with unilateral
maneuvers, then, it may well be that vote trading's theoretical bark
is worse than its actual bite with respect to marginalization of col-
lective outcomes.
A related concern is that, even if individual strategically shaped
decisions remain within a reasonable distance of the median posi-
tion, doctrine will develop erratically because the Court will occa-
sionally flip-flop back and forth on the same basic issue from one
side of the median to the other. This would most likely occur if the
Court is close to evenly divided on the issue, because then a single
trade might switch the collective result. For example, a conserva-
tive majority might control most Fourth Amendment decisions 5-4,
but periodically the liberal faction would acquire control over a
Fourth Amendment case via a vote trade sacrificing some other
case to the conservatives. Such oscillations would depend on the
mutually beneficial trades that happen to be available at the differ-
ent points in time given the Court's ever-changing docket 21 4 I
think this is a reasonable concern, though the force of the objection
is muted somewhat by the doctrine of stare decisis, which - if
taken seriously - should act as a brake on Justices' willingness to
engage in trades that would lead to disconcerting vacillations. 215
212. See supra note 178 (describing a median-promoting vote trade). In contrast, it
would be quite difficult for a single strategic-minded Justice to generate support for a truly
idiosyncratic outcome. She would have to negotiate a trade with at least four of her col-
leagues and offer each a concession of substantial value in order to convince them to support
her position.
213. See Stearns, supra note 163, at 1349-50 (arguing that because opinion publication
subjects judges to potential criticism for failure to abide by their own stated principles, "writ-
ten opinions discourage... vote trades").
214. As explained earlier, such oscillations would not be readily predictable even by
savvy Court watchers, given the difficulty of discerning each Justice's MPE assessment over
the range of cases available for trade. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
215. More technically, the relational judgment criterion of consistency should influence
the MPE assessment of any Justice considering whether to trade away her vote in the Instant
Case. The greater the break with the pattern of existing precedent, the greater the MPE of
the proposed rule and the more reluctant she should be to accept the terms of the trade.
Beyond the norm of consistency, fear of being criticized for ffip-flopping might dissuade
Justices from engaging in such strategic behavior. See Scalia, supra note 75, at 42 (stating that
Justices "cannot, without risk of public embarrassment, meander back and forth - today
providing the fifth vote for a disposition that rests upon one theory of law, and tomorrow
2377August 1999]
HeinOnline  -- 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2377 1998-1999
Michigan Law Review
And it is worth noting that the same theoretical propensity for peri-
odic flip-flopping inheres in legislative logrolling, given ever-
changing bargaining opportunities as the agenda fluctuates from
year to year. In practice, however, one finds more stability and
continuity than this concern might predict, at least on issues of ma-
jor concern. Again the distinction between vote trading and other
forms of strategic behavior may be one of degree, not kind.
Perhaps a more realistic concern is not so much ongoing vacilla-
tion within discrete realms of law, but a continual imbalance of judi-
cial influence over discrete realms. Suppose one group of Justices
has relatively strong convictions about free speech issues but weak
convictions about antitrust issues, and a second group of Justices
holds the opposite priorities. Vote trading would allow the former
group, in general, to dictate free speech doctrine and the latter
group, in general, to dictate antitrust doctrine. The development of
each doctrine could thus diverge in a sustained way from the equi-
librium position of the entire Court with respect to that particular
issue.
Whether such a prospect is troubling, of course, is a matter of
perspective and degree. Even leaving aside the rejoinder devel-
oped earlier that such divergence would reflect a plausible
intensity-based measurement of "group accuracy, ' 216 would dispro-
portionate factional influence over discrete issues be all that un-
precedented? For many different reasons (ranging from deference
to a colleague's expertise to saving one's resources for higher-
return cases), collegial judges sometimes permit one or a few mem-
bers to assert disproportionate control over particular doctrines.217
In the end it is undeniable that, as compared to a norm of sin-
cere voting, all forms of strategic behavior can (though they need
not) move the collective outcome away from the median sincere
position in the Instant Case and might generate erratic vacillations
around that median over a series of cases. And explicit or tacit vote
providing the fifth vote for a disposition that presumes the opposite"). Of course, if vote
trading became an accepted convention, then the likelihood and bite of such criticism would
dissipate.
216. See supra section II.B.3.
217. See supra note 190. Individual judges have often asserted disproportionate influence
over certain legal issues on their courts. For examples, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider
Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities
Fraud, 52 SMU L. REv. (forthcoming 1999) (noting the "widely shared assumption that Jus-
tice Powell received substantial deference from his colleagues" with respect to the develop-
ment of securities law); Margaret V. Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law of Securities
Regulation: The Creation of a Judicial Reputation, 50 SMU L. Rnv. 777 (1997) (exploring
Judge Friendly's disproportionate influence over his appellate court and the nation with re-
spect to the development of securities law).
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trading theoretically poses a greater threat than do unilateral ma-
neuvers, because the collective outcome bears even less of a neces-
sary connection to the pattern of sincere votes on the specific issue
in question. But whether these concerns are sufficient to justify a
norm against strategic voting - particularly one directly uniquely
at vote trading - is certainly not obvious.
IV. CONCLUSION
"The Court is something of a paradox - it is at once the whole
and its constituent parts. The very words 'the Court' mean simulta-
neously the entity and its members." 218 Appreciation of this para-
dox is reflected in an exciting explosion of political science
scholarship modelling judicial behavior, scholarship that both
predicts and tests for various forms of strategic or sophisticated
conduct, and also offers new conceptualizations of the relationship
between individual judges and their multimember courts. In partic-
ular, there is growing recognition that judicial behavior is not
shaped merely by ideological attitudes and conceptions of legal rea-
soning, but also by formal institutional structures and informal role
commitments.219 The question is not whether judges act in strategic
or sophisticated ways, meaning whether they consider the conse-
quences of their choices in light of the potential behavior of others.
The question, rather, is what institutional commitments and con-
ceptions shape and constrain judges' preferences and goals as they
interact with colleagues to construct decisions of the court. In
particular,
[B]argaining among the Justices is not merely a function of prefer-
ences plus an awareness of interactive effects; it is also an activity that
is constituted by an evolving set of normative institutional perspec-
tives. Because of these sorts of institutional effects the Justices inter-
nalize an understanding of whether such behavior is to be considered
professional, as well as an understanding of what forms of bargaining
are acceptable .... 220
218. Wdliam J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTNGs L.J. 427, 432 (1986).
219. See Howard Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton, Beyond Judicial Attitudes: Institutional
Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in Supimm COURT DECISION-MAING,
supra note 36, at 1, 1-7 (explaining recent efforts to supplement the "attitudinal model" with
more institutional approaches).
My inquiry about strategic voting has taken as given many existing formal and informal
rules, e.g., deliberation, majoritarian decisionmaking, no individual abstention vote, no col-
lective impasse default rule, and the influence of coalition size on precedential weight. Modi-
fying these and similar rules would generate somewhat different judicial behavior and
perhaps different normative questions.
220. Gillman, supra note 36, at 75-76.
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One apparent "rule of the game" 221 of collegial judging is that,
while certain forms of output-focused strategic behavior are ac-
cepted (even encouraged) and others are quietly tolerated, explicit
vote trading is disallowed. In theory, this observable but unwritten
code of conduct might reflect a widespread judgment that, in the
long term, vote trading is a counterproductive strategy for goal-
oriented judges on collegial courts.222 My strong sense, however, is
that judges (and scholars) believe vote trading is wrong, not just
unwise. But why?My conclusion here is that the answer is more complicated than
initial intuitions might suggest. While vote trading and other strate-
gic maneuvers can plausibly be viewed as furthering legitimate judi-
cial objectives, I have sketched a number of objections suggesting
that vote trading nevertheless constitutes improper judicial behav-
ior. But different objections rest on very distinct foundational as-
sumptions about the nature and purpose of collegial adjudication.
Moreover, some (though not all) objections logically entail that cer-
tain accepted strategic practices should be equally disapproved as
well. Finally, some objections apply to vote trading or other ma-
neuvers only in some contexts but not others, nuances not reflected
in current practice. My hope is that this inquiry will stimulate
deeper reflection about the "paradox" of collegial adjudication, and
perhaps assist judges in developing a more refined understanding of
the norms of their profession.
221. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
222. Cf. Gillman, supra note 36, at 71-72 (when discussing sophisticated rather than peer-
strategic behavior, noting that perhaps "the course of action that might best maximize the
interests of the Justices in the long run would be to act in a way that appeared principled
rather than strategic").
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